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"INEVITABLE" WAR: A PROBLEM IN THE CONTROL OF LONG-RANGE EXPECTATIONS

By HAROLD D. LASSWELL

BELIEF in the inevitability of World War III may well be a factor in bringing on that catastrophe. Certainly the way the crisis is expected to end will affect in some degree the course and outcome of the struggle between the Russian and non-Russian world. On the Soviet side there is dogmatic and unanimous assertion that world communism will "inevitably" triumph. The expectations prevailing in the other camp are strikingly different. In place of dogma and uniformity there are doubt, variety, and confusion. No single voice commands enough authority to speak for everyone, but there is extensive doubt of the "inevitable" spread and eventual triumph of the liberal outlook. Confidence in the inevitability of progress has been shaken, but the expectation of progress remains as a working hypothesis or at least as a declaration of faith, hope, and purpose. In other words, neither victory nor defeat of the liberal outlook is inevitable, and the shape of things to come depends in large measure on how the leaders of the liberal world shape them. Part of the shaping, if it is to be successful, will include the adoption of policies toward the Soviet Union which will modify Soviet expectations of inevitable progress through catastrophe. What are some of the practical means of accomplishing this end? If the non-Soviet world is to take practical steps, what modifications must be made in its own long-range expectations?

The official myth of the Russian elite is more explicit than a simple forecast of the inevitable triumph of world revolutionary communism in our historical period. War is alleged to be unavoidable because the enemies of the Soviet Union will be driven to attack the "Socialist Fatherland." Why will they make war? On account of "the inevitable collapse of capitalism." Faced by the danger of depression and harassed

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by the mounting anger of the unemployed, the elite of capitalist states will allegedly resort to a crusade against the worker's citadel. The whole world is in a civil war in which words like "peace" or "truce" are no more than tactical shams. The only limitation upon the exercise of power is lack of power. If the Red Army goes to the aid of a revolutionary party abroad, words like "aggressive" or "defensive" are beside the point, save as pawns in negotiation and propaganda. In the official line it is implied, though for understandable reasons not emphasized, that the defeat of the Soviet Union by a coalition of "counter-revolutionary imperialists" would not mean the final liquidation of the proletarian revolution. Such a defeat, however temporary, would condemn the world to years of unheard of and unnecessary misery.

The non-Soviet world has been making a reluctant and often confused transition from an earlier state of general confidence in peaceful progress. During the business century which set in after the quieting of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic uproar, the impression grew that whatever interfered with progress was "archaic." War, for instance, was archaic. When Marx and Engels were at work on the Communist Manifesto, Cobden was proclaiming the vision of One World through the inclusion of all peoples in One Big Market. Since whatever widened the market seemed good, "little wars," though deplored, were not always without a silver lining, especially when they opened the shutters of benighted peoples to the light of trade. As for socialism, it was viewed with some condescension. Was it not found among savage societies unquickened by the touch of progress? Could we not therefore think of it along with war as an "archaic" social institution doomed to melt as the sun of progress rose?

Instead of vanishing, war has grown more deadly. Instead of disappearing, socialism has emerged in large-scale modern economies. Under the pressure of these unanticipated developments, major assumptions of the world of capitalism and liberalism have had to be re-examined. The long-range expectation of "inevitable" progress, for example, has been re-edited in many quarters to push the time of realization into the far horizons of history. If the "inevitable" nature of progress is

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abandoned, there are currents of quietism, in which doctrines of the irredeemable evil of the "world" emerge from the shadows into which they were cast by the gas lights and neons of the business century.

But there are other and presumably stronger currents in which the decline and fall of "inevitability" is a challenge to impose human will upon the historical process, and to remove by force if necessary the enemies of progress toward freedom. And who and what are the principal enemies of freedom? The answer is ever more obvious in the non-Soviet world: the Soviet Union and all it stands for. Indeed, continues the reply, the only "inevitability" is a war that removes the colossal threat to progress embodied in the Soviet pole of a bipolarizing world.

When we look into the long- and middle-range expectations of the opposing camps in world politics, we are reminded of the point, so often lost sight of, that an important aim of state policy is the influencing of expectations about the shape of things to come. This is more than a weapon of the elite of one state or coalition in dealing with another state or coalition elite. Within states it is a weapon in conflicts among fractions of the ruling elite, and between the ruling elite and counter-elites. The decision-makers in the Soviet world are under no misapprehension about the important role of expectations, since they continue a protest movement which relied upon propaganda as it spread throughout the Western World before breaking through to power. By contrast, the decision-makers in the United States have taken our expectations for granted. For years it was nobody's official peacetime business to spread our special doctrines. The schools communicated the traditional perspective, less as an expression of planning than of the reigning ethos.

The present inquiry is concerned with one of the many sets of questions that arise in reference to middle- and long-range expectations. We are interested in the possible connection between these perspectives and the likelihood of war. In the Soviet Union, for instance, where the "inevitability" of war is part of the "infallible" doctrine of the ruling elite, does this expectation actually make for war, or is it a phraseology devoid

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of policy importance? If we conclude or assume that assertions of inevitability increase the likelihood of war, what can we say of the possibility of reducing this factor to impotency?[1] We particularly intend to consider the means open to the United States for altering the dangerous expectations current in the Soviet Union. This calls for the evaluation of what can be accomplished by the basic instruments of policy, namely force, diplomacy, economics, and propaganda. Since the possibility of acting upon the Soviet Union depends upon the perspectives which prevail in the non-Soviet world, we consider the likelihood that the appropriate middle- and long-range expectations will predominate in the United States and elsewhere outside the U.S.S.R.

I

The Presumption that Long-Range Expectations Count

The first question is whether long-range expectations are in fact significant factors in world politics. There are many lay and scientific opinions in favor of attaching serious importance to these expectations. The colloquial voice of common sense says that anybody has a better chance to win when he is confident of winning than when he thinks he is outclassed. Common sense also says that a competitor must avoid overconfidence. On both points the fable of the tortoise and the hare is instructive. The hare was too cocky. But the victory of the tortoise was no triumph of despair. The tortoise had the measure of the hare and saw a plodding chance to win.

Everyday experience gives us another clue to the effect of the expectations which we entertain about others. If we hear the rumor that X is hostile toward us, we may jump to the conclusion that his glance in our direction is contemptuous, and that he is conspiring against us. In our turn we may be aloof and distant, which confirms whatever suspicions have been aroused on the other side. The other party now looks wary and threatening, adding new fuel to our apprehensions. In this way a vicious spiral of interaction fans a spark into full antagonism. False expectations appear true when they set in motion a

[1] The point is not to be overlooked that assertions of the inevitability of peace can also make for war to the extent that aggression is invited.

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sequence of confirming acts. These "self-fulfilling prophecies" of everyday life are prototypes of what can happen on a grandiose and devastating scale.[2]

As a reminder of the importance of an optimistic outlook, Americans can recall the waves of confidence which at various times stimulated the growth of the nation. Carl Russell Fish characterized the generation which came into power about 1830 in these words:

> This enormous optimism was but newly becoming an American characteristic . . . . In matters of politics and economics Americans were nearly all millenarians, believing that they themselves would see the realization of human happiness; in religion the belief that this generation would with its own eyes, living, even see God, went far beyond the confines of the small sect who made that belief an article of creed.[3]

Historians of Western Europe usually take note of the influence of the expectation that 1000 A.D. would see the end of the world. G. C. Coulton writes of art:

> Here, as in almost every other field, we must go back again to the European Renaissance of about A. D. 1000. Something of this revival was due to the fact that man had lived in constant expectation of Christ's second coming, an expectation which was frequently renewed by the occurrence of what seemed peculiarly significant events or dates. The Apocalypse, with the emphasis which it laid upon the thousand-year long Reign of the Saints, focused men's minds naturally upon that year 1000.[4]

Thus history and science agree in attaching weight to the part played by sanguine or despondent expectations about the future of the self, whether the self in question is composed of those who identify with a nation, a civilization, a social class, or an individual.[5]

[2] Robert K. Merton discusses "The Self-fulfilling Prophecy" in *The Antioch Review*, Summer, 1948.

[3] *The Rise of the Common Man, 1830-1850*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, pp. 3-4.

[4] *Medieval Panorama; The English Scene from Conquest to Reformation*, New York, Macmillan, 1944, p. 558. One need not accept Arnold Toynbee's metronome theory of regularly recurring periods in the history of civilization in order to recognize the clarity with which Toynbee states the important part played by expectations in the history of civilizations and classes. See especially Volume VI of *A Study of History*, Oxford University Press, 1939.

[5] The analysis of the self follows the lines laid down by Charles Horton Cooley and George Herbert Mead. Data from experimental and field studies are found in Hadley Cantril and Muzafer Sherif, *The Psychology of Ego-involvements, Social Attitudes and Identifications*, New York, Wiley, 1947.

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Long-Range Expectations Are Not Easy to Evaluate

For purposes of political analysis, problems connected with expectation must be more narrowly circumscribed. What can we say about the impact of long-range expectations on short-range action? Certain difficulties appear when we take a critical look at available evidence. Similar expectations are often connected with different short-run acts. For instance, it is customary to explain the religious and secular martyrs of history by emphasizing the importance of the confidence which they had in the ultimate success of the cause for which they died. We are not surprised to learn that men of conviction were the ones who died in concentration camps during the war without giving in to their torturers, even when in special circumstances they were offered favors if they would cooperate with the regime.[6] The response was the same whether the ideology was Communist, Socialist, Anarchist, Democrat, Christian, or Jewish. But confidence in ultimate success does not always lead to martyrdom or even lesser sacrifices. Consider the conduct of the heads of Chinese families who put up little or no resistance to the invaders of China. There is no doubt of their confidence in the ultimate survival of Chinese civilization. Apparently they were so sure that China would live forever that they saw no reason to die now.[7]

The problem occurs in another form when different long-range expectations are connected with the same immediate acts. For opposite reasons, two soldiers may volunteer for a dangerous mission. One is confident of victory. The other is despairing and indifferent.

The Long-Range Must Sanction the Immediate

The answer to the puzzle appears to be this: Long-run expectations affect conduct to the degree that the immediate act appears to promote a goal which commands devotion and which in any case seems highly probable of future realization.

[6] Among the most discerning descriptions of concentration camp behavior are Eugen Kogon, *Der SS-Staat; das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager,* Munich, 1946; David Rousset, *The Other Kingdom,* New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947.

[7] A penetrating account of traditional patterns is by Lin Yueh-hwa, *The Golden Wing; A Sociological Study of Chinese Familism,* New York, Oxford, 1947 (International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction).

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A pre-Nationalist, pre-Communist Chinese had no tie-up between his identification with China and the making of last-ditch resistance against an invader. The martyrs, on the other hand, had a specific tie-up between the fate of the larger self and what they could do by laying down their lives. Links had been established between individual sacrifice and collective results, just as they have in the case of the modern Chinese Nationalist or Communist who accepts the idea that active participation in politics will affect the course of the struggle among nations and classes.

How Long-Range Sanctions Are Built Up

How are these links established so that long-range expectations can be brought to operate on immediate behavior? The process may be explained in terms of the general theory of new response. Some new responses are unlearned and appear when the organism is mature enough to make them. Unlearned responses are little affected by the rewards and punishments meted out by the immediate environment. A standard example is the blinking of the eye, or the jerk of the knee when tapped in a specific way. The knee continues to jerk even though the individual is slapped every time he jerks.

Learned responses are acquired in experience, and are affected by the answering indulgence or deprivation of the immediate environment. The clearest examples, perhaps, are from education. Consider how parents transmit a well-established pattern of culture to children. The child is rewarded for "acting like a Wang" or a Smith or a Nagy, and punished for failing to do so. If the pattern of the culture calls for treating a flag with respect, children are applauded when they carry the emblem of the country in community exercises, and punished physically or by withdrawal of affection if they use the flag as a cleaning cloth. "Acting like an American" is one of the standard sets of demands which determine the volume and ratio of indulgence and deprivation coming from the environment. To act like an American includes thinking and saying the proper things about the future of the country.

Sooner or later demands originally pressed upon the child by the environment are internalized. They are "demands by

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the self upon the self (and others)." In this way the responses of the individual are made relatively independent of the deprivations and indulgences forthcoming from immediate environments. We know that responses can continue in the face of formidable punishment, the extreme case being martyrdom. Although such responses are learned, for all practical purposes they have the durability of unlearned reflexes. Hence long-range views of the future of a desired objective can not only affect immediate conduct. They can impose themselves upon adverse situations.

The general principle, then, is that responses (including long- and middle-range expectations) are adopted and continued if they yield net advantages; they are rejected and discarded if they do not. It has already been implied that what is regarded as an advantage varies greatly through the career line of the individual. During early years physical discomfort or denial of affectionate approval may be the most important.[8] Later the conceptions of advantage become more complex until they may include universal conceptions of the distribution of values that ought to prevail in a free man's commonwealth.[9] Expectations about value positions and potentials are unconscious as well as conscious. Acting like a patriotic American—when it is completely taken for granted—becomes part of what Clyde Kuckhohn calls "covert" as distinguished from "overt" culture.[10]

How Long-Range Expectations Are Broken Down

Long-range expectations will not continue as effective influences upon immediate conduct if action in accordance with

[8] Sebastian de Grazia made effective use of what is known about "separation anxieties" during infancy and childhood in analyzing *The Political Community; A Study of Anomie*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1948.

[9] For descriptive purposes it is convenient to use a short list of "value" terms to classify "desired events." The terms power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment are used by the present writer and Abraham Kaplan in "Power and Society" (forthcoming). See the appendix to Lasswell, *Power and Personality*, New York, Norton, 1948 (The Thomas W. Salmon Memorial Lectures, New York Academy of Medicine). The basic patterns in the shaping and sharing of the values can be referred to as "institutions." Thus "government" is the term for the institutions of the value called "power."

[10] In psychoanalysis a line is drawn between "manifest" and "latent" psychic content. For Kluckhohn's point, see "The Concept of Culture" (with William H. Kelley) in *Man in the World Crisis*, Ralph Linton, editor, New York, Columbia University Press, 1945.

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these expectations no longer appears to yield a net advantage. First, expectations can be falsified, or attention can be diverted to other expectations. Second, the demands in reference to which expectations are entertained can change. Third, the identifications in terms of which demands are made can change.

Consider as an example the way in which wartime expectations of friendly cooperation with Russia have been given up in the postwar period. During World War II, President Roosevelt and many of his top advisers thought they had a good chance to change the Russians by acting with great generosity toward them. These middle-range expectations were generally held to be falsified by what happened from 1945 on. Optimism regarding East and West was originally fostered by the demand to keep the United Nations coalition together while defeating the Germans and Japanese. When this goal was reached, the Powers redefined their political demand systems, and in consequence lost incentive to believe in enduring cooperation. During the war, people in every country enlarged their scope of identification with others. They began to think and act as members of a unified world who dreamed and planned to bring world government into being by consent. After the war when the fragile identifications with the global community failed to bring about an effective world order, the older perspectives of nationalism reasserted themselves.

II

The World Political Context

The general principles of behavior do not carry us far unless we apply them to concrete contexts which are to be explained or manipulated. The principles themselves underline the dependence of each detail upon the context. A long-range expectation interacts with an entire system of expectations, demands, and identifications apart from which it cannot be understood. We have referred before to the features of the world situation which are most important for the problems we have in mind. Ours is a bipolarizing world in which dogmatism and uniformity confront variety and confusion. We declared that long-range expectations can be modified if contextual conditions change.

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Let us therefore set up a speculative model, a "developmental construct," of the future in which the environment of the Soviet Union is altered in ways that falsify the current long-range expectations of the Soviet elite.[11] Then we consider the likelihood that as a result long-range expectations in the Soviet Union will change in ways that improve the prospects of peaceful cooperation. Later we estimate the likelihood that the expectations in the non-Soviet world necessary to support the policies which change the environment of the Soviet Union will, in fact, appear.

We postulate, therefore, the following developmental construct: Capitalism does not collapse but becomes comparatively stable, sustaining high levels of productive employment, and at the same time continues to make large expenditures on armed forces as a deterrent to Soviet expansion. Further, the capitalist world does not initiate an aggressive crusade against the Soviet Union but adheres to the policy of military containment, supplemented by the policy of aiding economic recovery and development of non-Soviet countries. It is further stipulated that the ideology of the non-Soviet world is clarified in ways that carry conviction, and an atmosphere is created in which Soviet Communism loses its proselyting effectiveness beyond the Russian zone. As we go into various parts of the problem, we shall make the postulates of this speculative model more explicit.

Infallibility in a Despotism

We speak of "falsifying" the long-range expectations of the Soviet Union. But how is it possible to assert that the doctrines of despotism can be "exposed" and discredited by concrete happenings abroad? Do not the active political elements have more to gain by "saving" the basic expectation than by throwing it overboard? Once a despotism is in effective operation, we know that isolated and explicit denials of dogma are suicidal. A member of the top elite who challenges dogma is promptly de-

[11] Concerning the method see Harold D. Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935, Chapter 1. For an application see the writer's "The Prospects of Cooperation in a Bipolar World," *University of Chicago Law Review*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Summer, 1948), pp. 877-901.

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stroyed by his rivals. Hence, the incentive is enormous to reaffirm the infallibility of the doctrine even in the presence of developments which, to a less involved person, seem to contradict it.

The Soviet elite makes full use of the symbolic devices by which doctrines are "saved" from being thrown on the scrap heap by new developments. The devices are of two types, one aimed at *fact-form* statements, the other at doctrinal propositions which allegedly contradict the dogma. In dealing with fact-form propositions, the authenticity of the alleged facts may be entirely rejected. Or, some of the supposed facts can be admitted, while enough are denied to cast doubt upon the allegation as a whole. The statement can be cited in order to give a different meaning to the facts. A statement of doctrine can be denied entirely as a correct formulation of doctrine. Or, the authenticity of the statement can be admitted, subject to reservations which nullify the meaning attached to it. For instance, it can be asserted that the doctrine is improperly applied to a given state of facts, since another doctrine is actually in point. (That is, the doctrine is too broadly applied). Or, the assertion can be made that the doctrine is too narrowly applied to the facts of the situation.[12]

The devices which have just been described are no monopoly of the Russian elite or indeed of any despotism. They are, in fact, part of the technique of argument. Debaters in a free society make use of the same tools in contravening assertions with which they do not agree. The point is that in despotisms incentives are so arranged that these devices are invoked with great persistence in protecting the infallibility of the central dogma and its interpreters. In democracies the sanctions imposed for denying the cardinal tenets of the ruling ideology are far less severe.

The implication is not, however, that the ideology of a despotism is frozen into an unchanging mold beyond the reach of events. Even where the phrasing of the doctrine stays the same year after year, meanings change because the context changes. Analysis shows that doctrines are differently applied to similar

[12] For further elaboration see the chapters by Nathan Leites and Ithiel Pool in *Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics*, by Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and associates, New York, George W. Stewart, 1949.

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sets of facts, or that there are striking variations in the intensity with which a given proposition is affirmed from one time to another. It is obvious that the Soviet elite carries more doctrinal baggage than most, and ascribes great importance not only to putting down criticism of the basic dogma, but to retaining the role of its infallible interpreter.

Some Russian Expectations Have Changed

In estimating the future response of the Soviet elite, it may be useful to remind ourselves of some of the rigidities and flexibilities which have characterized the official line in the past. Looking back at the ideology of the Russian elite since 1917, what has been continuously affirmed? Very little. The principal doctrine is that the triumph of the world revolutionary proletariat is inevitable in our historical period, and that the collapse of capitalism is inevitable. The implacable hostility of counter-revolutionary elements at home and abroad is believed to be unavoidable. Within this broad frame all sorts of modifications have been introduced.

Perhaps the most drastic innovation is the doctrine of "socialism in one country." The early orthodox view, of course, was that the proletariat of the major industrial powers must rise simultaneously, or the socialist regime seizing power in one country would be obliterated by domestic and foreign forces of counter-revolution. Even now the success of socialism in one country is not declared to be inevitable. By vigilance and unheard of energy, however, the workers of the Soviet Union can prepare themselves and win the "inevitable" struggle which will one day be launched by capitalistic powers to destroy the Socialist fatherland. Hence the closest possible link is welded between the long view and the immediate necessities of all-out production, minimum consumption, thorough militarization, and unwavering obedience to the ruling few.

We know that Lenin had no confidence in the permanence of the revolutionary government which took over in 1917, but that he was determined to use every possible means of leaving the biggest impression possible. If 1917 was to be another 1905, let it be a glorious inspiration to the emerging proletariat of the industrial West. In the hectic months after the defeat of

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Germany in 1918, hope rose to great heights as the masses of the world seemed at last on the march. But with the failure of the social revolution in Germany to materialize, anticipations of immediate success faded rapidly and the universal revolution was tacitly deferred.

Early 1920 was the period of maximum threat to the regime in Moscow, marking the high tide of counter-revolutionary and interventionist forces. As the Red Army defeated the forces of General Denikin and Admiral Kolchak, the Soviet power gradually gained the upper hand in Russian territory. The gigantic task of reconstruction and new construction was begun. Swamped by internal problems and suffering from disillusionment about the immediate triumph of world revolution, the leaders of world communism were slow to seize upon such favorable circumstances as appeared in Germany in 1923. After the sensational defeat of the policy of collaboration with the Kuomintang in 1927, preoccupation with internal affairs continued to absorb the decision-makers of Russia. However, the danger of foreign intervention was played up on both ideological and tactical grounds. When the policy of dividing communist, socialist, and liberal forces in Germany helped to bring the Nazis into power, the threat value of the new enemy gave added color to the worn slogans of foreign intervention. After the interlude between the signing of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the German attack on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union depended for the margin that ensured survival upon the aid obtained from foreign allies. The slogans and tactics of world revolutionary communism were necessarily de-emphasized. The public liquidation of the Communist International belonged to this period.[13]

From this reminder of post-1917 developments it is evident that the long-range expectations of the Soviet elite have been modified in many ways, without however having erased the central core of predestinarian optimism about the triumph of world communism in our historic period. If we were to put Russian Marxism in the perspective of all Marxist movements

[13] The changing ratio of national and universal slogans in the Soviet Union is described by Serge Yakobson and Harold D. Lasswell in *The Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics*, cited above.

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since 1848, the range of variation around the central theme would be much wider. Some revisionist currents went far enough to deny the inevitable accompaniment of revolution by violence. In the early decades of Marxism, controversies were fought out in public or very near the surface, and even during the years immediately after 1917 it was not difficult to follow many of the great party debates. After the liquidation of the Old Bolsheviks, the Stalinists imposed a seal on the lips of the opposition and established the infallibility of the leadership in the interpretation of party dogma. Although it is relatively simple to study the changing long-range expectations of pre-'17 and early post-'17 years, these historical precedents are of limited help in estimating the future. Before 1917 the Communists were not in power, and between the wars the politics of the globe were not far along toward bipolarity.

It is possible, nevertheless, to discover certain points which bear upon our present problems. *First,* such changes as have occurred in long-range expectations of the Soviet elite have not constituted a trend toward peaceful cooperation with the non-Communist world. On the contrary the Nazi attack seemed to confirm the thesis of inevitable attack. The fact that the attack was repelled with the aid of non-Communist powers has been minimized, even to the point of denying that the assistance of the West came in time to help turn the tide. Elements inside the Soviet Union which have at any moment been willing and able to work with foreign groups have been cast aside and decimated as part of the policy of cutting connections of all kinds between the Soviet peoples and the outside world.

Second, the tightening of control by the elite in the Soviet Union has not only reduced to zero the practice of challenging official interpretations but has consolidated a regime which, in common with any modern despotism, depends upon continuing international tension to enable it to maintain controls once imposed.

Third, there is some evidence that agitational-propaganda ("agit-prop") weapons are less highly rated now than they formerly were. This can be affirmed with less certainty than the first and second propositions above. It is worth recalling, however, that the record of the Communist International was

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a long history of disappointments. In no instance was the majority of any Western people won over to the Soviet Union by agit-prop activity. Evaluated in terms of military worth, Communist opposition in Germany during the war was doubtless disappointing. Only the shadow of the Red Army has brought success to Communism in some neighboring territories. In nations at some distance from the U.S.S.R, the year-in, year-out sacrificing of revolutionary movements to the expediencies of the Moscow regime has brought about the disillusionment of successive waves of radicals and liberals.

To the extent that the Soviet elite attaches less importance to the weapons of agitation and propaganda in foreign affairs, they give more weight to what can be accomplished by the traditional instruments of violence. Preoccupation with "hardware," whether in the form of A-bombs or not, would be expected to reflect itself in impatience with political theory. And indeed, there are many indications that doctrinal refinement is not encouraged. The tendency is to stay within the elastic frame of the expectation of the inevitable success of the world revolution, and of inevitable conflict with an unstable and hostile capitalistic world. Interpretations are continually made to fit the changing short-range aims of the Soviet elite; but these interpretations lack the elaborate dialectical structure and the historical sweep at one time cultivated by the leaders of Russian communism.

Pluralizing Tendencies Inside the Soviet Union

We now consider the repercussion inside Russia if our speculative model of capitalist stability, firmness, and non-aggression were to become fact. Since it is obvious that the Soviet elite has in its hands a practical monopoly of the channels of incoming intelligence about foreign countries, the inhabitants of the Russian area will be mainly dependent upon the indirect results of the policies we have imputed to the non-Soviet world.

If changes occur at all, obviously they must begin with the ruling groups or the masses. So far as the ruling groups are concerned, a tiny corps of carefully chosen and closely supervised officials is involved in direct foreign contacts. These officials carry on the trickle of diplomatic, economic, armed force,

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police, cultural, and propaganda activities which are permitted beyond the Soviet pale. As years pass and the prophesied collapse of capitalism recedes into the distance, it is likely that new forms of exchange between the two worlds will grow. On a small scale, reminiscent of the early twenties, Soviet purchasing agents already procure raw materials, machinery, and semi-processed goods abroad. We expect "business-as-usual" attitudes to creep into foreign trade administration. The usual bureaucratic interest in enlarging budget and staff will doubtless assert itself. In contact with the highly differentiated living standards of parts of the non-Communist world, tastes develop among the Commissars (and their wives) who are not wholly insensitive to the figure they cut. Gradually these officials lose a sense of overwhelming personal urgency about the defense of the Soviet Union against a supposed aggressor, an attitude which is not wholly lost after returning home.

Among the masses we can anticipate certain changes which are in some respects parallel to the transformation we have been describing for a fraction of the elite. Not all observers of the Soviet Union who are in contact with the peasant population believe that it is possible to segregate the broad masses of the peasant and working population from all contact with, or awareness of, the world outside, especially where standards of living are involved. Even after allowance has been made for any surviving tendency to romanticize the wise men of the soil, there is a residue of creditable testimony that the gossip chains through the Soviet Union are not all run or necessarily tapped by the NKVD.

Pluralizing tendencies are strengthened by a diminished sense of the urgency of making personal sacrifices for the security of the Soviet Union. Every focal point of identification throughout Soviet society is capable of rallying some degree of loyalty and evolving demands and expectations of better treatment. The main lines of present and potential pluralization are ethnic, functional, and territorial. Hundreds of folk cultures are alive in the Soviet Union, and functional groups comprise hundreds of skills and sub-skills which range from learned professions to the simplest occupations. Territorial lines follow the neighborhoods and regions of each ethnic

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group. In Russia, as everywhere, the primary circle of identification embraces the family and cliques of friends.

Pluralizing processes do not leave the party intact. There is a continual drag, particularly at the humblest levels, to adapt the party to the society rather than to adapt the society to the party. A party member feels more protected if his closest friend is also a member, even though the friend has little interest in doctrinal points. If the party is trying to increase production and to improve the technology of weapons, engineers can be forgiven some lack of interest in party ritual. Local party leaders build up informal constituencies when they are credited with having brought better working conditions to the plant or the cooperative. Leaders with similar constituencies build up informal blocs inside the party. In these ways small pressures accumulate by the million for "more now."

Since the pluralizing process does not express itself at once in full consciousness, there need be no sense of fear, guilt, or shame connected with the putting forward of special demands. Indeed, the underlying optimism of the revolutionary expectation can provide a convenient re-enforcement of pluralizing claims. Without hypocrisy, demands can be made for better working and living conditions in the interest of becoming a more efficient creator of the "Socialist Fatherland." It can be affirmed with every color of plausibility that if an adequate job is to be done, spacious living quarters, longer vacations, and more medical care are necessary for engineers, for skilled workers of all kinds, and indeed for every productive element in the Soviet world. Hence, the claims of the components of the self which are non-state do not necessarily appear to conflict with the claims of the state.

Party Defenses Against Pluralization

The parties or, as they are more properly called, the "political orders" of despotism,[14] use many devices to prevent the reabsorption of the control hierarchy into the society which it is attempting to reconstruct and dominate. The aim is to bind the member and the official to the "order" for the most important rewards (and punishments) of life. As a means of preventing

[14] See William Ebenstein, *The Nazi State*, New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1943.

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the growth of informal ties with "constituencies," officials are switched from one place to another. To forestall the growth of blocs among members, such as the trade-union bloc or the co-operative bloc, officials are continually assigned to work with new rather than old associates. Members are subject to unceasing indoctrination in the world-shaping mission of the Communist Party. Those who devote themselves to the party identify the boundaries of the self with the boundaries of the party, and learn to immunize themselves against the claims of blood and friendship.

It is, however, no simple matter to create and sustain a vast organization whose members must conform to a code of extraordinary selflessness which contrasts sharply with the much more easygoing code governing the lives of the surrounding community.[15] The high level of tension which characterizes the political orders of despotism reveals the enduring strength of the claims of family, friendship, religion, territory, skill, and ethnic affiliation. These "orders" tend to expand and dilute the "ideal type" of member. In turn, the top elite is eventually stirred into defensive action to purify the ranks. During their climb up the ladder, top leaders may learn to read and interpret signs which express nuances of meaning that escape the notice of the individual displaying the symptom. While in themselves symptoms constitute no peril, they can be precursors of a more serious development. A diminished sense of urgency may reveal itself today by nothing more sensational than a slightly rising absentee or accident rate. But may not the next step be the appearance of a small swarm of pluralistic requests? If these gain headway, will not the Soviet Union begin to fall behind in armament? In industrialization? And will not the enemy strike at the first sign of weakness? If pluralizing demands are tolerated will they not presently create a democracy? And is not democracy fatal to the safety of the party whose mission it is to fight until all the Russias, and

[15] The sense of sacrifice for the future is a recurring theme in Soviet literature, and indicates how at least some elements of the population find it necessary to stress great expectation in order to overcome more pluralistic tendencies. Ilya Ehrenburg, for instance, wrote in 1919 that "into the ages we have scattered the sparks of our extinguished life." See his poem "The Sons of Our Sons" in *A Treasury of Russian Verse*, edited by Avraham Yarmolinsky, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. 225-26.

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indeed all the globe, have been kneaded into the communist society?

Top elite fears bring about those mass expulsions of party members which confer a distinctive rhythm upon the political orders of modern despotism, whether Italian Fascist, German Nazi, or Russian Communist.[16] Closely connected with the party purge is the war scare, which is also nourished by the inner needs of despotic regimes. The deprivations that are imposed by despotisms upon human personality provoke rage and counter-assertion. But the next man up the hierarchy is not a suitable target for the discharge of aggressive tendencies since he is a source of indulgence as well as deprivation. He is a source of bribes as well as kicks. He stands for the system as a whole, which rewards sacrifice, partly by allowing aggression to be turned against the man lower down. But the simplest escape valve is a war scare, since the scare enables a vast charge of hostile affect to be displaced upon the world beyond the office, and even beyond the masses at the bottom of the pyramid. The war scare can be "genuine," in the sense that the top elite (the Political Committee) can consciously accept the fact that a threat exists. But the scare is not necessarily authentic. And it can be handled with most assurance when least genuine, since it is least likely to get beyond the stage-management of the top group.

The climax of the precautionary statecraft of despotism is the combined purge and spy scare, which confirms the supremacy of the top elite over the party and heals the bruises of disunity in a catharsis of hate against foreign demons.[17]

The Effect of Weapon Parity and Continued Industrialization

To this point we have made no express assumption about the strategic position of Russia. We have postulated that the United States pursues a firm and consistent policy of containment and refrains from attacking the Soviet Union. Let us now examine the effect of the attainment of weapon parity by the Soviet Union with the United States. Parity, as here used, does

[16] Robert Michels often spoke of the "accordion rhythm" of such parties.

[17] Neatly expressed in the cult of hating Goldstein in George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1949.

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not signify arithmetic equality; it implies command of weapons sufficient to inflict very heavy damage upon an enemy. The precise date of parity does not concern us here, the essential point being the impact of the new state of affairs upon the long-range expectations of the Soviet elite and upon the imminence of war or of peaceful cooperation.

So far as the top elite is concerned, the sense of peril from abroad will undoubtedly be reduced. If we further suppose that parity in new weapons is not immediately followed by weapon supremacy, the situation will look much as it does now, with both sides operating elaborate systems of mutual surveillance. So far as freedom to promote war scares is concerned, it is obvious that abundant material will be at hand at any time. The purge-spy dramas can continue as an endless serial.

Meanwhile, basic transformations go forward inside Russia and the satellites. The urban-rural ratio is changed by industrialization which also brings about a new and more complex division of labor. This greatly enlarges the policy-making and enforcing institutions of Soviet society. The new pattern of specialization resembles a tissue of interrelated cells of many types and sizes. Each innovation creates a somewhat distinctive environment for all who work in it. Each new focus of attention is a matrix where new perspectives and operations grow.

It is true that we are unable to strike a sure balance between the strength of the pluralizing and super-centralizing tendencies released by industrialization. For example, it is likely that as new occupational and professional groups multiply they will become or remain apolitical in the sense that they acquiesce without protest in the control measures of the party. But demands to improve technical and personal facilities and privileges are not initially put forward in a highly political context. Among the general questions that suggest themselves are the following: In a rising economy do the demands for "more now" tend to outrun the shares which are distributed? Are there "critical levels" at which demands rise quite sharply? Are there discernible connections with skill, such as with the magnitude of sacrifice involved in acquiring technique? Are there special relations to particularly unhealthy, accident-prone, or heavy jobs? In the light of available knowledge of

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comparative history and social science, we can do little more than pose these problems.

The Intellectual Reorientation of Russia

We are postulating an ideological development in the non-Soviet world which emphatically reduces such appeal as Soviet doctrine retains abroad. Before describing the possible details of this development we ask how intellectual reorientations can occur in the Soviet world. The fact must be confirmed that the only Russians with an opportunity to make a direct appraisal of the changing climate surrounding the Soviet Union are the small number who have their eyes to a peephole on the West. Though it cannot be disseminated, foreign literature on the Soviet Union and upon world political issues is not entirely ignored by the Soviet elite.

However slow the permeation of ideas from the outside world, we are confident that the movement of ideas inside Russia is not entirely extinguished. It is, of course, not necessary to assume that unorthodox conceptions quickly become conscious or public. From the history of doctrinal innovations elsewhere, we know that long before the "heresy" is premeditated the tides of unconscious sentiment can turn in new directions. A poem written in all piety can subtly change the relation between God and man by making God a less remote and indifferent figure. By stressing the mother figure within a cult, the formidable elements of orthodoxy can be softened and the way prepared for a more indulgent evolution. The scholar who finds new arguments to justify the existence of God may miss the point that he has generated and perpetuated a new crop of doubts. It is a common hypothesis among historians and philosophers that in the long run the struggle of orthodoxy against innovation is a losing battle because it is a struggle against the creative mind.[18] New ideas are continually being brought up

[18] For some conception of the measures used by the Church to stamp out dangerous thoughts, the classical work of Henry Charles Lea is always valuable. See especially *A History of the Inquisition of the Middle Ages*, New York, Harpers, 1887-88, 3 vols., and *A History of the Inquisition of Spain*, New York, Macmillan, 1922. G. C. Coulton discusses the essential soundness of Lea's work in the volume cited in footnote 4. See the notes to Chapter XIV at p. 736, and to Chapter XXXV at p. 746. Abundant detail on the controversies between orthodoxy and heterodoxy are in Sir R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, *A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, Third Edition, Edinburgh and London, 1930-36, 6 vols.

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in the privacy of meditation or in intimate conversations. Wit and humor are able to mask or unmask new perspectives, while candor and objectivity set new temperatures. Our assumption is that the conscious and unconscious phases of doctrinal change fade gradually into one another in the Soviet Union as anywhere else.

III

A New Conception of the World Revolution of Our Time

Now we look into the conceptions which stand a chance of bringing more unity into the non-Soviet world and creating an intellectual climate in the environment of Russia in which the transformation of the Russian outlook may make eventual headway.

We have said that traditional expectations about the course of history need to be revised. Recent trends cast doubt impartially upon Marxism and Liberalism alike. For the most part the two were one in propagating a sanguine view of the immediate future, in which it was affirmed that the world moves toward a free man's commonwealth where human dignity is realized in theory and fact. Though sharing the expectation of progress, different blueprints were drawn of the paths to felicity. The adherents of one tradition tended to hold to the idea of an inescapable trauma of revolution, the other to the primacy of gradualism. For the dominant Marxist elements the future held felicity *through* and *despite* catastrophe.

Today the idea of assured progress is no longer tenable. And the conception of felicity through catastrophe is altogether suspect and dangerous. In a world of A-bombs, radioactive poisons, jets, and rockets it is more reasonable to say that catastrophe breeds further catastrophe, not felicity.

The threat of physical destruction is obvious to all serious and informed persons. But in the next few years the threat of physical disaster may be less grave for mankind than the loss of freedom brought about by the state of perpetual crisis. The chronic threat of war favors the gathering into a few hands of the control of manpower, facilities, and resources. Power flows toward centralized government. Decisions give special weight to the advice of the specialists on violence—the airmen, sol-

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diers, sailors and political police. If under the stress of continuing high levels of world tension this process works itself out to the end, the body politic is transformed into a garrison-prison state. Inside the Soviet Union this process has gone far already. Thus far, however, the party elite has succeeded in keeping control out of the hands of the Red Army, though at the risk of being swallowed up by the party police. If the crisis goes on throughout the globe, the process which is so far along in the Soviet Union can be expected to appear in every country. It may entail no revolutionary seizure of power by the marching masses. The process has more in common with men struggling in a bottomless bog.

The plain implication is that we may be living through a reversal in the direction of modern history. Instead of continuing toward freedom and social mobility, the trend may be veering toward enslavement and caste.

Frightening as these possibilities are, we do not think of them as "inevitable." Indeed, the appeal to the "inevitable" is one of the features of Marxist and Liberal doctrine that needs to be abandoned. When applied to the future, the term "inevitable" is propaganda, not science. The future is full of possibilities, some probable, others contingent. We endorse those who are ready to take personal responsibility for willing and working to mold the future into the pattern of aspiration toward the free man's commonwealth.

Expectations of "inevitable" progress, whether through the agency of invisible hands or visible catastrophes, are destructive ideas. These expectations imply that it is a matter of indifference, in the long run, whether we go to war or not, since all will come out unbloodied in the end. It is difficult for the fertile brain of man to devise a more dangerous idea, unless it is the expectation of "inevitable" failure.

Mankind has enormous potentialities for bringing the free man's commonwealth closer to realization on a vaster scale than has ever been dreamed of before. Science is tapping sources of energy capable of raising the world's standard of living. More important, perhaps, is the discovery (or for that matter the re-discovery) on the part of modern psychiatry and the

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related human sciences of the significance of human dignity as a factor in social development.

If mankind is to resume the march toward a free man's commonwealth, it is essential that the long-range expectation of inevitable collapse and aggression on the part of the capitalist world shall be weakened as an effective force in the Soviet Union. This depends in part upon the characteristics of the environment which surrounds Russia and the Satellites. If this environment is to be what it needs to be, it requires certain intellectual characteristics. One of these characteristics is a set of long-range expectations which provides a unifying guide for the non-Soviet world, and which also provides a climate conducive to the transformations which must take place in the Soviet Union if Russia is to be drawn into the life of a globe that moves toward peace and freedom, and away from war and enslavement.

One such expectation is that the future is not "inevitable," and that our values and value-strivings can in all likelihood have something to do with the shape of things to come. Neither progress nor reaction (measured in terms of the demand for human dignity) is out of the question. The progress of science and technology has created a world situation in which war can bring about a degree of destruction that demolishes the material and cultural bases of freedom. If there is no war, yet crisis is perpetual, the danger is in the loss of freedom by a process of attrition in which power is centered in the hands of the garrison-police elites. Either the fact of war or of continual preparation for war promises to bring about a reversal in the direction of history from freedom and mobility to enslavement and caste. The ideal aspirations of neither socialism nor liberalism can find fulfillment in a world of garrison-police states. The resumption of world progress ultimately depends upon an effective sharing of the aims and institutions appropriate to a commonwealth of free men. In the meanwhile, progress can first be made in the accessible, non-Soviet world. Policies of military containment, economic assistance, diplomatic reassurance, and ideological clarity are mutually re-enforcing.

Outside Russia and the satellites it is by no means out of the question to find common factors in Marxism and Liberalism,

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factors consistent with the conception of the world revolution of our time which has been outlined here. Within the broad frame of Marxist and Liberal tradition, many interpretative variations have appeared in the past and flourish to this day. We need to promote a vigorous reappraisal of both families of doctrine.

IV

Reappraising the Families of Marxist Doctrine

Marxist analysis depends upon certain estimates of the significance of material factors upon the social and historical process. Many revisionist currents among the Marxisms have already covered the ground that needs to be re-canvassed on a more comprehensive scale. The vital point is that new estimates are needed of the major developments of our own time. It is not within the scope of this discussion to work out the adaptations which are essential within the world of Marxists. They are of special importance because the Soviet elite regards itself as part of the Marxist tradition; indeed, as a matter of dogma, it describes itself as the infallible interpreter of Marx. It may not be amiss to give some hint of the lines of creative development which can take place.

A. The difference between method and application. Marxists need to recapture the freedom in applying their tools that distinguished the stubborn genius of Marx himself. In the literature of Marxist socialism there is ample justification for distinguishing between method and application, and for accepting the integrity of the method of analysis even when alleged applications are rejected.[19]

B. The underestimation of certain material factors. Forecasts in the name of Marxism which relate to the present historical period have grossly underestimated the impact on society of certain material factors. The tempo in the application of science to technology has risen much faster than foreseen. The technological advances in production are at the same

[19] During the Bela Kun period Georg Lukács gave a brilliant statement of the creative significance of Marxist method in a series of lectures in Budapest. *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein; Studien über Marxistische Dialektik*, Berlin, 1923. The verve of this precocious outpouring may be compared with the decorous scholarship of his recent *Der Junge Hegel, Ueber die Beziehungen von Dialektik und Oekonomie*, Zurich and Vienna, 1948.

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time advances in destruction, and the tempo is such that war is more devastating than anyone imagined. Hence the implications of accepting war as an inevitable prerequisite to the final overthrow of capitalism are more serious than formerly supposed. Moreover, the new methods of running a large-scale society make of war preparations a threat to freedom whose magnitude is unprecedented.

Taken alone, the erroneous appraisal of the tempo of technological growth would be serious. It is, moreover, coupled with two other erroneous judgments, one relating to nationalism and the other to militarism.

C. The underestimated impact of nationalism on economy. Marx recognized the common, universal elements in the experience of those who engage in modern industrialism. He saw the universal elements in receiving money wages rather than payment in kind. He wrote of the standardizing effect of having the same income, expressed in money, and of the diversifying effects of money differences. Marx described some of the common factors in having a given factory job, and in managing or owning the instruments of production.

He did not, however, make anywhere near the necessary allowance for the psychological factors which pinned down the universal to the parochial. Owing to the spread of literacy, the press, and popular government, economic processes were thought of as belonging to the national way of life, rather than as the experience of a "passportless cosmopolitan" worker, owner, or manager. The piecemeal introduction of modern industrialism favored parochialism. Hence, the technological improvements which appeared in a given locality were perceived as part of a context which was less than universal. A new factory was thought of as employing local labor and as using local capital; or, if labor and capital obviously came from elsewhere, the "elsewhere" was typically perceived as national rather than cosmopolitan. Although the common, universal element was present in relation to the machine, it was experienced as part of a local context. Hence Marx and the Marxists miscalculated the role of nationalism in economic life.

The strength of the parochial context was so great that the new industrialism was first adapted to the nation rather than

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to the globe as a whole. By far the largest percentage of national saving and investment was made at home rather than abroad. And when capital did flow across the frontiers there was a tendency for it to conform to the national interest in the current balance of power. British capital, for example, went in relative abundance to the United States and to Canada and other parts of the Empire. States which industrialized later than Britain began to raise barriers against foreign goods and often against uncontrolled investment. The initiatives for restriction were typically taken by local business men who appealed to nascent national sentiment.[20]

Although the new technology was initially pressed into the service of the existing balance of power and sentiment, it presently became a dynamic factor in transforming world politics. The capital sums, markets, and resources needed by modern technology provided a strong incentive to widen by force if necessary whatever areas could be legally incorporated into, or effectively subordinated to, an existing big state. The new advances in military technology, psychological warfare, and central-planning technique provided the means to implement this incentive. Hence the outcome of the intermittent crisis of recent years has been to reorganize world politics into the mold of a bipolarizing world.

The relative eclipse of the smaller states has led to no leaping development toward the one-state world—the drag of parochializing factors is still too strong. Rather, the sequence continues to move from small-state identifications to identifications with giant states and interstate combinations. The demand for security has not meant, and does not mean today, that peace is sought at any price, but rather that peace is sacrificed if necessary to resist outside dictation of policies within the largest effective state or combination of states with which one is affiliated (short of the world state as a whole). The world is not split, irrespective of geographical lines and territorially restricted loyalties, into a biclass polarization. It is divided into bizonal polarity. And this gives a signifiance

[20] Just as socialism has typically been state socialism, planning has typically been national planning. On the nationalization of socialism and the socialization of nationalism see David Mitrany, "The Political Consequences of Economic Planning," *Sociological Review* (London), XXVI (1934), pp. 321-45.

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to the interplay of psychological and economic factors which neither Marx, nor most Marxists, foresaw. For loyalties are aggregated in two giant camps in space, not geographically dispersed throughout the world in an ever recurring pattern of hostile proletarian *versus* hostile owner.

D. The underestimated impact of militarization on economy. The foregoing analysis provides the basis for correcting another error in most of the Marxist estimates. The psychological and material factors connected with the power process were grossly misunderstood. The expectation of violence and all of the institutions which sustained that expectation, and were sustained by it in return, were more important than originally foreseen.

One consequence has been to place too great credence in the supposed "inevitable collapse" of capitalism. The continuing military crisis creates a situation in which measures can readily be taken to avoid collapse. By this time it is well understood in the United States, for example, that no large-scale modern community can permit mass unemployment without flirting with political and military disaster. The incentives to expand the sphere of government, if necessary to take up the slack in the labor market, are re-enforced by the world military crisis which permits needed expansion to take place in the military sphere and to be justified in the name of security.

V

Reappraising the Family of Liberal Doctrines

The range of Liberalism is at least as wide as corresponding variations within the Marxist family. The language of Marx has been misapplied in the Soviet Union to sustain a despotism, and the language of Liberalism has more than once been misused as a cover for social repression. Liberal expectations regarding the future are typically ambiguous and doubtful, and the liberal outlook fails to distinguish sharply between institutions which are *formally* liberal and those which are *effectively* liberal. The view of the world revolution of our time which was outlined above has much in common with many of the significant elements of the liberal tradition, and supplements it at important points.

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A. The missing conception of the future. At first glance it seems capricious to suggest that the liberal tradition lacks a conception of the future, since in recent generations liberalism has been oriented toward the future in the sense of assuming the postulate of progress. And we have already challenged the conception of "inevitable" progress, saying that in so far as liberalism depends upon affirming the "inevitable," it is false and dangerous. But there is a narrower point involved in suggesting that liberal expectations about the future need to be revised.

Liberal thinkers have not felt called upon to be very specific about the future which they regard with such confidence. They are not accustomed to estimate the speed of progress (or the retarding effect of reaction). They have not tried to construct comprehensive conceptions of the context of events which at any given time lie just ahead.

The lack of working models of the imminent future has little apparent importance during non-crisis periods when intellectual energies can run in every direction with little or no sense of relevance to social results. Whenever crisis appears, however, the situation changes. It becomes apparent that intellectual resources of high quality are scarce. In our own time it is painfully obvious that the whole trend of history can change and freedom and mobility can be wiped out. With proper alertness to the course and structure of world affairs gathering storms can be anticipated before they are in danger of breaking. And it is not out of the question that perils, once fully foreseen, can be at least partially avoided.

So far as the immediate crisis goes, we are too far advanced to retain much freedom of action. None the less, if we are aware of the nature of the threat which faces freedom, we can at least be prepared to discount in advance the embittered, desperate, and militant advice born of panic-stricken disillusionment with former fantasies of inevitable progress.

B. Clarifying goals and institutions. In modern times the chief problem of Liberalism and its many variations has been to keep clear the difference between goal values and specific institutions. Goals have continually been misidentified with

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specific devices which do not necessarily correspond or contribute to the aims of the liberal cause.

Liberalism has been one wing of the vast movement which likewise includes modern socialism, by which caste-bound and absolutistic societies and states have been dissolved in the interest of freedom and mobility. The positive goals of Liberalism have not been easy to discover on account of the special circumstances surrounding the early success of the liberals. The program was at first "negative" in the sense that it took as targets many of the surviving restrictions on the market. But even in the heyday of its negative program, Liberalism was moving in another plane. The support given to free public education is an earnest of the central intention of what has continued to be a somewhat confused and imperfectly articulated outlook.

In the early years of the last century the dominant trend of Liberalism was neither optimistic for all elements of society nor democratic. However, the movement continued to grow and in growing transformed itself with much of the agility of modern industrialism itself. During its evolution Liberalism acquired a sufficiently inclusive optimism to include the worker, and wrote a platform where democracy, nationalism, and social equality were inscribed alongside world peace through law.

Liberalism has experienced the greatest travail of spirit in trying to separate goal from method in connection with the institutions of private monopoly. Private monopoly is almost certain to do violence to the liberal code, vague as the code may be. Since monopoly power is scarcity power, the range of choice open to consumers, workers, promoters, and investors alike is in danger where monopoly occurs. None the less, liberals have been reluctant to put government monopoly or strong regulation in place of private monopoly, even though they have often adopted both expedients. But they have done it for the most part with the unhappy sense that in doing so, they were losing rather than vindicating the values for which they desired to stand.

Discounting the many deviations in all directions it appears that the liberal tradition has at least one valid and important

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technique that deserves to be kept alive. This is the technique of putting every concentration of power on the defensive by demanding that it show cause for survival. At best, Liberalism pursues the free man's commonwealth by questioning and challenging the contributions to freedom of any powerful person, group, or method. Liberals are consistent with their principles, for instance, when in some circumstances they support democratic collectivism against private monopoly. In one sense the core of Liberalism is the demand to distinguish between the *forms* and the *effects* of social institutions. The yardstick is freedom, abundance, security, and indeed every social value.

Liberalism has been groping to see and apply what may be called, as it is in some scientific circles, *the contextual principle*. The contextual principle emphasizes the fact that the meaning of the part of any whole depends upon its position in relation to the whole. Hence the detail which is unchanged from one context to another may have an entirely different significance in the changed setting. Or details that differ markedly from one another can perform equivalent functions in their respective contexts. This is the principle which has been so helpful in the psychology of perception, where it has led to important discoveries about vision, hearing, and other sensory processes. Modern medicine has advanced by applying the same conception to any particular symptom of which the patient complains. The symptom depends upon its relation to the psycho-somatic context where it appears. Modern social science has benefited by the concept of culture which sees any human institution in relation to the whole texture of institutions of which it is a part.

When the contextual principle is applied, as many liberals have been seeking to apply it, to public policy it is essential to clarify the goals of the community. If these are taken as the free man's commonwealth, the community in which human dignity is realized in theory and practice, the next step is to take stock of the current situation. What are the trends toward or away from the goal situation? What are the most likely estimates of the future? In the light of existing knowledge of scientific relations and of the demands and expectations relating to the future, what policy acts are indicated?

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A typical example of contextual thinking is the study of what the private ownership of the instruments of production signifies in our society. Those who "own" capital instruments no longer have the significance they once had in the making of important policy decisions in business or government.[21] Under the stress of crisis the private owner and the private business manager are both declining as social formations. We have seen their places taken by the party leader-organizer and the public official. More significantly perhaps, as in Russia, the ruling elite of a chronic crisis comes to depend to an increasing degree upon coercion. And along that path lies the garrison-police state.

A revivified liberal outlook can become aware of the kernel of wisdom in its distrust of concentrated power. More significantly, it can disentangle its enthusiasm from any one set of gadgets for protecting diversity. It is not private or public ownership, public regulation or private monopoly, that embodies or safeguards freedom. The term that best sums up the valid recommendation of Liberalism in the economic field is *free enterprise*.[22] The task is to *improve the methods by which enterprise can be kept free whether collectively owned and managed or not*. If, for technological reasons, central direction appears necessary, then the problem is one of how to stimulate the processes of decentralization, initiative, and democratic participation within and around the enterprise. In a word, the task is healthy pluralization.

As the leaders of Liberalism see more clearly what they stand for, recognizing that they are in favor of free enterprise inside or outside government, they will be in a stronger position to identify their true friends and enemies among fellow liberals and socialists. Among liberals the enemies will be those who prefer private monopoly to the effective restoration of competition, or, if that is impracticable, to operation or regulation by democratic government. Among socialists the enemies will

[21] For a contextual view see Myres Smith McDougal and David Haber, *Property, Wealth, Land: Allocation, Planning and Development; Selected Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Real Property, an Introduction*, Charlottesville, Va., Michie Casebook Corporation, 1948. A classical treatise is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, New York, Macmillan, 1939.

[22] See the original and important work of Abba P. Lerner, *The Economics of Control*, New York, Macmillan, 1944.

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be those who stand for socialization at any cost. Friends among the socialists will be those who are willing to proceed by experiment and experience. There are also socialists who concern themselves with the task of loosening the shackles of supercentralized enterprise.[23] Like the genuine liberals, they are against the bureaucratizing tendencies of large-scale organizations, whether governmental or private. Such socialists can be aided not only by the challenges of those who speak in the spirit of the liberal tradition, but by the devices which have been developed in some large-scale enterprises to keep alive the fact as well as the form of freedom.

Today's issue is not capitalism *versus* socialism. Rather, it is the possible annihilation or destruction of humanity; or the possible growth of a garrison-police state system; or the possible resumption of peaceful cooperation to the end of bringing the free man's commonwealth into being on a global scale. Some liberals and some socialists can work together on behalf of free enterprise *in fact* regardless of the forms of ownership and authority. From the combined experience of the world with diverse forms of social control there may arise neither "pure private" nor "pure public" enterprise, but rather an ever-changing pattern fused from both, and under continual assessment to determine the effectiveness of its contribution to the values of a free and abundant society. The control systems of the Great Technology may well cover the gamut of socio-capitalism.[24]

VI

The World Revolution of Our Time and the Revolution at the Eruptive Center

The world revolution of our epoch has, we have suggested, features which are compatible with much that is found in Marxist and Liberal tradition. There are lingering echoes

[23] See in this connection the valuable discussion so greatly stimulated by Oscar Lange, *On the Economic Theory of Socialism*, edited by Benjamin E. Lippincott, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota, 1938. Consult also J. A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (2nd ed.), New York, Harpers, 1947.

[24] The leaders of the countries caught between communism and capitalism have sought feverishly after a "middle way." This healthy trend was early manifest in The Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen, and is currently expressed in Jawaharlal Nehru and a host of lesser lights.

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from a century of propaganda on behalf of "the proletarian revolution" which have not been extinguished. It may therefore be useful at this point to consider a view of historical change that will make it easier for many of those who share the Marxist or Liberal tradition to see more distinctly where we probably stand today.

Two points are involved. First,—and there is not much dispute about this—our world is passing through a period of sweeping transformation to which the term revolution can reasonably be applied. Second, many can agree that the world revolution of our time is not to be confounded with the revolution which took place in Moscow in 1917.[25]

The latter conclusion is strengthened when we look at past world revolutions. The best known case occurred at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. There is no doubt that a world revolutionary movement was under way at the time, since some of the principal states of Europe were changing social structure and ideology. Feudal forms of society were giving way to more mobile patterns, and the ideology of individualism was superseding the caste-bound outlook. Moreover, there is no doubt that the world revolutionary process of that epoch included the emergence of the revolution at an eruptive center (in that case, Paris). But the pattern of 1789 (and immediately thereafter) can be distinguished from the pattern which we can now identify as the revolution of the period. In the same way, the innovations of 1917 (and immediately thereafter) are not necessarily identical with the pattern of our epoch.

VII

Do Despotisms Change Their Spots?

We are prepared to review the ground we have covered. Our principal purpose has been to consider the circumstances in which certain long-range expectations on the part of the Soviet elite lose their influence in deterring policies of peaceful cooperation with the world community as a whole. We have postulated certain changes in the environment of the Soviet

[25] See footnote 11 above.

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Union which falsify long-range anticipations of capitalist collapse and aggression, and which put an end to the proselyting appeal of Soviet Communism abroad. At the same time that these direct and indirect deprivations are imposed upon the expectations in question, various indulgences are offered or made available on condition that certain other expectations be accepted. It was postulated that the environment of the Soviet Union shall be economically stable, militarily secure without aggressiveness, and sufficiently unified in ideology to rob Soviet Communism of persuasiveness. It has not been within the scope of this analysis to estimate how likely these developments are, although some indications have been given of the lines along which the intellectual unification of important bearers of the Marxist and Liberal tradition can proceed. The principal aim has been to inquire into the possible repercussions inside the Soviet Union of the changes which have been stipulated. As a result of this exercise, it is possible to arrive at a judgment of Soviet response and to ask many questions which can stimulate further study.

We have suggested that Soviet subjects in the thin layer brought in contact with the outside world are likely to sense or recognize changes in the environment which reduce the urgency of sacrifice. But the effectiveness of these elements inside the Soviet Union is diminished by the special surveillance to which they are liable and the tendency to protect themselves from adverse suspicion by "leaning over backwards" to suit what they conceive to be the orders and whims of the central elite.

So far as the peasants are concerned, with their somewhat mysterious gossip chains about conditions abroad, it is clear that we are dealing with a factor which, if it has weight at all, is a rather indefinite check on the tendency of the elite to impose unremitting sacrifices.

We have said that Soviet intellectuals are not to be dismissed as incapable of unorthodox creativeness. But if heterodox intellectual currents are to become significant forces, they must rise above the unconscious or purely private level. We anticipate, first, an unconscious stage of declining confidence in long-range expectations of inevitable capitalist collapse and

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aggression, and in the necessity of making great immediate sacrifices in order to stave off disaster; second, a stage of dawning private and intimate-group awareness of the new outlook; and third, a stage of explicit general acknowledgment of the change. Obviously the third phase must be part of a general movement if it is to signalize other than disaster for its members.

We have taken note of pluralizing tendencies brought into being by industrialization. But the analysis shows that, up to the present, the appearance of informal constituencies and blocs inside the party has been effectively countered by the tested devices of the elite. Before collective action can be effective, there must be communication and organization; and the police machinery of the Soviet elite is notoriously alert.

Pluralization includes every indulgence of components of the self in ways that are not authorized by blind devotion to the commands of the elite which speaks in the name of the whole Soviet Union. The concept includes corruption, in the sense of influence employed for non-political purposes. It embraces the "right to a private life," besides all forms of graft, blackmail, and sadism (considered as means to personal gratification in addition to power). Every dilution of "Soviet puritanism" comes in this category.

All estimates of the future of Soviet despotism must take into account the dynamics of an elite which is oriented toward power to a degree which is almost without precedent in other states. The pursuit of wealth, for instance, has thus far played an insignificant role in the shaping of the elite which reaches the apex of the Soviet world. The ideology of the Soviet Union subordinates all values to the service of Soviet power. In this connection several questions arise. The elite practices of the Soviet are not, after all, the ultimate in power. The aim of elite training is not to shape the power-hungry personality who dreams only of power, sacrifices everything to maximize power, and sees all in relation to his individual power. The task of the Soviet leadership training system is to mold an instrument, not of personal power, but of the world power of the Soviet Union, or, more generally, of world communism. Such a power figure is supposed to develop a conception of the self that transcends the narrow pin-point of the primary ego, the "I" and

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"me." The identification with the power position of the Soviet Union is to be made as complete as possible. And this carries with it the ruthless exclusion of every incompatible identification, whether with family, friend, ethnic group, occupation, or territory. No values, whether of respect or rectitude or well-being, or of any other kind, are to stand in the way of total absorption in the historic destiny of Communism, the Party, and the Soviet Union. Now the obvious question is this: Can the molding process continue to succeed? Or does it have within itself seeds of its own destruction? It may be suggested, for example, that power-calculating men will not indefinitely hesitate to calculate every element in themselves and society, including the value which they are supposed to leave unchallenged, the power advantages of the Soviet Union. Will the elite eventually weaken itself through exclusive preoccupation with power, owing to the development of the "pure" power type who knows no bounds but those of calculated ego risk?

Wise decisions depend upon a realistic stream of intelligence about the foreign and the internal environment. How reliable are the estimates of reality made by power-centered types? Are there unconscious components of the personality that revenge themselves upon the power specialist by subjecting his perceptions of reality to serious distortions? We think in this connection of the "occupational paranoia" of the man of power. Systematic suspiciousness is essential to survival; this is realistic and not necessarily fantastic. But all men are not healthy enough to live in the midst of chronic distrust without themselves beginning to succumb to weaknesses within themselves. (And what we call "weaknesses" may turn out to be some stir of affection or prick of guilt.) We do not know at the present time whether the estimates of political reality made by pure power operators are necessarily more correct than, or on the average even as correct as, the estimates made by less homogeneous types.[26]

[26] Autopsies on Nazi Germany should prove valuable in estimating the factors affecting realistic intelligence. The most general hypothesis, perhaps, is that pure power calculators try to calculate what their superiors want to hear, and believe that they dislike reports which appear to be incompatible with basic preferences. Personal, factional, and organizational rivalries are such, however, that much "truth leaks up." The degree to which Hitler and his inner circle were correctly informed (up to the final days) is still in doubt; and as yet we know less than we need to know about other apex elites to provide a suitable basis of comparison.

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A further query refers to the increasing contempt which the party elite in the Soviet Union appears to be showing for intellectual activity of theoretical depth and scope. Is the party organizer throwing away one of his assets, an asset that will eventually ease the way for his loss of power to the professional soldiers heading the Red Army? The party man appears to pin his hope in recent years on physical rather than ideological instruments. He may be abdicating the distinctive skill which helps keep alive the ascendancy of the party thinker-organizer over other specialists within the Soviet elite as a whole. In the shadow of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (who are treated in Soviet tradition as commanding intellectuals) top party men have successfully insisted upon the integrative task of the party as against the army, the official bureaucracy, or indeed any other element in society. Does the disregard of intellectual activity both register and accelerate a withering away of the claims to ascendancy by the party organizer? The top elite of the army may well become more formidable. The professional army man has an organizing frame of reference which at the top levels can contribute to his intellectual competence, scope, and social discipline. The weapons with which he works can only be understood on the basis of training that includes physical engineering and some branches of human engineering as well. It is to be doubted whether the elite of party organizers is composed of persons possessing the level of competence of top Army elements. Neither the party policemen nor party organizers may last indefinitely.

At the moment we cannot answer such questions as the foregoing. We have come to no firm basis for predicting a shift in the expectations, demands, and identifications of the Soviet elite in a direction more favorable to peaceful cooperation in world affairs. On the other hand, we cannot rule out entirely the possibility of a comprehensive and gradual transformation which entangles most of the elite. If one or two members of the central leadership come prematurely to unorthodox conclusions, they will speedily come to an orthodox end. The most effective type of transformation would be an almost unspoken consensus of initially inarticulate changes in expectation regarding the future. The sense of overwhelming urgency to

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fend off foreign assault would dwindle down and reset Soviet perspectives. Such transformations, difficult as they are to discern at any given moment, are signs that the creative processes of man in history are neither at an end, nor entirely at the level of consciousness.

So far as the non-Soviet world is concerned the many opportunities now at hand can be seized to provide a positive set of goal values and expectations for the guidance of all. By changing the climate of opinion throughout the accessible globe we can somewhat improve the chances of bringing about a universal change in a direction favorable to the ends of freedom and hostile to the appearance of a world of garrison-prison states.

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AMERICA'S TRADE BALANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER

By HORST MENDERSHAUSEN*

SINCE the end of the first World War, a turn in the trade balance of the United States toward an import surplus has been prophesied or advocated repeatedly. According to these prognostications and beliefs, the United States has been moving into the position of an "old creditor nation" and therefore is likely, or will be obliged, to carry a passive trade balance financed by a net inflow of earnings on, or repayments of, capital from abroad.[1] Fulfillment of such an obligation has often been regarded as a contribution to domestic welfare and international order.

The turn of the trade balance has not materialized. During the last thirty-five years, except for the time of the Great Depression and the early New Deal, the stream of goods and non-financial services leaving the United States for other parts of the world exceeded the reverse stream flowing into this country. Since 1914, twenty-nine years showed active trade balances, only six years, passive balances; and the cumulative total of these balances rose from $11,429 million at the end of World War I to $84,023 million at the end of 1948 (see Table I). These figures refer to a comprehensive concept of the trade balance, including merchandise trade, transactions in silver, shipping and freight, travel and government "household" operations. They exclude the financial services which con-

* Ernest Block and Dorothy Swerdlove assisted in the research work underlying this paper.

[1] This definition is similar to that of Cairnes' "fourth stage." It differs from it only in so far as two alternative ways of financing the passive trade balance are considered jointly: (a) net capital earnings exceeding net capital exports; (b) net capital earnings combined with a net import (return flow) of capital. Cairnes' definition of the "fourth stage" considers alternative (a) only. A distinction between the two alternatives may be desirable where emphasis is put on the difference between repayments of principal and earnings of capital. This is not the case in the present paper. See J. E. Cairnes, *Some Leading Principles of Political Economy, Newly Expounded,* New York, Harper, 1874, pp. 360-62.

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stitute the remainder of our balance of payments, or what may be called the financing balance.[2] The comprehensive trade balance measures the exercise by foreigners of an excess of their current claims on our goods and services over our current claims on their goods and services. The financing balance measures the financial processes through which that excess of claims becomes available to foreigners.

Involvement and Withdrawal

It is apparent that the cumulative active trade balance of $84 billion was built up chiefly during years of acute involvement of the United States in world affairs. As a fighting ally in wartime, the United States developed an active trade balance of $11,429 million in World War I, $34,481 million in World War II. Fifty-five percent of the cumulative balance of the thirty-five years was built up in wartime.

As a participant in postwar reconstruction, the United States added an active trade balance of $8,595 million after World War I, and $22,978 million after World War II. Thirty-eight percent of the total cumulative balance was built up in the two postwar reconstruction periods.

As a participant in economic development abroad, this country provided an active balance of $2,512 million in the 1920's up to the Great Depression. Our present record includes only one development period besides two war and postwar periods; we now may be at the threshold of another development period.

Participation in war, postwar reconstruction and international economic development are the main ways by which nations get involved in world affairs. Neither of them can be regarded as abnormal from a broad historical viewpoint. Therefore we shall inquire into the significance of the active trade balance without setting aside any of these experiences as "abnormal."

Nor shall we assume as "abnormal" that unique phase of the 1930's during which the active trade balance of the United

[2] The financing balance is the balance of private and governmental capital movements, capital earnings, unilateral government transfers, gold movements, personal and institutional remittances. Insurance transactions are included in the trade balance. Apart from errors and omissions in the balance of payments, the trade and financing balances as defined here are identical in size.

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Table I

Balance of International Transactions of the United States in Goods and Non-Financial Services, 1914-1948 (a)

	Merchandise Trade Balance	Silver Balance	Balance on Shipping and Freight	Balance on Travel Expenditures	Balance on Gov't "Household" Items	Miscellaneous Private Services (net)	Total Trade Balance	Average Annual Trade Balance
July 1, 1914 to Dec. 31, 1918	+11,808 (b)	(b)	−379	(c)	(c)	(c)	+11,429	+2,540
1919	+4,016	+150	+291	−67	−763	−79	+3,548	
1920	+2,950	+26	+271	−123	−131	−68	+2,925	
1921	+1,976	−11	+60	−124	−71	−98	+1,732	
1922	+719	−8	−55	−182	−54	−30	+390	
Sub-total (1919 to 1922)	+9,661	+157	+567	−496	−1,019	−275	+8,595	+2,149
1923	+375	−2	−30	−189	−44	−14	+96	
1924	+981	+36	−46	−226	−47	−18	+680	
1925	+683	+35	−73	−264	−49	0	+332	
1926	+378	+23	−45	−262	−52	+1	+43	
1927	+680	+21	−57	−286	−46	−30	+282	
1928	+1,037	+19	−88	−327	−53	−60	+528	
1929	+842	+19	−119	−344	−62	−30	+306	
1930	+782	+11	−152	−334	−60	−2	+245	
Sub-total (1923 to 1930)	+5,758	+162	−610	−2,232	−413	−153	+2,512	+314
1931	+333	−2	−119	−247	−64	+14	−85	
1932	+288	−6	−84	−194	−62	+19	−39	
1933	+225	−41	−46	−133	−51	+28	−18	
1934	+478	−91	−63	−137	−42	+56	+201	
1935	+236	−396	−67	−144	−58	+69	−360	
1936	+33	−114	−89	−180	−64	+74	−340	
1937	+265	−88	−130	−213	−47	+123	−90	
Sub-total (1931 to 1937)	+1,858	−738	−598	−1,248	−388	+383	−731	−104
1938	+1,134	−206	−36	−73	−46	+80	+753	
1939	+859	−77	−64	−155	−39	+64	+588	
1940	+1,466	−55	+69	−96	−73	+55	+1,366	
1941	+1,898	−41	+219	−143	+1	+118	+2,052	
Sub-total (1938 to 1941)	+5,357	−379	+188	−567	−157	+317	+4,759	+1,190
1942	+5,260	−38	+426	−73	+264	+220	+6,059	
1943	+9,687	+1	+767	−89	+63	+244	+10,673	
1944	+11,280	+100	+908	−108	−349	+235	+12,066	
1945	+6,744	+63	+888	−147	−2,165	+300	+5,683	
Sub-total (1942 to 1945)	+32,971	+126	+2,989	−417	−2,187	+999	+34,481	+8,620
1946	+6,727	−21	+841	−205	−445	+298	+7,195	
1947	+10,022	−37	+1,008	−210	−601	+249	+10,431	
1948	+5,748	−58	+394	−294	−746	+236	+5,338	
Sub-total (1946 to 1948)	+22,497	−116	+2,243	−709	−1,792	+783	+22,964	+7,655
GRAND TOTAL	+89,910	−788	+4,400	−5,669	−5,956	+2,054	+84,009	+2,435

Notes: (a) In millions of dollars; inflow of dollars: +, outflow: −. (b) Silver balance included in merchandise trade balance. (c) Data not available.

Sources: 1914-1918: J. H. Williams, "The Balance of International Payments for the

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States turned into a passive balance. These were years of withdrawal from international involvement, a time when "the nation in its trouble turned in upon itself."[3] On the rapid downgrade of the Depression and on the slow upgrade of recovery, the United States had a passive trade balance. The question arises whether a turn in the trade balance in the foreseeable future could be had at a lesser price in wealth and power than we paid in the 1930's.

The first World War wiped out the net debtor position of the United States and made us a "new creditor nation." From that time on, an active trade balance was no longer needed to meet financial obligations contracted with foreigners. It became a matter of choice, from the point of view of national policy. This transition, together with the decline of the foreign financing capacity of other nations, finally put the United States in the unique position of being the only nation free to decide whether or not to sustain a continual export surplus to the rest of the world.

Clearly, this freedom urgently requires an understanding of the role of our active trade balance. The freedom has been used in the course of the past thirty-five years, and the experience contains important lessons. The active balance is still with us, and it may comprise one of the greatest opportunities, and if misused, one of the greatest dangers to welfare and peace.

Welfare and Power

Before examining the forces that have kept our trade balance active it should be pointed out that according to all appearances its recurrence has been consistent with the tremendous growth of the productivity and the living standards as well as the power of this nation. The only serious setback suffered in

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U. S. for the year 1920," *Review of Economic Statistics* (June 1921), p. 201.

1919-1939: U. S. Department of Commerce, *The United States in the World Economy* (1943), Table I.

1940-1944: U. S. Department of Commerce, *International Transactions of the United States During the War* (1948), pp. 15, 61, 84, 85, 176.

1945-1948: Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, June 1948 and June 1949.

[3] Barbara Ward, *The West at Bay*, New York, W. W. Norton, 1948, p. 107.

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this growth, during the 1930's, was paralleled by the disappearance of the active trade balance. There is no evidence in our national experience that the dispatching of an excess of goods



and services to the outside world retarded the growth of our economy and our welfare at any time, and there is much evidence to the contrary. On the average of the thirty-five years, that excess amounted to 2.3 percent of gross national product.

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Only in three years (1917, 1943 and 1944) did the percentage exceed 5 percent of the national product. (See chart on page 44.*)

The goods and services transferred to the outside world came of course out of the "national cake," but the cake grew in the turbulent process that called forth the transfers, and the process left the nation richer and stronger, not weaker and poorer. No allowance need be made for the amount or the soundness of the capital claims on foreigners built up during that time. They are only a fraction of the cumulative trade balance and quite marginal to our welfare and security.[4] Nor need we count the increase of our gold stock by about $20 billion as an important asset. The essential political and economic assets brought home by the export surplus were not of the easily measurable type. This may explain the paradox of the nation's wealth growing with the practice of "give-away."

The active trade balance of the United States has become a direct expression of the nation's political stature and power. In a world that is continually hungry for greater supplies of goods—although sometimes creating the spurious impression of surfeit—the supply capacity of this country over and above its external requirements could not fail to become a measure of its power and a prime instrument of international leadership. This applies to "civilization goods" and war goods, which in alternation have been demanded from us and supplied by us

* The chart "International Trade Balance of the United States as Percentage of Gross National Product" is based on data derived from the following sources.

Trade Balance: 1919-1948 from Table I; 1914-1918 annual figures based on Bullock, Williams and Tucker, "The Balance of Payments of the United States," *The Review of Economic Statistics*, vol. I (1919), p. 235.

Gross National Product: 1929-1948 from *Survey of Current Business*, 1919-1928 values derived from M. Hoffenberg, "Estimates of National Output," *The Review of Economic Statistics*, vol. XXV (1943), p. 108, by adjustment to the Department of Commerce GNP series. For 1914-1918, basic data from Simon Kuznets, *National Income Since 1869*, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, p. 119, prorated according to W. C. Mitchell, editor, *Income in the United States*, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1922, p. 331.

[4] The value of United States investments abroad minus foreign investments in the United States has been estimated by the Deparment of Commerce as $12.3 billion at the end of 1937. This is no more than 16 percent of net foreign financing during the preceding 34 years. The value of that investment to the nation of course will depend more on future developments in the world economy than on the amounts that now appear on the books.

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to the outside world. Whatever the vagaries of the market, the world basically demands economic leadership by supply and investment. There are too many hungry mouths to be fed to permit the richest nation to aim at taking more goods out of the world than it puts in.

The manufactured products of the United States have become the standards of progress, productive efficiency, consumer's convenience and handiness to use, for people in all parts of the world. From dehydrated eggs and American cigarettes to jeeps and air conditioning equipment, American products are now identified with the advance of material civilization for which most of the world is hankering. Similarly, mass-produced American war goods, from liberty ships to electronic equipment, became standard of modern war gear. And where foreign appreciation has been lagging, American tourists and soldiers abroad, as well as the selling efforts of American producers, have helped to create tastes and demands for American products.

Not only are existing American manufactured products eagerly sought abroad, but a reputation, perhaps a "mystique," has been established that America can design, mass-produce and export the "latest" in instruments of living and warfare. There can be no doubt that this reputation is one measure of America's power in the world. The active trade balance is both a consequence and a test of the existence of that power.

The power deriving from supply capacity is emphasized by the high degree of self-sufficiency in our raw material basis. Nature and human innovation have shared in making the most important resources of food production and manufacturing, twentieth century style, available in abundance within the territorial United States and its friendly surroundings. Of course, at any particular time there have been and always will be certain resources that are lacking at home or expected to be lacking at some future date. They are sought abroad to fill a current gap, to permit stockpiling or conservation of domestic resources. These imports of raw materials, in fact, constitute the hard core of our import needs. Most of the rest of our im-

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ports would be called "non-essential" in any country accustomed to strict householding in its foreign economy. But more important, this country has proved able to satisfy essential raw material requirements by substitution. With its broad basis of natural resources and its technological and managerial capacities, it can produce the lacking resources synthetically or find good substitutes for them. Our industrial system has proved capable of enlarging its generous foundation and of adapting it to new needs without hardship to the people. Nylon, synthetic rubber, and plastics are no *Ersatz* for us. This has dampened our import needs and lowered the scale of our propensity to import in the midst of full employment. Advances in the field of atomic energy and other fields open further possibilities in this direction.

During the thirty-five years as a whole, the difference between American economic development and that of the other major industrial nations of the world has increased our relative supply capacity and the need of the world for its use. While the United States has been forging ahead, with only one major interruption during the Great Depression, the development of Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Russia, Japan and their dependencies during the same time has been checked more than once by heavy war burdens, devastation, depressions, or civil war. The difference has caused time and again an urgent need for additional exports of foodstuffs, coal, steel, cotton and many manufactures, for relief and recovery. It has meant the repeated interruption of the inflow of foreign manufactures or services into the United States, and an encouragement to their substitution by domestic products. It put our optics, aircraft, synthetic rubber and other industries on their feet and helped the United States to become a net exporter of shipping services, first and tentatively during the years following World War I, second and perhaps more definitely, from 1940 on.

At full performance, our economy has tended to outstrip its raw material basis and produced some new import needs. But in the main, the differential development has sustained

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our capacity to contribute more goods and services to the world than we are taking out of it.

Uncoveted Leadership

Support and enforcement of the active trade balance during the thirty-five years have not resulted from a deliberate policy of the United States Government. We have not been accustomed to seeing in the active balance a desirable feature of our political economy. Domestic economic considerations usually have not held us to such a view.[5] Professional opinion generally has been critical of the phenomenon, more concerned with its abolition—through stimulation of imports—than its continuation.[6] As a regular means of "increasing the riches and power of the country" the active trade balance has aroused little interest. The effective use of this means by the nation in past years suggests that this view may have been mistaken.

The chief source of the mistake probably has been the neglect of a basic political fact, the role of the United States as a leading nation in the world. Uncoveted, this role has been pressed upon this country by its own success and the failures or lags of others. The economic welfare and the security of this country depend now decisively on a peaceful and balanced process of economic development in an area extending far beyond its boundaries.[7]

In several ways, our thinking on foreign economy has been diverted from the problem of leadership inherent in our position. Our foreign economy has been considered alternatively as part of a leaderless international system, as a means for

[5] Directly traceable effects of the export surplus and foreign financing on employment tend to be small in comparison with the magnitudes of the domestic economy. See Norman S. Buchanan, *International Investment and Domestic Welfare*, New York, Henry Holt, 1945, pp. 138, 143, and Calvin B. Hoover, *International Trade and Domestic Employment*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1945, p. 14. But this does not exclude a strong impact on certain sections of the domestic economy at certain times, and on the whole of it via the political conditions that the foreign transactions help to create beyond our boundaries.

[6] In the extreme, professional opinion has taken the recurrence of the active trade balance and foreign financing as an indication of perpetual waste and suffering on the part of this country. "For nearly three decades . . . the United States has been the principal sufferer . . . inasmuch as, to keep things going, it has been impelled, practically throughout the period, to subsidize the rest of the world on a very large scale." Frank D. Graham, *The Cause and Cure of the "Dollar Shortage,"* Princeton, N. J., January, 1949, p. 14.

[7] "The welfare of the World is now our responsibility," President Truman in an address to new Senators and Congressmen, April 6, 1949.

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the nation to gain through trade in consumption or employment, or as an overflow of a virtually autarchic domestic economy. These conceptions tend to blur leadership problems by referring them to anonymous or fictitious authority or by submerging them under problems of competition between trading nations.[8] They fail to focus on the basic identity of the American national interest with the success of Western civilization and on dependence of the outside world on American economic assistance to safeguard or achieve progress in that direction. Nor do these conceptions facilitate an understanding of such problems of the led as confidence in leadership, the safeguarding of national rights, "grievance machinery," and so forth.[9] If they have dominated our thinking, as is submitted here, what has prevented the retirement of the United States from economic world leadership in the past, and what has maintained or reinforced the active trade balance that appears as a decisive instrument and test of that leadership?

The answer to this question may be found in three observations: (1) A disposition at home to refuse the adjustments required by a resignation from leadership. This disposition has produced powerful countermovements to any orderly withdrawal of the country toward the status of an "old creditor." (2) The shock of recognized international emergencies. Such shocks have called forth responses of genuine leadership from this country. (3) Finally, a growing readiness to exercise a measure of leadership in peacetime economic development, at least in a tentative manner.

[8] In the economic literature the leadership problem usually is submerged under the recognition of the sheer quantitative weight of our economy in the world picture ("what we do is bound to affect the others") or under the problems of compliance with certain trade rules ("we must play the game"). The combination of international leadership and foreign financing in the United States position seems to be more easily noticed by British or other foreign observers. See Geoffrey Crowther, *The Economic Reconstruction of Europe*, Claremont, California, 1948, chapter III, and François Perroux, *Le Plan Marshall*, Paris, 1948, second essay. The American literature on the other hand contains a few references to that combination in Britain's pre-1914 position. See Frank W. Fetter, "The United States and World Trade," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (January 1948), p. 166.

[9] I should like to use this opportunity to draw attention to General Eisenhower's wise comments on the problems of leadership in an international enterprise. Cf., Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1948, pp. 29-30 and *passim*.

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Countermovements to Adjustment[10]

The recurrence of large active trade balances has been enforced, during the last thirty-five years, by the financial measures that implemented America's responses to the challenges of war, postwar reconstruction and world-wide economic development. In that sense, the story of the active trade balance has been the story of the War Loans, the investments of the 1920's, Lend-Lease, and ERP.

But besides those formidable measures internal processes in the American economy have worked throughout the period to maintain an active trade balance. First there are the export drives of the time. American agricultural and industrial producers typically turn to foreign markets to supplement their sales in the great domestic market. Such additions to domestic sales have been sought on a permanent or a temporary basis, to establish the desired scale of production, to keep it employed in the face of a slack in the home market, or to open up reserve markets in anticipation of future slumps. In most fields of industry, agriculture, and services the resources specifically assigned to export production are relatively small compared with European countries; but the interests are there. Their manifestations and pressures are bound to be strongest, and cumulative, in times of shrinking domestic markets.

At this point, an important political factor must be acknowledged. Our political system makes legislative and executive authority very sensitive to the pressure of economic groups that command considerable voting power. What these groups conceive to be their vital interests the system has difficulty in overriding. Political authority may divert but cannot lightly disregard the export pressure of organized producers in distress.

Export drives do not create a supply of dollars for foreigners; they presuppose such a supply and seek to absorb it. But if they do not find it in existence, they favor its creation at least to the extent that the extra dollars can be expected to sustain particular exports. Export drives have won the creation of special dollar credits for exports (by the Export-Import

[10] This discussion is focused on the apparent unreadiness of the nation to undertake the economic adjustments required for transition to an "old creditor" status. It should not be overlooked, however, that such a transition would also call for far-reaching political and moral adjustments.

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Bank) and acted as a powerful obstacle to the suppression of the active balance.

The protectionist drives of the time are frequently assigned a major role in keeping our commodity and service imports below exports. Like the export drives, these have come and gone with the changes in the domestic market situation, the rise and fall of specific industries, the eagerness of foreigners to try their luck in the American market. Their most outstanding appearances have been in certain fields of manufacturing and in shipping, where they have been working for protective tariffs, restrictive customs practices, and the preferential treatment of domestic producers.

There is little doubt that in the absence of these drives and their effects, imports of certain commodities and services would have been greater during most of the thirty-five-year period. By how much they would have been greater is a question beyond answer; there is no way of disentangling the effects of tariff changes and changes in effective demand and supply during the past for the economy as a whole.[11] But the fact that political protectionism held down certain types of imports and thus reduced total imports does not mean that it has played an important role in producing the surplus of exports over imports. Greater American imports by supplying additional dollars to the outside world might well have called forth greater exports and left the balance unchanged during part or all of the period.[12]

It is well known that protection by political means is not the only protection for the American market. Our industrial and distribution system has its own protective devices. These are perhaps of greater importance than the tariff.

In the first place, there is the much renowned efficiency of the American productive mechanism, the economies of scale, management, capital application, and labor efficiency that tend to lower absolute costs of production and distribution. Secondly, there is the vigorous process of innovation and improve-

[11] See Hal B. Lary, *The United States in the World Economy*, Washington, D. C., U. S. Govt. printing office, 1943, p. 53. For a partial separation of income, price and tariff factors, see J. H. Adler, "United States Import Demand During the Interwar Period," *American Economic Review*, vol. 35, no. 3 (June 1945), pp. 418 ff.

[12] See C. P. Kindleberger, "International Monetary Stabilization," in *Postwar Economic Problems* (Seymour E. Harris, ed.), New York, McGraw-Hill, 1943, pp. 375 ff.

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ment that changes comparative cost relations, makes them unpredictable and unreliable for the long-range dispositions of foreign business. Thirdly, the markets for mass-produced articles demand a scale of supply, a continuity of specifications of products, an extent and persistency of the sales effort, a degree of acclimatization of the selling organization that are hard to create and maintain by foreign producers. The markets for specialties are either local, unstable and unremunerative or else subject to invasion by mass production. Fourthly, there is the competitive process which makes it difficult for the "foreign job" to survive a buyers' market given the lack of political protection to the foreign producer. These are tremendous obstacles to the building up of imports of manufactured goods.

The size of the American market is of course a real stimulant to imports that are unopposed by domestic competition. It attracts foreign primary products needed by industry, and this attraction can be emphasized by stockpiling and conservation activities over and above the effects of high employment. But it can also be de-emphasized by substitution and declines of employment.

It may be noted here that export and protectionist drives have been reinforced by the differential between American economic development and that of foreign nations, noted above. Calamity abroad and accelerated economic performance at home have repeatedly provoked the development of productive capacities in this country that could or did become "surplus" shortly thereafter. Such capacities created vested interests that called for protection at home or for markets abroad.

The interplay of the three drives, export pressures, and protection by political and economic (competitive) methods, produces a situation that deviates significantly from that of "trade between countries" usually considered in international trade theory. Where "comparative advantage" calls for imports to the United States today, the tempo of change in ways and means produces comparative disadvantage for the foreigner tomorrow and buttresses an export drive from this country. Or where ways and means remain the same, political protectionism comes in and pits the arguments of "unfair competi-

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tion" and "sweated labor" against the importer. And if the situation calls for major adjustments in the livelihood of important or "strategic" population groups, the drive is bound to get a hearing before democratic political bodies.

It is not the purpose of this discussion to "argue the case" of these traditional drives that tend to sustain an active trade balance. Nor do we deny that they can seriously damage domestic and foreign welfare when they become masters of foreign economic policy. It should not even be thought that the cumulative effect of these drives always works toward a larger active trade balance. For instance, protectionist barriers to certain imports from abroad may under certain conditions create barriers to American exports (this idea has found a reflection in the Hull trade agreements program). But it is proposed here that, on balance, these drives have worked to uphold the active trade balance. They are inseparable companions of our dynamic economy and political democracy, may be checked in detail, but cannot be expected to abate as a whole, particularly not in times of underemployment.

In 1932, Moulton and Pasvolsky, in their study of the debts of World War I, stated the problem of the export and protectionist drives sharply, perhaps too sharply: "American policy not only calls for a restriction of imports in all competitive lines, but also for promotion of exports in every possible direction."[13] Although the administrations in power since that time have been far from underwriting such a policy *in principle*, the pressures and attitudes that have supported it remain unimpaired. But even if Moulton and Pasvolsky overstated the power of these pressures, America's approach to world affairs, in interventions and withdrawals during the thirty-five years, ensured the correctness of their conclusion for our balance of payments. "One thing is certain—that a country which is unwilling to receive payments cannot be paid."[14]

Catastrophe of Withdrawal

During the thirty-five-year period as a whole, this country proved "unwilling to receive payments" in the sense of accept-

[13] Harold G. Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, *War Debts and World Prosperity*, Washington, D. C., Brookings Institution, 1932, p. 398.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 402.

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ing a passive trade balance. Its most unhappy experience was the time when it was forced by uncontrollable circumstances to adjust itself to a net receipt of "payments." The early 1930's is the one time when the "old creditor nation" pattern was forced on our balance of payments. The fact that this happened in the form of a crisis rather than of "gradual maturing" does not diminish the value of the evidence. Indeed, this fact suggests the incompatibility of the old creditor nation pattern with the position of this country in our time.[15]

Without attempting to argue a line of single causality, we must observe the relative weakness and the irregularity of our foreign financing during the 1920's. Only in two years, 1924 and 1928, did net foreign financing exceed the half-billion mark. Between 1923 and 1930, the net outward movement of private capital, then the prime mover of foreign financing, averaged $544 million. It was less than the annual average net intake of interest and dividend transfers ($581 million).[16]

The Senate investigation on foreign investments, in 1931-32, focused attention on the "madness of lending" in the 1920's. Senators and international investment bankers showed little concern about the irregularity of the stream of our long-term capital exports and their drying up toward the end of the 1920's. Yet, the desiccation of this stream contributed greatly to the advent and spread of the Great Depression.

In the late 1920's private capital following the guidance of its natural indicators, was cautioned by economic difficulties in certain debtor countries, particularly among raw material producers. At the same time, the stock market boom in this country offered gains to investors and attracted capital from abroad. The rapid decline of the net outflow of capital from the United States, from 1928 onward, increased and exposed the instability of the international economic structure. The structure toppled over readily when the boom broke in this country.

[15] The notion of a "gradually maturing creditor country" may indeed be quite meaningless for a leading industrial nation in the framework of world politics. Britain's modern history offers perhaps the least unfortunate example imaginable of such a transition. Yet even the favorable circumstances that cushioned the eclipse of London as the center of the world do not veil the loss of power and wealth that attended a half-century of retreats and pyrrhic victories.

[16] See Hal B. Lary, *op. cit.*, Table I.

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During the subsequent years, a revival of private capital export was effectively barred by the ensuing defaults of foreign debtors, the disintegration of the financial system (transfer difficulties, expropriations) and the ominous political reactions that marked the Great Depression. Once blow began to follow blow, the interest in retrenchment and withdrawal blotted out the interest in new enterprise.

In any divorce, either both parties are to blame or neither is; but it is common for each party to blame the other. In the international economic divorce of the Great Depression, the defaulting foreign debtors personified the evil to many American creditors. The Congress strongly reflected this sentiment. The Johnson Act of 1934 and certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 were not instrumental in stopping foreign lending; but they expressed in terms of public policy the resentment of the bewildered American public and the willingness to withdraw from further entanglements in international commitments. The "old creditor nation" pattern was ushered in by a strong isolationist reaction.

Domestic capital owners temporarily helped to deepen the imprint of the pattern by selling depreciated foreign obligations. And as that movement abated foreign capital owners revived its substance by sending flight capital to the United States. Thus the financial system was fully employed in a progressive liquidation of this country's net creditor position.

Reading the record of the early 1930's, one will not find much inclination anywhere to have the government open new channels for an outflow of development capital. Disappointment over foreign delinquencies and the scolding of the delinquents completely banned the thought of government loans or grants to the outside world. For the beginning of a reversal of this position we have to look to the developments in the field of trade.

Contracting world commerce and the growing economic isolationism of all major countries affected our exports more strongly than our imports. With exports of goods and non-financial services falling faster than imports, the American trade balance was neutralized and turned into a slightly passive balance in 1931 and 1932. The balance of merchandise trade

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remained active; but after having declined continually since 1928, the active merchandise balance of 1932/33 was only about one-fourth of that peak year.

The circumstances under which the active trade balance disappeared left no room for satisfaction over the adjustment of our balance of payments to an "old creditor nation" pattern. Instead, this development met the fierce resistance of protectionist and export drives. The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 was perhaps the first manifestation of this resistance. It increased the barriers to imports of foreign manufactures; but it also helped increase foreign barriers to our exports. After the advent of the New Deal, the export and protectionist drives, fully aroused, sought and found expression in national policy. The competitive devaluation of the dollar in 1933 was designed to lend force to the export drive for agricultural products. From 1934 on, the Export-Import Bank was put in the service of financing agricultural and industrial exports (this remained its main concern until the end of the 1930's). Recognition of Soviet Russia was expected to lead to a substantial increase of our exports of manufactures. Finally, the Hull trade agreement program, from 1934 on was effective in raising American exports, by trading reductions of the Smoot-Hawley tariff level for foreign concessions to our exports. Protectionist and export drives combined to reactivate U. S. foreign trade by reactivating U. S. exports. The obstacle to imports of manufactures were raised, as under the Smoot-Hawley tariff, or lowered, as under the Hull trade agreements, in a fashion unfavorable to a neutral or passive trade balance.

But the resistance was not strong enough to keep the passive balance from prevailing. After a fleeting return of the active trade balance in 1934, the balance became passive again. Despite the dollar devaluation, the active trade balance could not remain after 1934 in the face of a capital account that showed a huge net inflow of funds, both short-term and long-term, into the United States. It is noteworthy that the "interests" proved strong enough to prevent a durable turn in the trade balance and yet failed to implement a revival of a strongly active balance.

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Here was the dilemma: the inflow of funds could not be stemmed, let alone reversed, in view of the state of the world and America's disinclination to get involved in its management. Nor could the trade balance be kept active; but powerful forces in the economy opposed its becoming more passive. With disinvestment and capital flight proceeding overseas and our economy seeking recovery along the line of greater exports, the trade in precious metals came to square the accounts.

Beginning in 1934, as is well known, an enormous stream of gold and silver imports was employed to balance the progressive liquidation of this country's net creditor position. The pressure of the domestic silver interests for a higher silver price and the attempt of the administration to foster recovery by a standing offer to buy gold at a high price helped to make imports of precious metals take the place of the unavailable trade adjustment. Paradoxically, the opening up of the "cemetery for the world's precious metals" was a cause of great international disturbance, as well as a forerunner of new international financing and order.

The arrival of the "old creditor nation" pattern in our balance of payments spelled catastrophe to economic and political relations. The consequences of that shift can hardly be exaggerated. When the most productive nation ceases to invest abroad and becomes the refuge of flight capital, every nation in the world is precipitated into a struggle for survival. Discrimination in trade is justified and so is preparedness for the struggle of succession.[17] The general international chaos that accompanied our unsuccessful experiment with a passive trade balance ruled out the recognition of common interests between nations, economic or otherwise, as well as the constructive assertion of American power in the world. Common international interests and American leadership then were undefinable empty words. The vacuum thus created was an invi-

[17] That experience has left traces on the memory of many contemporaries. It still is alive in the thinking about British or European discrimination against American trade at some future time when America might again cease to lend. See the article by Thomas Balogh, "The United States and International Economic Equilibrium," in *Foreign Economic Policy for the United States* (Seymour E. Harris, ed.), Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Press, 1948, pp. 466 ff.

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tation to aggression. By 1941, the danger had become unmistakable.

This catastrophic pattern was only reversed in a definitive way with the enactment of Lend-Lease in 1941.[18] It was then that the threat of an alliance of a hostile Europe and a hostile Asia against the United States was realized in this country. The relation between this measure of foreign economic policy and America's view of its role in the world has been stated simply and eloquently by Edward Stettinius:

> The American people debated Lend-Lease as no issue in our foreign policy had ever been debated before. As a nation, we finally thought through the entire problem of our national security in a dangerous world. The debate reached from the halls of Congress to every fireside of America. The discussion grew violent and sometimes bitter . . .
>
> It was as if the whole American people were thinking out loud. I felt then, and feel now, that in the process we as a nation cleaned up our thinking about our place in the world. We were able to take a fresh inventory of ourselves, of our past and our future.[19]

Lend-Lease made possible an active trade balance the like of which the United States had not seen before. Its implementation threw off the "old creditor nation" pattern. It resulted in an unprecedented increase of American involvement and influence in world economic affairs. It also marked the beginning of a new order of these affairs. Lend-Lease, which has rightly been called our "declaration of inter-dependence," revived America's role as a "new creditor nation."

Responses to Emergency and Contributions to World Order

The experience of the 1930's has indicated a parallelism between the imposition of a passive trade balance on the United States and the disintegration of international order. Reactivation of the balance accompanied the response of this country to the total emergency. The response, including new active

[18] The rise of the active trade balance from 1937 to 1940 should not be considered a definitive reversal. No political decision had yet been made. The balance of capital transactions remained passive. The export surplus was financed mainly by gold imports.

[19] Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory*, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 4 and 72.

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financing, became a new basis of international order. But order could not be re-established in the way of the Twenties.

The shape of the international order of the 1920's may be described briefly as one of sovereign nations engaging in international trade and banking under the control of the gold standard mechanism operated by the banking system for the business community, and under the protection of a peace maintained by a complex balance of power between several major national governments. This conception was taken over from the nineteenth century.[20] America's foreign economic operations during World War I and the 1920's contributed greatly to the implementation of this conception—and to its *reductio ad absurdum*. The war loans of World War I sustained the governments of the Entente in warfare. The reconstruction loans helped to sustain old, and establish new, national governments. The private loans and investments of the 1920's helped to develop national economies and their trade with each other. They raised levels of living abroad, strengthened the middle class and moderate socialism, and forestalled revolution. Taken at the time of the original capital transfers through the trade balance, these transactions contributed decisively to the viability and progress of foreign private and public economies.

But the responsibilities assumed by the United States were of a strictly financial sort. They were not part of a commitment to sustain the welfare and peace of the *outside* world. In the eyes of our postwar government it was the exclusive responsibility of the foreign nations to make the economic adjustments needed to ensure the service of their financial obligations to the United States creditors at that time. Our government refused to be saddled with responsibilities for economic processes at home and *a fortiori* abroad.[21] If foreign nations needed economic assistance they should address themselves to American banks; that was the proper channel for economic relations.

The attempt to treat the war and reconstruction loans and the developmental investments of the 1920's as private trans-

[20] But the facts of the nineteenth century were not. In particular, there was nothing in the 1920's to replace the British navy and the City of London as centers of world economy and power.

[21] A letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the President of the United States Chamber of Commerce of January 28, 1920, quoted in Hal B. Lary, *op. cit.*, p. 139, is most revealing of this view.

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actions between bankers and borrowers, and to "privatize" reparations obligations, imposed complex and burdensome economic arrangements on an international political system that lacked all the safeguards and redistributive features of common government. These arrangements obstructed the achievement of the very purposes which they were meant to serve. Instead of supporting a steadily rising and spreading process of economic development, private financing ebbed away toward the end of the 1920's and left the world economy short of an expansive impetus and full of obligations that could not be met in the absence of such an impetus. The close tie between economic and political foreign relations, recognized under the impact of the war but defied during prosperity and peace, asserted itself in the joint political and economic crisis of the 1930's.

The order of the 1940's, emerging in connection with the Lend-Lease and ERP programs, the Atlantic Defense pact and other institutions, shows a different shape from that of the 1920's. It seems to reveal a pattern of concerted management of economic and political relations between nations led by the United States, with the Soviet Union endeavoring to build up a countersystem. This pattern differs greatly from that of the 1920's. It clearly implies an international center with regard to power and responsibilities. It involves certain limitations of national sovereignties, chiefly through the development of common executive institutions and the explicit recognition of common interests between nations with regard to peace, prosperity and ways of living. Typically, political and economic affairs now tend to be considered jointly, government and business agencies to be pulled together—cooperatively and competitively—in the efforts of dealing with them. International executive bodies such as SHAEF, OEEC, the World Bank, and the Monetary Fund are characteristic institutions of this order in the making. These agencies are to coordinate national efforts and policies, to pool resources among partners, and allocate such resources within wide cooperating areas. Together with other United Nations and regional institutions these are pilot plants of common government.

American foreign financing, applied through the active trade balance, has played a vital role in furthering the growth of

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order in this direction. There would have been no SHAEF—and no victory—without Lend-Lease. There would have been no OEEC—and no European recovery under freedom—without ERP. The outlook for the World Bank would be dim indeed if America chose not to make an effective contribution to the economic development of underdeveloped countries. The Atlantic Defense system would have no future without American contributions to the defenses of the European nations; neither would Benelux or broader schemes of European union in the absence of sustained foreign financing.

The active trade balance is the practical way by which American assistance has been and can be transferred to underequipped allies, disturbed economies of "old" countries, poor economies of "new" countries. It is the necessary means of supporting and cushioning transition processes in foreign economies that are deemed necessary and advantageous for local prosperity and international cooperation. Without a sizeable active trade balance it would be very difficult for this country to act as the "economic stabilizer for most of the rest of the world, for generations to come," as ECA Administrator Paul G. Hoffman recently proposed.[22] Fortunately, efforts at economic stabilization are no longer considered outside the legitimate field of public authority. But we face peculiar difficulties in using foreign financing as a steady means of international economic development.

Fatigue that Comes with Success

The powerful implementation of the active trade balance by foreign financing, borne at least four times in the past by the national response to emergencies, is subject to a dangerous tendency of wearing off prematurely. The very success of the financing measures seems to produce a measure of fatigue and disappointment at a time when success is most pronounced; and there appears an inclination to cut them short. The frustration seems to feed on anachronistic concepts of foreign economy, revived by the apparent return of "normal" conditions and a dulling of the sense of international tension. It causes the premature liquidation of working mechanisms of international cooperation.

[22] Interview with Cabell Phillips, *New York Times Magazine*, April 3, 1949.

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The tendency toward abrupt termination of working measures of foreign financing, in the absence of new and reliable methods, appeared at the end of World War I and World War II (war loans and Lend-Lease). A tendency to foreshorten its duration, curtail its scope, and to identify success with complete termination of sustained financing has made itself felt increasingly in the course of ERP. Large active trade balances of the United States, rather than being recognized as the means of a leading new creditor nation engaged in shaping an international order, are taken again for proofs or portents of imbalance in our international accounts, expressing calamity and loss to the United States. Domestic institutional issues such as the respective roles of government and business in foreign financing come to becloud the international issue.[23] In such a setting, the exercise of our economic leadership is greatly endangered, and the implementation of new foreign financing likely to be slighted. If the experience of the last thirty-five years counts, premature termination or curtailment of foreign financing is a portent of international crisis.

Against this dangerous fatigue may be pitted a growing insight on the part of the American people into the role of our foreign economy, a learning by trial and error. From time to time professional discussions and policy statements recognize the vital role of large-scale foreign financing and seek the right criteria and means for its execution.[24] In a pragmatic manner,

[23] While debating whether foreign financing by government is "extraordinary" and that by business the only "normal" type we risk overlooking the quantitative and qualitative complementary of the two channels of financing. The division of tasks between government and business financing presents the real problem. See in this connection the report of the Brazilian delegation on "Foreign Investments in Brazil," in *Report of the Joint Brazil-United States Technical Commission,* Department of State Publication No. 3487, Washington, D. C., June, 1949, pp. 288 ff.

[24] In the professional discussion, the late war and first postwar years produced valuable insights, in the first place, Hal Lary's classic *The United States in the World Economy* (1943). See also the papers on International Economic Relations by C. P. Kindleberger, Eugene Staley, Eugene V. Rostow, Frank W. Fetter, Victor Schoepperle, and discussions in the *American Economic Review,* Supplement, March 1943.

In the field of policy statements, President Roosevelt's famous Lend-Lease press conference, President Truman's message to Congress calling for a European aid program (1947), General Marshall's speech at Harvard, and the "Point Four" paragraphs in the President's Inaugural Address of 1948. In connection with the latter, see the address by John R. Steelman, "Goals and Practical Problems of the Point-4 Program," *State Department Bulletin,* June 12, 1949.

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new means and criteria have been found where the old ones proved barren.

An interesting measure of change in the approach to the problem of leadership can be seen by comparing basic statements of the American policy position in 1920 and 1947.[25] Analogous paragraphs from 1920 statements against cancellation of World War I debts and 1947 statements in support of the European Recovery Program are arranged in parallel columns.[26]

In each case, the policy statements were made roughly two

1920	*1947*
Who should remedy the economic ills?	
The relief from present ills, in so far as it can be obtained, is primarily within the control of the debtor governments and peoples themselves . . . It is very clear to me, however, that a general cancellation of intergovernmental war debts irrespective of the positions of the separate debtor governments is of no present advantage or necessity. (Houston)	The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole . . . It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of economic health in the world . . . The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. (Marshall)
Reproach or Cooperation?	
Most of the debtor governments have not levied taxes sufficient to enable them to balance their budgets, nor have they taken any energetic and adequate measures to reduce their expenditures to meet their income. Too little progress has been made in disarmament. No appreciable progress has been made in deflating excessive issues of currency or in *stabilizing the currencies* at new levels, but in Continental Europe there has been a constant increase in note issues. Private initiative has not been restored. Unnecessary and unwise *economic barriers* still exist. Instead of setting trade and commerce free by appropriate steps there appear to be concerted efforts to obtain from the most needy discriminatory advantages and exclusive concessions. (Houston)	A successful European recovery program will depend upon two essentials. The first is that each nation separately and all nations together should take vigorous action to help themselves. The second essential is that sufficient outside aid should be made available to provide the margin of victory for the recovery program . . . Most of the necessary outside aid, if it is to come at all, must come from the United States . . . Each of the countries receiving aid will be expected . . . to pledge itself to take the following actions: (1) To promote industrial and agricultural production . . . to become independent of abnormal outside economic assistance. (2) To take financial and monetary measures necessary to *stabilize its currency* . . . (3) To cooperate with other participating countries to reduce *barriers to trade* . . . and to stimulate an active interchange of goods and services . . . (Truman)

[25] For 1920 there is a message of Secretary of the Treasury David F. Houston, dated March 1, 1920, to Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, rejecting British suggestions for the cancellation of the intergovernmental debts of World War I. (*Combined Annual Reports of the World War Foreign Debt Commission,* Washington, D. C., 1927, pp. 69-70.) Quotations from this message are supplemented by a paragraph from a letter of President Wilson to British Prime Minister Lloyd George of November 3, 1920, which deals with the same subject. (H. G. Moulton and L. Pasvolsky, *op. cit.*, p. 69.) For 1947 there is President Truman's message to Congress calling for a European aid program (December 19, 1947). Quotations from this message are supplemented by passages from Secretary of State George C. Marshall's speech at Harvard of June 5, 1947, outlining the approach to a European recovery program.

[26] The italics in the text are the author's and have been used to indicate parallels and contrasts.

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The U. S. decision

What this Government could do for the immediate relief of the debtor countries has been done. Their need now is for *private credits* . . . (Houston)

The long delay which has occurred in the funding of the demand obligations is already embarrassing the Treasury, which will find itself compelled to begin to collect back and current interest if speedy progress is not made with the funding. Unless arrangements are completed for funding such loans, and in that connection for the deferring of interest, in the present state of opinion here there is likely to develop a dangerous misunderstanding. I believe it to be highly important that a British representative with proper authority proceed to Washington without delay to arrange to carry out the obligation of the British government to convert its demand obligations held by our Treasury into long-term obligations. (Wilson)

I recommend that our *aid should be extended* partly in the form of grants and partly in the form of loans, depending primarily upon the capacity of each country to make repayments, and the effect of additional international debt upon the accomplishment of genuine recovery . . . As economic conditions in Europe improve and political conditions become more stable, *private financing* can be expected to pay an increasingly important role. (Truman)

Conception of U. S. benefits

A general cancellation as suggested would, while retaining the domestic obligations intact, throw upon the people of this country the exclusive burden of meeting the interest and of ultimately extinguishing the principal of our loans to the Allied governments. This nation has neither sought nor received substantial benefits from the war. On the other hand, the Allies, although having suffered greatly in loss of lives and property have, under the terms of the treaty of peace and otherwise acquired very considerable accessions of territories, populations, economic and other advantages. It would, therefore, seem that if a full account were taken of these and of the whole situation there would be no desire nor reason to call upon the government of this country for further contributions. (Houston)

Since surrender of the Axis powers, we have provided more than 15 billion dollars, . . . for aid to victims of the war . . . This assistance has averted stark tragedy and has aided progress toward recovery in many areas of the world. It is of vital importance to the United States that European recovery be continued to ultimate success . . . Our deepest concern with European recovery . . . is that it is essential to the maintenance of the civilization in which the American way of life is rooted . . . (Failure of European recovery) would constitute a shattering blow to peace and stability . . . It might well compel us to modify our economic system and to forego . . . the enjoyment of many of our freedoms. (Truman)

years after the termination of a world war. They were prompted by economic and political troubles in Europe and deal with similar maladjustments. But the conceptions of responsibilities, dangers and benefits, and of course the decisions concerning American action, were radically different.[27]

This growth of insight now faces a decisive test. Once more the shocks of the war and an acute postwar crisis are wearing off. The needs for our foreign financing abroad do not appear any more in the shape of total emergency but as a dull and steady pressure. In this shape they tend to be misunderstood as the designs of foreigners to live extravagantly at our expense.[28] Will large-scale foreign financing once more become a "political impossibility"?

[27] While the adoption of Lend-Lease was preceded by considerable discussion and criticism of the War-Loan experience of World War I, the author is not aware of any discussion of the refusal of American help after that war in connection with the enactment of ERP. But the change in the postwar approach was just as great as in the wartime approach, if not greater.

[28] Such designs do exist on the part of the ruling groups of certain underdeveloped countries. But their idleness and rapacity is likely to be more conquerable within the framework of an international development effort than outside of it.

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Future Trade Balance and the Outcome of ERP

Our thinking on foreign economy policy cannot well stop at the much repeated truism that we must either export less, or import more, or finance the difference. If the issue is examined in the historical and political context, the alternatives are not equivalent. Maintaining foreign financing at levels close to the present, we may succeed in raising both imports and exports and achieve a better balance in the world economy by expansive means. But failing in this task we shall risk finding powerful drives in our domestic economy pitted against the rise of imports and the curtailment of exports that would be called for. A serious lessening of foreign financing is likely to provoke economic warfare between the Western nations and disaffection from the Western cause in various parts of the world. This is the external setting in which a drastic decline of the trade balance would be most likely to occur.

It has been said that exports that are not "ultimately" paid for by imports are a loss to the nation. For a nation in our position this is likely to be a half-truth, overlooking the political and economic benefits of the export surplus that do not register in the balance of payments. Even if it were the full truth, neither domestic nor foreign developments suggest that we should hasten the arrival of the "ultimate." F. W. Taussig referred to its coming after "decades and generations" of foreign investment.[29] Why should we grow impatient after one generation?

In the foreseeable future, it would be wrong to seek economic and political benefits through the realization of a neutral or barely active trade balance. Such an approach probably would endanger the foundations of the international order that is in the making, in particular the success of ERP. We shall indeed be unable to visualize European "viability" beyond 1952 outside an active process of foreign financing by the United States that affects the European nations, directly as recipients of credit, or indirectly as exporters to developing countries. This does not mean that it would not be desirable to reduce America's active trade balance with *some* European countries, or with all of the participating countries to *some extent*, during

[29] *International Trade*, New York, Macmillan, 1927, p. 131.

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the years ahead. Many changes in the quantities and directions of our trade will be indicated as differentials in costs, supply capacities, and recognized needs and requirements change. On the other hand, it would be desirable to increase our active trade balance with the underdeveloped countries of Asia, the Mediterranean area, Africa and Latin America and to underwrite their development by our foreign financing.[30]

We shall not consider here the methods of financing a future active trade balance of the United States with particular countries or with the rest of the world as a whole. New methods seem desirable as relief and recovery are superseded by development, as long as they safeguard the effective net transfer of sufficient purchasing power to permit long-range dispositions in economic development. In the face of this important requirement, the question of what is and what is not "abnormal outside economic assistance" (Economic Cooperation Act) may take on a new meaning. The "norm" may be found in the contemporary experience of international and national, public and private financing institutions and in the requirements of sustained economic development in specific countries.

Maintenance of the momentum of economic improvement and political cooperation between now and 1952 presupposes the early conception of an imaginative and realistic financing program beyond 1952. Foreign nations will more readily rely on an international division of labor and peaceful cooperation if they are persuaded that the United States will not retire from economic leadership.

[30] An attempt to outline this shift and to assess the magnitude of total net financing needed is contained in the author's forthcoming article in the November issue of the *Review of Economics and Statistics*.

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INTERWAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE

By WILLIAM T. R. FOX[1]

WHAT is today in the United States conventionally known as international relations is a subject different in content and emphasis from its counterpart of even two decades ago. Much of what seemed important in 1929 seems irrelevant, and some of it even trivial, in 1949. Another twenty years may perhaps bring a similar judgment on work now being done. But we ought at least to be aware of the direction in which we have been moving if we are to control the future development of the field.

In 1930 the following statement passed unchallenged in a discussion among some of Ameria's leading social scientists: "The emotional drive is so highly developed in the kind of person who goes into the international relations field that it often leads to unclear thinking." The implication that no one without this drive could conceivably be persuaded to enter the field is a commentary on the disesteem with which international relations research was then regarded.

The desire for legitimacy, for recognition as a scholar by the community of scholars, has been a powerful spur to soul-searching activity. An even more compelling reason has been the failure of events in the 1930's to accord with the expectations generated by the academic study of international relations in the 1920's. From the invasion of Manchuria to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement, students of international relations too often found themselves emotionally and intellectually unprepared for the event. If they are to be taken seriously in the 1950's, they must show that they now know

[1] This paper and the succeeding one by Frederick S. Dunn were prepared for the Committee on International Relations Research of the Social Science Research Conucil. Each one has been extensively revised as a result of discussions with groups of scholars in New York, Washington, and Palo Alto.

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what went wrong, that they now know what sorts of data and analysis would have given them in the 1930's the answers that were then denied them.

I

Interest in America in the study of international relations seems to have been generated by the old nineteenth-century peace movement. The first effect of this on the academic world was an increased emphasis on international law, largely because of the central place which arbitration then occupied in plans for eliminating war.

The early years of the twentieth century saw the establishment of such institutions as the World Peace Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. To Mr. Ginn, the publisher, and Mr. Carnegie, the steelmaker, the gentlemen responsible for establishing these organizations, it seemed quite possible that with a little extra intellectual effort and a little greater missionary zeal the evil of war could be abolished. Both Mr. Ginn and Mr. Carnegie entertained high hopes for early success in abolishing this "foulest blot upon our high civilization." Carnegie even went so far as to direct Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as follows:

> When . . . war is discarded as disgraceful to civilized men, the Trustees will pleas then consider what is the next most degrading evil or evils whose banishment—or what new elevating element or elements if introduced or fostered, or both combined—would most advance the progress, elevation and happiness of man, and so on from century to century without end, my Trustees of each age shall determin how they can best aid man in his upward march to higher and higher stages of development unceasingly; for now we know that man was created, not with an instinct for his own degradation, but imbued with the desire and the power for improvement to which, perchance, there may be no limit short of perfection even here in this life upon earth.[2]

The men most influential in giving shape to college, university, and research organization work in the field of international relations between the two World Wars grew up under

[2] Mr. Carnegie's letter to the Trustees read at their first meeting, December 14, 1910, *Year Book for 1911*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C., 1912, p. 3. Andrew Carnegie was a believer in simplified spelling.

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the influence of the ideology which motivated Mr. Ginn and Mr. Carnegie to establish their respective peace organizations. They did not all share Mr. Carnegie's belief that the world could be won for peace in our time by using the techniques of the old-time revival meeting. Such a conception indeed repelled such coldly intellectual persons as Elihu Root. But they did believe that the final elimination of war was a much more simple matter than their counterparts of today believe.

Why could permanent peace seem to be an unattainable short-run objective in the early years of our century? Especially in the United States, war was thought of as a procedure for settling disputes to which rational men would resort only if other procedures were unavailable. Many, to be sure, recognized that this formula would never account for the wars of a Napoleon or a Bismarck. But they believed that the trend of history was toward free government and that a free constitutional democratic people would never permit its government to embark on wars of aggression. The recipe for peace was therefore simple: democracy, international understanding, and arbitration.

The triumphant spread of constitutional democracy was apparently taken for granted. No endowments or foundations of comparable size were set up to promote the spread of democratic institutions. The firmly established tradition of nonintervention would in any case have inhibited the growth of a popular movement to abolish the evil of absolutism. It seemed a contradiction in terms to think of imposing democratic institutions on countries not yet able to produce from within themselves a revolutionary democratic leadership.

To the assumption of the inevitable spread of free institutions, at least among the areas of European culture and inheritance, was often added the assumption of a basic harmony of interests. Why did not this underlying harmony of interests between peoples lead to a final elimination of war? The answer, it was thought, was twofold: lack of understanding and lack of procedures. The peace foundations accordingly set themselves the two tasks of promoting international intercourse and of discovering new ways of achieving the pacific settlement of international disputes.

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To promote international intercourse was to hasten the development of the international mind which would find war as irrational and anachronistic as trial by ordeal. In this situation, past experience seemed to have little to teach. It had only produced recurrent wars, and war was to be abolished. With the development of the international mind the underlying harmony of interests was expected to become apparent. Peace then would only be a matter of having available proper procedures for pacific settlement.

The fifteen years before the First World War were periods of great inventiveness in the area of pacific settlement of international disputes. The Department of State was run by lawyers; each dispute was regarded as a case; and men like Root and Carnegie could agree on the importance of expanding the use of arbitration. This is the period of the two Hague Peace Conferences. It is the period of the Bryan "cooling off" treaties. When governments actually came to the point of negotiating general arbitration treaties, they did not reflect completely the optimism of the proponents of arbitration or other forms of pacific settlement. They always left an escape hatch in the agreement to arbitrate. Thus, vital interests, independence, and honor were often three expected categories. Since these are the elastic categories into which a dispute leading to war almost always seems to fall, the elaboration of arbitration treaties apparently averted no wars. Certainly the world conflagration of 1914-18 proved that here was no sure way to eliminate war.

Four years of war disillusioned those who thought that peace was simply a matter of having available the right sort of procedures. To the prewar trinity of democracy, international understanding, and arbitration was added national self-determination, disarmament, and collective security. But the pre-World War I interest in form rather than function remained.

The old system was thought of as absolutely bad. It was in even worse repute than in 1914 when it had not yet produced the First World War. It had no lessons to teach and there was remarkably little analysis of the political function which would still have to be performed in a reorganized state system.

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The historian in this respect frequently had little more to offer than the political scientist. The tremendous research effort on war guilt seemed only to document the badness of the diplomats and their system and to contribute little to understanding the causes of war and conditions of peace.[3]

The political scientist's focus on form rather than function meant detailed consideration of the forms of the supposedly emerging world commonwealth. The international political process as it was then operating was viewed as a regrettable, but one hoped short-lived, survival from the bad old days.[4]

II

The activities of the Social Science Research Council's various international relations committees exemplify the prevailing attitude both of those social scientists working in the field and of those outside it.[5] Professor James T. Shotwell referred in a 1927 report to "new forms arising which if they mature will modify the entire relationship of civilized nations."[6] These new forms, it was said, "cannot be studied adequately by instruments at our disposal." The reference to "new forms" was of course to the Geneva institutions.

Intensive study of League activities apparently was believed to dispose of the "political" aspect of international relations.

[3] The search by the historian for *the* person or persons responsible for bringing on World War I was paralleled by other social scientists' quest for *the* cause of war. Various simplistic determinisms, other than those already alluded to, among which economic determinism and the devil theory of war were probably the most fashionable, flourished. In a way the belief in the possibility of discovering *the* cause of war reflected the prevailing optimism; for if the cause could be isolated, the cure could be prescribed.

[4] Concentration on the Geneva institutions was most highly developed in the United States but was not a unique characteristic of the American student of international relations. Professor S. H. Bailey in England was able to interpret a directive to survey educational and research activities "in so far as they tend to impart a knowledge of the League and develop a spirit of international co-operation" as a mandate to survey "the objective study of international relations." See his *International Studies in Modern Education*, London, 1938.

[5] The SSRC's major effort in the international relations field occurred between 1931 and 1933. Professor James T. Shotwell directed its work as a member of the SSRC staff, and a committee of men of affairs under Owen D. Young replaced the Council's earlier academic international relations committee. The work during this period of concentrated activity was not so much concerned with inquiries into the nature of the field as with the survey of existing organizations and creation of new research organizations here and abroad. His work therefore stands largely outside the scope of the present analysis of trends in research.

[6] "Report of the Advisory Committee on International Relations of the Social Science Research Council," mimeographed, 1927.

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There were also economic, social, and legal "aspects" to be studied, but there is no clear conception to suggest what the various studies would be aspects of.

It was said at one point that the distinctive characteristic of international relations problems was that they tended to be interdisciplinary.[7] But what the second discipline was did not in the case of most proposed studies appear in the record. What seemed to give a proposed study an international character was that it should involve collection of data from more than one country. Thus "land utilization forms in the Far East" could be and was approved as a study worthy of support as an international relations project; land utilization forms in Siam—or any other one country—presumably would not have been.

Land utilization forms may well be of great interest to students of world politics. But this might be so even if all the important data could be studied in one country. Whatever criterion should be adopted in selecting projects for research, the number of states from which data is to be collected is not such a criterion.

A similar question-begging formula for dealing with international relations research was evolved in the mid-thirties. In 1936 a reconstituted Social Science Research Council committee expressed itself in favor of what was called the "segmental approach." Robert Crane, then Director of the Council, supported this view. He asserted that it was "impossible to treat research in international relations as a unit." Their suggestion was that in accordance with the segmental approach work should begin on the economic side. Again there was no particular indication as to the economic side of what. Mr. Crane may well be right as to the lack of unity of international relations research, but it by no means follows that all important international relations projects could be fitted into then existing categories. Neither those who asserted the unity of the subject and the utility of recognizing it as a separate discipline nor the academic detractors of the subject seem to have left any place for international politics. This remained largely in the domain of the historian.

[7] Cf. *ibid.*, esp. Part II.

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The records of the Social Science Research Council's various international relations committees at no time show any sustained effort to set up criteria for determining which researches should be supported. Given adequate financial support, there were few projects recommended or even suggested which could not have been studied by methods already at the disposal of social science. Securing adequate financial support is not a minor matter, but there are few working in the field today who wish to think of the label "international relations" as simply a "come-on" device in dealing with potential donors.

III

The account of research in the interwar period has so far emphasized the role of a particular institution designed to promote research. But research is performed by individuals and not by committees seeking to promote research. Any judgment on the interwar experience in international relations research should rest upon the publications of individual scholars. Such men as the following were occupying the chief international relations professorships in political science departments during the interwar period—David P. Barrows, Charles A. Berdahl, Philip Marshall Brown, Kenneth Colegrove, Frederick S. Dunn, Charles G. Fenwick, James Garner, Ralston Hayden, Amos Hershey, Charles P. Howland, Charles Cheney Hyde, Parker T. Moon, Roland Morris, DeWitt C. Poole, Pitman Potter, Harold Quigley, Jesse S. Reeves, Frank M. Russell, James T. Shotwell, Nicholas J. Spykman, Graham Stuart, W. W. Willoughby, George Grafton Wilson, and Quincy Wright. The list is representative rather than complete and includes only men who had been appointed to professorships by 1930.

Their research is to a notable degree characterized by high technical competence and lack of chauvinism. Much of their research which has proved of great importance to the field could be and was completed without any special international relations technique having to be developed. This was especially true in the areas of international law and organization and the conduct of foreign relations, the fields of specialization of eighteen of the twenty-four men listed above. The same

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observations could be made about the research carried on by the diplomatic historian, the student of international economic policy, and the law school professor of international law.[8]

What were the attitudes and beliefs which influenced the character of the contribution which most of those in the political science profession could make to the new study of international relations? The traditional emphasis on international law was maintained, but there were other orientations more specifically associated with the interwar period, orientations which men like John Bassett Moore for example did not share.

There was a tendency to equate "peace" and "government" on the one hand and "war" and "power politics" on the other. Research was therefore strongly oriented toward international government. The typical political scientist, who in domestic politics regarded the study of government and the study of political science as identical, projected this conception onto the international scene. International politics was left to the historian and he was often preoccupied with discovering the villain in the piece.

Just as it took the bitter experience of the interwar period to dramatize the fact that democratic institutions would not automatically flourish once democratic constitutions had been adopted, so it took the breakdown of the Versailles order to make clear how much more there is to creating a world commonwealth than drafting its charter. The study of international organization has gained rather than lost urgency but emphasis is shifting to analyzing the political conditions necessary for its development.

The usually unexamined assumption that everything international was better than anything national biased the selection of research projects. Since peace and the various new proposals for insuring its perpetual maintenance seemed so obviously to be a good thing, subjects liks disarmament and pacific settlement were, as isolated problems, disproportionately overstudied. So were "good" international things like collective security and peaceful change and "bad" national things like

[8] See, for example, the works directed or edited or written by such men as Shotwell (the series on the economic and social history of the First World War), Fay and Schmitt (the war guilt studies), Hayes and Moon (on nationalism and imperialism), Merriam (the civic training series), and Hudson (the codification of international law).

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nationalist attitudes, imperialism, and the munitions makers. There was a corresponding underemphasis on "bad" international things like the Third International and "good" national things like American security. The national interests which the new international institutions were expected to protect and the ways by which these values should be protected if the new international institutions were not by themselves adequate for the job were on the whole neglected. It was thus partly traditional definitions of political science and partly culturally determined normative inhibitions which channeled research effort away from studying the politics of the contemporary state system.

Although the First World War had rudely shaken men's faith in the inevitability of progress, it was still fashionable to believe in an underlying harmony of interest which with a little more education would become apparent to men of good will in every country. Knowledge was thus held to be an automatic and sure guarantee of understanding.[9] It took Hitler and the Second World War to disillusion many men who had continued to believe that "truth" alone would reveal to men everywhere their underlying harmony of interests.

It is no doubt true that rational men equipped with what most Americans would consider socially acceptable sets of value preferences would find it difficult to discover a situation in which international war is a paying proposition for either the victor or the vanquished. Even before the First World War, Sir Norman Angell had convincingly developed "the case for peace" on rational grounds. The illusion under which Sir Norman Angell labored when in 1913 he wrote his *The Great Illusion*[10] was that he was writing for a world of rational men, equipped with value systems like his own, who were evenly distributed on the two sides of every international frontier. He did not deal with the case of a nation of rational men, sharing his values, who find themselves attacked. Would it be worth while for them to try to win on the theory that the vanquished loses even more than the victor? How much a uni-

[9] Some of the more exaggerated claims made about UNESCO's contribution to maintaining world peace suggest that this belief still persists.

[10] New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911.

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lateral increase in understanding makes for peace is something which ought to be examined rather than assumed.

For present purposes, what is important about the unexamined assumption of an underlying harmony of interests and the equating of peace and "understanding" is that it diverted energy and resources which might otherwise have gone into genuine research. An attempt to make the implicit harmony explicit by promotion of international understanding and other activities which are essentially irrelevant in terms of their contribution to human knowledge, however valuable they may be in other ways, absorbed much of these energies and resources. In fact the hard intellectual task involved in discovering the conditions under which national interests could be harmonized was rarely undertaken. The job to be done was to prescribe the conditions of harmonization not to assert the fact of harmony.[11]

Those who did not accept the League of Nations focus for the subject frequently found themselves in a difficult predicament. Their lack of focus reinforced the tendency to regard international relations more and more as a highfalutin way of studying current events. One thing which the international relationists could do which the historian was not already doing would be to deal with the recent events which the historian shied away from recounting. Here was a function which somebody ought to perform; the international relationists leaped happily into the breach. A leap into this particular breach was unhappily a leap away from applying the analytical skills of the social sciences to solving the problems of war and peace.

In the absence of a sharply defined focus, the international relationist who rejected current history as his peculiar province has no generally accepted, scientific criteria for the selection of research projects. "General worth-whileness" and availability of data were the only two criteria developed. Neither of these criteria is in itself bad, but in the absence of any other criteria of relevance they tend to discourage efforts to put a given research into a scientifically meaningful frame of reference. The second criterion, availability of data, explains the

[11] Cf. Walter Lippmann, *An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society*, Boston, Little, Brown, 1937, for an analogous description of what went wrong with *laissez-faire* economics.

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heavy concentration of research in the four fields of international law, international organization, international trade and finance, and diplomatic history. These were the four subareas in the field with profuse documentation. That intensive study in these fields had ultimate relevance to basic problems of war and peace cannot be doubted. What the relevance of particular research projects to the basic study of how men could live together more peaceably was rarely examined. Thus even the studies in these four fields were provincial in the sense that a problem in international law was treated as contributing to the solution of another problem in international law, etc. There was occasional testimony to the important contribution which the psychologists, the anthropologists, the sociologists could make to the study of international relations but the nature of this contribution was rarely examined.

In summary, one could say that the analytical model used for investigative purposes was a world commonwealth characterized by permanent peace. The real world was described in terms of its deviation from this model. In the collection of data, on the other hand, there was a high devotion to the use of empirical techniques in areas where there was a wealth of data but a great timidity about extending or combining the areas in which hypotheses are to be tested by empirical research.

IV

The pattern just described is of course not characteristic of the whole body of academic research during the period between the two wars and it is less characteristic of research at the end of the period than of that at the beginning. Whether from Marx or from Machiavelli, from European geopolitics or American war debunking, from German sociology or Columbia historians, or from a change in the intellectual climate of American social science, generally, a new realism and a new interest in group interests—national, transnational, and subnational—was increasingly felt. Studies which interrelated the domestic and international political process became more frequent.

Charles A. Beard, for example, was raising questions about national interest. He was writing as early as 1930 "I want to

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know what the devil it really is." That Beard got what many would today consider the wrong answers is less important than that he asked the right question.[12]

The same year saw the opening of the Walter Hines Page School at Johns Hopkins whose stated purpose was "to create a research laboratory for the study of the motivating causes of the conduct of nations in relation to one another." Frederick S. Dunn's various books between 1929 and 1935 are one product of that laboratory.[13] The interest in the behavior of diplomats and in the decision-making process which he then exhibited has since become more fashionable.

At Chicago the Causes of War Study under Quincy Wright was by then well under way and the two-volume *a Study of War*[14] which was completed a decade later stands as a monument to a research effort which focused on an existing political institution rather than on some future utopia.

Frederick Schuman's *International Politics*[15] sought to describe an existing state system rather than a future world commonwealth. Harold Lasswell's *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*[16] is in terms of the prevailing academic environment for international relations research a work of great precocity. Its tone and focus is in most ways more congenial to the intellectual atmosphere of the 1940's than to that of the interwar period.

Edward Mead Earle,[17] Harold Sprout,[18] and Nicholas Spykman[19] are notable among political scientists for their rediscovery of national security problems and for focusing their

[12] Cf. *The Idea of National Interest*, New York, Macmillan, 1934; and *The Open Door at Home*, New York, Macmillan, 1934.

[13] Cf. *The Practice and Procedure of International Conferences*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929; *The Protection of Nationals*, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1932; and *The Diplomatic Protection of Americans in Mexico*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1933.

[14] Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942.

[15] 1st edition, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933.

[16] New York, McGraw-Hill, 1935.

[17] Cf. his "National Security and Foreign Policy," *Yale Review*, Spring, 1940, pp. 444-60; and "Political and Military Strategy for the United States," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, January, 1941, pp. 112-19.

[18] Cf. Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1939; *Toward a New Order of Sea Power*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1940.

[19] Cf. *America's Strategy in World Politics*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1942.

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research upon them. Arnold Wolfers in his *Britain and France between Two Wars*[20] led the way in systematically relating the activities at Geneva to the foreign policies and national interests of the great powers and these in turn to the ideologies of the major political groupings within each country. This second list could be extended but is already long enough to suggest some of the perspectives uncharacteristic of the 1920's but of which account must now be taken.

1. International politics is moved to the focus and other subjects are related to it. International organization, for example, is studied in a political, and not a predominantly constitutional, context. A body of political theory dealing with a system characterized by an absence of central authority has yet to be developed, but its rudiments are found in the works of some of these men.[21]

With politics at the center, it becomes possible to help the anthropologists ask the right questions. International politics can then deal with all group interests which influence politics in a world of nation-states and not just official interstate relationships.

2. In their capacity as political scientists, they neither affirmed nor denied the legitimacy of national interests on *a priori* grounds and just because the interest was national. There was, however, recognition that the interests which governments are trying to promote must be identified, as must various transnational and subnational group interests. This is an absolute prerequisite to useful research on the problem of harmonizing the various national interests so that a broader supranational community of interest can more easily develop.

Whether international relations has yet "arrived" as a separate social science discipline is probably as much a matter of debate in 1949 as in 1929. But the trends described have certainly increased the relevance of international relations research to the making of public policy.

[20] New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1940.

[21] Grayson L. Kirk reaches a similar conclusion in *The Study of International Relations*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947.

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THE PRESENT COURSE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS RESEARCH

By FREDERICK S. DUNN[1]

THIS is a good time to ask what are the important emerging trends in research in international relations. In the first place, the problems of world politics today are as arresting in their implications for the security and well-being of peoples everywhere as they have ever been; at the same time, they seem less subject to human control. Secondly, a generation of experimenting and high-level groping with international problems has produced, or ought to have produced, some valuable conclusions about how to proceed in carrying out fruitful research in the field. Finally, the impressive advances made in various branches of the social sciences in the last few years have provided some interesting new tools and skills that ought to be of great help to the political analyst working on the international level.

Current developments in international relations research may be conveniently divided into three groups: (1) the changing focus of research; (2) the types of specialization; and (3) the role of value analysis. Some of these developments are familiar enough in other disciplines and are noted here merely as recent achievements in a new and groping branch of learning.

1. The Changing Focus of Research

In recent years there has been a gradual but persistent shift in the kinds of questions which have attracted the attention of professional researchers. In its most elementary form, this shift has often been described as a movement from reform to realism. This label is perhaps not inaccurate in so far as it suggests the intention to give priority to the unsentimental search for knowledge, wherever it may lead, and not to allow such search to be distorted by schemes for reforming the world. It is misleading, however, if it suggests that researchers today

[1] See footnote 1 of the previous paper by William T. R. Fox, *supra*, p. 67.

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are not motivated by desires for improving the state of international affairs. Most of them seem to be quite as bent upon finding new ways of maximizing values as were their predecessors.

At any rate, researchers have been shifting their attention away from the descriptive analysis of formal governmental structures toward the closer observation of political processes and the study of concrete decision-making. Similar trends are of course found in all modern social studies. They seem to be a natural consequence of changing conceptions of the part that pure reason plays in the choices of men and in the maximization of social values.

Nineteenth-century political liberalism had been based in large part on the twin assumptions of rationalism and an inevitable upward progress toward peace and plenty. These guiding ideas had led political theorists to devote their energies largely to the search for institutional devices through which man's reason could and would dispose of the conflicts that arose in society. So long as the assumption was accepted that men acted rationally and that the sum of their individual free choices added up to the maximum value for society, it was not necessary to look very closely at the inner springs of social behavior. All the researcher had to do was to devise rational institutions and wait for men's reason to catch up with him and adopt his recipes.

But the bitter experiences of recent years and the striking advances in modern psychology and the other sciences of human behavior have made it necessary to revise somewhat these assumptions which had fixed the focus of earlier researchers. There is impressive evidence to the effect that, under conditions of modern technology, the unrestricted choices of individuals do not always lead to the maximum realization of social values nor to universal agreement on goals and the best means of attaining them. At any rate, it was obviously not fruitful to go on devising political plans which were consistently ignored or by-passed by the community, or which did not accord with any justifiable expectations about human behavior. Research workers have generally turned instead to

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a more careful observation of international politics in action and of the forces influencing political beliefs and actions.[2]

This has brought about a deeper interest in the objectives of national action, as well as in the analysis of political power and the balancing process. Researchers have begun to pay more attention to the conditions of modern society which shape the attitudes and behavior of peoples in world politics, for example, the growth and decline of population in different regions and the aspirations of agricultural nations to enjoy the fruits of modern technology.

The study of the conditions of harmony among peoples and the possibilities of increasing cooperation and consensus has been shifted from the area of philosophical speculation to that of careful observation and systematic analysis. The importance of communication among peoples has been recognized and elevated to the level of a special branch of social study.

There is a growing dissatisfaction with simplistic explanations of international events and with beliefs that certain things are foredoomed to happen. Researchers no longer spend much time looking for the causes of war in simple economic explanations or the scheming of munitions makers. They recognize that a multiplicity of influences bears on every international situation and it is necessary to think in terms of configurations of events rather than grand single causes. They give less attention to making absolute predictions and more to spelling out the range of future contingencies and the limits of manipulation or control.

Along the same line, researchers are less inclined now to choose questions for research primarily on the basis of prior availability of data. They have found it more profitable to decide on a priority of questions on other grounds and then, if necessary, to invent ways of developing data that would be helpful in answering them. This represents quite a change from the old days when the general tenor of research in international relations was determined largely by the kinds of documents the government thought best to release to the public. That led to an undue amount of attention being given to minor

[2] See the two penetrating studies by Herbert Feis, *Seen from E. A.*, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1947, and *The Spanish Story*, New York, A. A. Knopf, 1948.

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legal questions and very little to the major unsolved problems of modern society.

In traditional thinking there has been a sharp line between "international" and "domestic" affairs, and the custom has been to exclude the latter from the range of attention of the international relations researcher. States have been regarded as solid units, with like characteristics and equal status. This picture of the international society grew largely out of the political idealism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and the doctrines of international law. As a device for protecting small states from intervention and encouraging the development of free institutions, it has been enormously helpful. Nevertheless, there is a growing realization that it can also serve as a serious obstacle to clear thinking about the realities of international life.[3]

It is not possible to obtain a useful understanding of the conflicts between nations if one refuses to look beneath the surface of sovereign states to the bureaucracies, elites, political parties, pressure groups, and individuals who hold the values and pursue the purposes that culminate in national action. One cannot comprehend why governments act the way they do until one finds out something about who is really interested in what. For example, it would not have been possible to understand British and French policies between the two world wars unless one observed, among other things, that the left and right groups in one country did not synchronize with the corresponding groups in the other.[4] This fact is now widely realized and there is a general tendency to reduce the line between "international" and "domestic." International relations researchers are no longer ignoring these important segments of essential data.

In like manner, researchers now talk less about states in general and more about particular states. In their model-building, they shy away from the fiction that states are all alike and emphasize instead their uniqueness, especially that of the Great Powers. Only in this manner has it been possible

[3] See Philip C. Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, New York, Macmillan, 1948.

[4] See Arnold Wolfers, *Britain and France between Two Wars*, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1940; also Charles Micaud, *The French Right and Nazi Germany, 1933-1939*, Durham, North Carolina, Duke Univ. Press, 1943.

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to arrive at a useful understanding of present-day world politics and to anticipate future trends with any success.

There is one current trend regarding the focus of research that should be scrutinized with the greatest care. This is the tendency to allow the consumers of research, and especially the governmental decision-makers, to determine the questions on which academic researchers shall work. The practical questions of the day have an urgency which it is hard to resist, and it is natural that specialists should want to give as much service as possible to harassed government officials. However, there is great danger that the absorption of the researcher in the servicing of the demands of potential consumers, whether governmental agencies or private institutions, will gradually reduce his value, not only to scholarship, but to the consumers themselves.

Decision-makers give their attention to disposing of the practical questions that come before them and not to the increase of usable knowledge. They are seldom concerned with the value of an inquiry beyond the particular question that perplexes them. For them, research is almost always *ad hoc*. The researcher, on the other hand, must see some significance to his work beyond the immediate help it may give to decision-makers. The ultimate justification for his professional standing lies in his success in pushing back the frontiers of general knowledge. At the same time, his value to potential consumers of research gains in direct proportion to what he has been able to add to the field as a whole.

The answer does not seem to lie either in complete absorption in the servicing of consumers or in a withdrawal from such a function entirely. Many of the practical problems of the day also have permanent significance in improving the understanding of political processes in general. Researchers who contribute to their solution often gain valuable insights into the ways in which choices of action are made. Academic specialists can profit greatly from the increasing number of opportunities to fill the role of participant-observer. At the same time, it is essential that the researcher maintain his full freedom to choose and define his problems himself. If he allows this to be done for him by operating officials or by private

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institutions or pressure groups, both he and the consumers of research will lose.

2. The Types of Specialization

The second group of emerging trends is related to the various forms of specialization that are developing. It is obvious that the expanding field of international relations is too big for any single person to handle as a whole and that a considerable degree of division of labor is inescapable. But there has been great difficulty in deciding how the pie should be sliced.

It is necessary at first to know what one is dividing. International relations can be regarded as the actual relations that take place between governments, or the body of knowledge which we have of how those relations take place. It can be simply the non-domestic side of the traditional disciplines of political science, economics, law and history. It can be a field of factual data, a set of general principles, or a special set of questions that have to be answered.

The best current views tend to accept the last of these and to look upon international relations as the particular set of questions that arise out of the division of the world into a number of autonomous political units. If there were no political divisions in the world, there would be no such questions and hence no international relations.[5]

If we accept this picture of international relations, we have a guide to the kinds of skills and knowledge that are needed by researchers in the field. Obviously not all workers will need exactly the same combination. The questions which make up international relations are of many different kinds and call for different patterns of equipment. Nevertheless the number of specializations required to cover the field is relatively small and corresponds to some extent with the accepted divisions of the social sciences.

In the first place, since it is the existence of autonomous *political* units in the world that gives rise to international relations, the most important combination of skills needed in

[5] Career specialists in international relations can view this fact with equanimity since the chances of complete removal of autonomous political divisions in the world are too remote to be of serious present concern.

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research would obviously be that which centered around political analysis. Politics is not only the one inescapable element (by definition) in all international questions; it is invariably the most significant one in all important questions. Hence one may expect that the largest class of researchers in the field will be those whose main competence lies in the analysis of the conditions making for conflict, adjustment, and harmonization of national policies and the security of national values, in other words, in international politics.

With this subject at the center, it is customary to combine some competence in diplomatic history, international economics, international law and political geography (including demography). These make up the core of essential subjects which should be in the quiver of the researcher who wishes to be prepared to meet the general run of international questions. In fact it is now the most common combination of skills possessed by experts in the field. The main difficulty has been to find a suitable name for such people. The invention of the term "international relationist" hardly seems to have disposed of this problem permanently.

In addition to this most frequent pattern of skills, there are other types of specialization centering on one of the other of the above core subjects besides politics. In each case, of course, the specialist has as his primary skill the discipline which lies at the center of his pattern, and is at the same time possessed of some competence in the other four subjects. Unlike the specialist whose central subject is politics, these other types of specialists have acquired names, i.e., international economist, international lawyer, diplomatic historian, and political geographer.

The important thing to note about these types of specialists is that, while they owe primary allegiance to their own respective disciplines, they are dealing with international problems and these are always broader than any single one of the separate specializations. If the economist or the legal scientist attempts to deal with an international question solely in terms of his own discipline, he is apt to come up with an incomplete or distorted conclusion.

This is due to the fact that each traditional discipline

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abstracts from the total picture of men in society a single value or set of values or characteristics. Thus the political scientist tends to think of men pursuing power and security—though not in all cases as ends in themselves—whereas the economist thinks of men as concerned with the values of wealth or income. The historian, in his analysis, looks on human beings as participants in events that have a more or less orderly development in time. The lawyer sees them as primarily guided by the supremacy of the law. The political geographer looks upon them as affected in their choices of action principally by their physical environment.

These simplified models of men are indispensable in developing and testing hypotheses in the respective disciplines. Nevertheless it is important to keep in mind that individuals and groups at all times seek many different values, and these are often in conflict with each other. If one is trying to answer questions of the complex world of international events, one has to be familiar with the full range of human objectives that influence such events.

Thus foreign economic policies cannot be discussed effectively simply on the basis of expertise in international trade theory, but must take account of the other values which move men and nations in formulating policies. In like manner, the international lawyer who acts on the legal assumption that the values of law and order will generally prevail over other values (such as security) in the reconciliation of the conflicting interests of nations will find that his expectations about the behavior of peoples and governments are regularly disappointed.

In terms of professional competence, what this means is that the specialist in international economics must first of all be an economist but he must also have a deep understanding of international politics and some acquaintance with what the other social sciences can give to the solution of questions of international behavior. Such a combination of talents is unhappily not very common among economists, even those who write on international questions. A similar equipment is also needed by the specialist in international law or international organization or history or geography.

A third group of specializations in international relations has

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grown out of the recent shifting of the focus of attention in the direction of living political process and of decision-making. Considerable help in understanding the forces that influence political behavior has recently come from sociology, anthropology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. Hence there has been a demand for specialists who could effectively bring to bear on international questions what these sciences of human behavior have to offer.

For example, the desire to find an essential foundation for international cooperation in the existence of universal values and common institutions has led to a focusing of attention on the similarities and diversities of national cultures and character structures. This has brought both the anthropologist and the social psychologist into the picture.

Current findings of anthropologists seem to indicate that national cultures as determinants of behavior are more firmly fixed than had been commonly supposed, and it is unlikely that harmonious international relations can be achieved in the immediate future by mass alterations of national culture patterns. At the same time, there are ways in which anthropological data have proved to be of considerable help in understanding the conditions under which conflicting national interests can be harmonized. For example, knowledge about the basic facts of other cultures often indicates how certain anxieties might be reduced and attitudes more favorable to mutual accommodation might be cultivated. Actions of another nation which arouse hostile responses sometimes turn out to be quite harmless when understood in the context of the national culture.

In addition to the anthropologists, the sociologists have provided a rich source of suggestive thought for those concerned with theoretical problems in international relations. The works of Max Weber, Durkheim, and Karl Mannheim, for example, are full of insights into the questions that are encountered in seeking to understand international events.

Perhaps the most interesting recent developments have come in psychology and psychoanalysis. The spectacular advances that have been made in knowledge of human behavior and unconscious motivation in the last fifty years are beginning

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to be applied with some effect to the study of international problems.[6] Thus we know that the "personality" of a nation is largely determined by the fact that parents regularly channel the behavior of their children toward the local culture patterns. If this channeling could be subjected to control, perhaps the national character could likewise be changed. But while it has been demonstrated that psychoanalysis can change the personality structure of an individual, it has not yet been established that the same thing can be done for the character structure of a nation. However, the social psychologists have produced some leading ideas which are of great interest for those who design research programs in international relations, e.g., theories about leaders and about elites.

At least we now know that it is possible to break down political actions into types and categories and thus to facilitate our understanding of them. We can begin, for example, to comprehend such behavior traits as political apathy and the reluctance to participate in political processes. Most important, though, is the revelation that modern social science has brought us of the crudeness of our traditional ideas about the forces and influences that control political behavior.[7]

The problem in regard to these psycho-cultural developments is: by what methods are the findings to be applied to international questions and who shall do it? Should it be the anthropologist or psychologist, or should it be international relations experts who have acquired some special knowledge of these subjects? No easy answer has yet been found to this question. A pure eclectic approach is apparently not the correct solution. It has often been demonstrated that picking pieces of knowledge from various disciplines and cooking them together in one dish does not necessarily make a good pie. Eclecticism does not seem to generate creative scholarship.

Knowledge from existing disciplines can generally be made useful to the analysis of a new area of questions only by pass-

[6] See Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword,* Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946; Dinko Tomasic, *Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics,* New York, George W. Stewart, 1948; Nathan Leites, "Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses About Political Acts," *World Politics,* Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1948), pp. 102-19.

[7] At the same time, some social scientists, in their concern with new discoveries in unconscious motivation, seem to lose sight of the fact that, at least on the problem-solving level, men still use reason, more or less, in arriving at their choices of action.

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ing it through the sieve of the system of thought that has been developed for these questions. Concepts and classifications have to be translated into correct equivalents in the new subject matter before they can do much more than mislead. Hence there is a need for specialists who can operate effectively in both fields. Whether these are to be international relations specialists who have also acquired a working knowledge of anthropology or psychology, or whether they are to be anthropologists or psychologists who have thought deeply about international relations, is not yet finally answered in all cases. In the end, it will be decided on the basis of the relative showing which each group makes in dealing with whole questions.

In any case, international relations research faces the fact that the field of knowledge relevant to international problems has broadened out considerably in recent years and now includes all of social science. While the specialist in international politics could not be expected to take over the work of all the other social scientists, he does have a special responsibility to help the others ask the right questions and to interpret the answers they get.

One illustration of this need for teamwork will suffice. Recent meetings of psychologists have discussed the increase in aggressive attitudes in this country toward the Soviet Union, and what could be done to alleviate the insecurities and anxieties those attitudes revealed. But at no point in the discussion was there any suggestion that anything the Soviet Union had done or was continuing to do had any particular connection with the increase in aggressive attitudes here.[8] This is perhaps not important in itself, except that by failing to stress the "response" character of the aggressive attitude, they missed completely the function which increased aggressiveness performed. It permitted a hardening of the American position which in turn halted the Soviet advance and this in its own turn tended to alleviate the insecurities generated originally by Soviet aggressiveness. Failure to discuss the problem in its larger world political context also caused the problem to be considered on the basis of unexamined value assumptions.

[8] See *Journal of Social Issues*, Winter, 1948, pp. 21 ff.

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Is it really true, for example, that any increase in hostile attitudes toward the Soviet Union is good and any decrease is bad?

This expanding range of social science knowledge that bears on international questions has led to interesting developments in teamwork in research. At Yale, Harvard, the Hoover Library at Stanford University, the University of Washington, the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the Brookings Institution, the University of Michigan and other places, various combinations of skills are being tried out in different kinds of cooperative research adventures. It is too early, perhaps, to assess these enterprises, but the results to date indicate that, where particular research projects call for a wide range of specialized knowledge, cooperative teamwork is not only workable but essential. This does not mean, of course, that the independent scholar is being supplanted by cooperative research projects. It is still true that most inventive thinking and imaginative trail-blazing comes from the individual researcher. At the same time, he can be greatly stimulated by close daily association with a carefully chosen group of other specialists, and the scope of his work can also be considerably widened.

A development of the greatest interest for international relations research is the rapid expansion of area studies in recent years. This derives largely from the realization of the immense importance of differences in national cultures in influencing the relations between peoples. The basic aim of area studies is to achieve an integration of the various social science techniques in the understanding of whole societies or geographically determined units. Such studies help to find ways of mutual accommodation among nations and hence are of the greatest value for international relations research. At the same time, it must be remembered that area studies are not the whole answer to the need for knowledge in the international field, and should not be allowed to divert too much attention from other specializations.

3. The Role of Value Analysis

The most neglected part of international relations research has been that which relates to the analysis and clarification

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of goals. In this it does not differ much from research in domestic affairs. However in the latter case this lack is not so serious, since in each national culture there exists an inherited system of values of some sort, whereas in the international field whatever system may have existed in the middle ages has been steadily declining.

There are three reasons why value analysis in international relations has been so backward. The first of these arose out of the effort to escape from the reformist emphasis of prewar international relations research and to achieve a more scientific orientation. This led at first to a tendency to ignore problems of value altogether. It was believed by many that realism required a completely neutral approach to questions of ends.

As a matter of fact, this attitude did not accomplish an exclusion of value judgments on the part of researchers but merely permitted such judgments to be made blindly and without reflection. Often those who thought they were achieving a scientific detachment were merely operating on the basis of unconsciously acquired value patterns, the applicability of which to modern conditions had not been examined.

It is now generally recognized by the more astute researchers that value analysis is an inescapable part of international relations research, and that to engage in it does not necessarily mean any lowering of precision standards in systematic thinking.[9] As in other social sciences the aim of research here is not merely the promotion of knowledge but also its effective application to human interests. In this sense it is a policy science but that does not necessarily mean any sacrifice in rigor of method where the aim is to add to the sum of present knowledge. In descriptive analysis, in classification, and in the logical development and verifying of hypotheses, a policy science can be quite as systematic as other types of scientific thinking.

The major stimulus to research in international relations in the United States has always been the desire to find out how unnecessary wars and threats of wars might be avoided. There is certainly nothing wrong with this basic motive. Had

[9] See T. D. Weldon, *States and Morals*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1947.

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the relations between autonomous political units never led to wars or conflicts or social problems of any kind, it is quite unlikely that people would have thought it necessary to do any research on them at all. However, this normative character of international relations research need not interfere with the systematic technical development of the subject. It refers merely to the kind of questions mainly dealt with by researchers and does not imply that the subject-matter is associated with any particular ideal conception of the international community.

This brings us to the second reason for the backwardness of value thinking in international relations research, and that is the kind of models that researchers have been accustomed to use in carrying forward their analyses into the future. All thinking which involves a choice of alternatives calls for such model building (consciously or unconsciously) as a means of evaluating possible courses of action.

What was wrong in the early days of the subject matter was that researchers tended to conceive of ideal social systems in which wars did not exist and then to evaluate existing practices in the light of these ideal conceptions. If such models are to serve any useful purpose in guiding the decision-maker, they have to come much closer to what may be expected in the foreseeable future and must be based on a more careful estimate of the forces and conditions that influence behavior among nations.

The third reason for the backward state of value analysis in international relations has been the preoccupation of researchers with single-value thinking. Work on values in international relations has largely been directed toward reducing them to a neatly ordered value hierarchy, by means of which it would be possible to derive, by logical deduction, an answer to any future question of ends or goals.[10] Up to the present time no such simple system has been discovered, or at least there is no general agreement on any one system. The fact that value hierarchies have generally in the past been associated with a single cultural system makes the problem of discovering one that is acceptable to the international community

[10] See E. H. Carr, *Conditions of Peace*, New York, Macmillan, 1942, Ch. 5.

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as a whole peculiarly difficult. However, that has not prevented many people from trying.

But even if a hierarchy of values could be agreed upon, it seems doubtful that it would last very long as an automatic means of settling disputes about ends. One difficulty is that pursuing a single value has to be done at the sacrifice of other values and eventually the cost in these other values becomes too great. Values, like principles, have an inconvenient habit of travelling in pairs or in groups, and the choice of one always means that others have to be given up.

Even the value of security from violence does not seem to escape this rule of diminishing returns. The exclusive pursuit of it would call for increasing sacrifices of other important values, such as freedom of individual development, and eventually this would go so far as to make security seem a debatable thing.

Instead of seeking a single-value system, researchers now tend to think in terms of a maximization of values in each given set of circumstances. This provides a clue to intelligent choice between competing values in a particular case. The task is a matter of weighing various value combinations and coming out with one that seems to be the maximum that can be achieved in the configuration of events that confronts the decision-maker. But this involves a careful analysis of the various alternative goals favored by different groups in the national community and an effort to achieve as many of them as possible.

This work of value analysis and clarification is as important as any other step in dealing with international problems. Without it one does not possess an effective approach to new questions, since such questions usually pose unanswered problems of goals and one has to have some way of going at them other than flipping coins or resorting to private prejudice.

Conclusion

Out of this experience in international relations research, it is possible to draw a few lessons that point the way toward greater effectiveness in future research.

The first of these is the need for sticking closely to *concrete*

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cases at all stages of research. One should begin with the observation of real events and processes, and never get very far away from them. To rely on general impressions or assumptions as to what is the case is to compound errors at a fatal rate. Thinking about political events needs constant checking at all points by reference to examples, especially where one is surest that he knows the truth. If the researcher will follow this rule he will not only save himself from a great deal of wasted intellectual effort but will also acquire the professional's intuition which comes from observing hundreds of cases and which helps him so often, when faced with a new situation, to ask the right questions in the beginning. From concrete cases one can proceed step by step to generalization but it is necessary to return constantly to the cases for verification.

The second lesson is the need for accurate classification of observations and the building of a body of systematic knowledge. Some kind of conceptual scheme is necessary to carry thought forward. Much time and effort are saved by it, and new hypotheses are suggested for testing. But such a system of knowledge should be kept close to the specific at all times and should not take off into the rarefied air of speculative philosophy.

The third lesson is the need to develop an effective way of thinking about new questions. This includes all the ways of analysis that have been found useful in approaching social problems. It especially includes the means for clarifying values to help in making more intelligent choices between possible goals. The professional researcher here combines theory and practice to aid in getting better decisions.

These lessons are drawn from the most recent experience in international relations research. But they are far from new. In fact they were first suggested by Hippocrates as guides for successful medical research more than two thousand years ago.[11]

[11] See L. J. Henderson, "The Study of Man," *Science*, Vol. 94, No. 2427, July 4, 1941.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

RUSSIAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY – N. S. OR O. S.?

By ALFRED VAGTS

Histoire de la diplomatie, publiée sous la direction de Vladimir Potiemkine de l'Académie des Sciences de l'U.R.S.S., traduit du russe par Xenia Pamphilova et Michel Eristov (vols. I and II), et I. Levin, J. Tarr, et Boris Metzel (vol. III); 3 vols., Paris, Librairie de Médicis, n.d.

BIBLIOGRAPHERS, who have perhaps a better way of ascertaining what is going on inside Russia today than the much restricted foreign diplomats and journalists, tell us that "a very high percentage of Soviet books published recently in the field of political science deal with various problems of international relations. The Soviet leaders are at pains to make the Russian people foreign-policy minded."[1] This tendency, if at all new would seem to have started as far back as 1934 when the Politburo gave the directive for a large history of diplomacy to be written, the first volume of which appeared in 1941.

As the original introduction stated, the history was designed "for the practical worker in Soviet diplomacy and the young cadres preparing themselves for such a career. For them the *History of Diplomacy* may serve as one of the basic guides." The preface to the French edition[2] makes rather different claims, as indeed it would have to in order to justify publication in the Western countries. First, it is averred that the work is designed for the great public and has a popular character. But "the exigencies of historical science have nevertheless been rigorously respected so that the reader who is already acquainted

[1] *The Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions*, vol. VI (Feb., 1949), p. 53.

[2] According to the French edition, the authorship is as follows: vol. I by Professor S. Bakhrouchine, A. Ephimov, E. Kosminski, A. Narotchnitski, V. Serguiev, S. Skazkine, V. Khvostov, and E. Tarlé; vol. II by Professors V. Khvostov and I. Mintz; vol. III by Professors I. Mintz, A. Pankratova, V. Potiemkine, N. Koltchanovski, and E. Tarlé.

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with the principal facts of general history can easily use it in order to complete his knowledge. The *History of Diplomacy* has for its aim to help him understand the problems of foreign policy and judge diplomatic action at its true value." (I, 5.) Secondly, the work is said to fill a bill hitherto unfilled according to David Jayne Hill's complaint that there does not yet exist "in any European language a general history of European diplomacy," that most of the work in this field has been "history of international relations." Unfortunately, the methodically important discussion of what is "history of diplomacy," and what is "international relations," is never undertaken by the authors, and generally speaking their history of diplomacy becomes ever more that of international relations as 1939, their terminal year, approaches.

To the charge of not having written any comprehensive history of diplomacy, Western historical science, in all its national sectors, must plead guilty. In explanation one might refer to the hopeless fragmentation of scholarly effort, due to Western nationalism, which stands in the way of an international or supra-national cooperative history of an international-national institution like diplomacy, and some other institutions as well. Modern historians feel a conscientious hesitancy to tackle such a vast and much-disputed subject single-handed, while Western individualism, as a tradition working among them, leads them away from the treatment of great historico-philosophical themes and, even more, from writing the history of particular institutions and groups in society. From these inhibitions Soviet historians are less apt to suffer, and least so, it would seem, when they receive, individually or in groups, the necessary directive from their political superiors, who understand the uses of history more readily than the difficulties of its writing. As to the scientific claims made for their cooperative work on diplomacy, grave doubts will be raised presently. About its comprehensiveness, a warning is in order: while it covers a greater time span than any previous history of diplomacy in existence,[3] Soviet nationalism not only centers the recital around Moscow but also keeps the writers from furnishing the same descriptions of the foreign

[3] There are documents from as early as 1200 B.C., and as late as 1939. The bibliography, for the most part, stops at 1942, although there is one item from 1945.

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offices of competitor nations that the Moscow foreign ministry receives at their hands.

The authorship of the work is semi-anonymous: eight professors appear on the title pages and in the table of contents of Volume I, two on and in those of Volume II, and five again on the title page of Volume III, but none in its table of contents. The name best known in the West is that of Eugene Tarlé, who contributes extensively to Volume I and to an unknown extent to Volume III. The work was published—and presumably written—"under the direction of V. P. Potemkin," who also contributed to Volume III. Potemkin was a former Soviet diplomat, minister and ambassador to Athens, Rome and Paris (1929-37), and later Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs under Litvinov and for a short time under Molotov. After 1940 he was shifted from the diplomatic field to such posts as that of Commissar for Education of the RSFSR. He died in 1946. One of the contributors, I. Mintz, has lately come under critical attack from the new "Old Russians"—so old that antisemitism is part of the amalgam they represent—as being a representative of "national nihilism" and a "homeless cosmopolitanism," "fawning before foreign things" and neglecting "the historian's duty in the development and cultivation of Soviet patriotism."[4] As far as he is identified with specific chapters of this *History of Diplomacy* he seems quite innocent of these charges, as far as we can grasp them, and so seem all his colleagues.

Now that the Slavists have passed judgment on the original text,[5] the historian of diplomacy may venture, though with some misgivings, to speak on the strength—or the weakness—of a French translation. He can feel the more at liberty as this translation is an official one, done in Moscow itself, where, we understand, an equally official English translation has also been prepared and is now being offered to publishers in this country. Whether or not this procedure springs out of the old fear of the translator-traitor it seems to indicate an eagerness on Moscow's part to have its version of diplomatic history read

[4] UP dispatch from Moscow, May 11, 1949.

[5] Cf. C. E. Black in *The American Slavic and Eastern European Review*, Oct., 1948, pp. 276 ff., and B. Elkin in *Slavonic and East European Review*, April 1947, pp. 569 ff.

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and possibly embraced in the West, and attract attention not through the usual Party publishing outlets but through capitalist firms.

The process chosen in Moscow has produced many pitfalls for the reader. The text is smooth enough and the translators seem good linguists. They are, indeed, better linguists than historians, or they would have gone back to the original French documents on which certain texts and quotations are based and would thus have avoided the hazards of a double translation from French into Russian and back into French. This is demonstrated in the treatment of French texts (II, 39, 103-04), from *Die Grosse Politik* (II, 230 ff. and V, 1026), in which an original "accord de vues" emerges as "unité" after the double translation. One of the most obvious, though perhaps more ridiculous than serious, faults in this Moscow-made version is the handling of personal names in the process of retranslation. Most of the mishandled names are easily recognized,[6] though some appear in two or even three different versions. Elihu Root is at one time Rout, at another Ruth; Ambassador Alanson Houghton is either Hawton or Houton; Goschen is on one and the same page written Gochen and Goshen (II, 280) and at one point Hoschen (II, 225); Helfferich appears as Hellferich and Holferich (II, 386). It becomes a trifle more difficult to recognize Hicks-Beech in Heaks-Beetch (II, 146), Carnarvon in Carma (II, 49), or Haldane in Halden and Holden (II, 191 and 228).[7] And who was "the American banker Ben" from whom Abd-el-Krim received financial help (III, 334)?

[6] Posomby is Ponsonby; Niemann is Neumann (I, 418); Stockman is Stockmar (I, 426); Suard is Seward (I, 461); Gansemann is Hansemann; Lyard is Layard on one occasion (II, 47) and Lairds on another (I, 464); Hertzberger is Erzberger; Curr, Hankee and Nox (III, 73-74) are Kerr, Hankey and Knox; Heisler is Gessler (III, 103); Mawlton is Moulton (III, 135); Gösch is Hoesch and Heinlein, Henlein and Colonel Swine (III, 769) is Swaine. Aehrenthal is transcribed as Ehrenthal (Honor Valley), which of course omits the family history behind the name Aehrenthal, which refers to the grain trade in which the family fortune was made.

[7] Or Corti in Corthis (II, 54), Oubril in Oubry (II, 63), Cave in Kayves (II, 73), Currie in Kerry (II, 93), Beit in Beight (II, 132) and the British generals Poole and Dunsterville in Poul and Densterwill (II, 409 and 414) or Philip Lloyd Greame in Lloyd Grimm (III, 209). Mignier is the historian Mignet (I, 243), Thomas Penn is Paine (I, 338), Lisol (I, 171) is Lisola, Vikford is Wicqfort whose handbook *The Ambassador* did not appear in 1778 but in 1681 (I, 169). The Hohenlohe mentioned on II, 181, is actually a Hohenau, the Crewe on II, 195, a Crowe (Sir Eyre); the grand-duke mentioned on II, 241 and II, 268 is an archduke (Francis Ferdinand), the lord Runciman (III, 648) a viscount; Bismarck was not yet a count when ambassador to Russia (I, 473) and not an

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Considering the linguistic barriers, this would at first seem trifling, but after these errors pass the first hundred in number, the Western reader, instead of excusing them as slips of the pen or signs of carelessness on the part of authors or translators, is quite overcome by the feeling that this may be due to a basic conviction on their part—so strong that it works even subconsciously—that Western personalities, aside from those who are too well known for this treatment, do not count in the historical process as outlined by historical materialism. In this way, many of those who have made a name for themselves in diplomacy are unmade and de-named. "Wenn der Leib in Staub zerfallen, lebt der grosse Name noch . . ." said Schiller, but he appears to have been wrong. A Winston Churchill might even see in this mishandling of European names, dates and ranks something like a literary devastation prior to an actual attempt by the Reds at invasion farther to the West.

This treatment or mistreatment of data is not basically different from that accorded to the so-called great in the history of diplomacy. The thumbnail sketches of Richelieu—whose *Political Testament* with its absolutistic rigor and vigor and insistence on the State and *raison d'état* receives strong commendation (I, 163)—of Talleyrand and Metternich are trite; about the best is that of Caesar as diplomat (I, 63). Bismarck, whether subject or object, suffers from a Moscow persecution mania; that past master of diplomacy is even stated to have shown "an air a trifle confused when he met the Russian *chargé*" after some Austro-German intrigues against Russia—this apparently on the report of the *chargé* in question (II, 92). About Gortchakov the authors cannot finally make up their minds; Litvinov is mentioned as little as possible—the important date of his dismissal is not even given—and receives neither praise nor condemnation, while Molotov gets the treatment meted out to a hopeful student in the presence of his great teachers, Lenin and Stalin. All fulsomeness of praise is, of course, reserved for Lenin and Stalin, as the master diplomats.

East Prussian (I, 481). The Dutchman Baltassar Hayala, author of *De jure belli et officiis bellicis* of 1582 (I, 167) is the Spaniard Ayala. The Hohenzollern in the beginning of the XVth century were not princes but simple counts (I, 251); Bernadotte was never Charles, but Jean Baptiste, as long as he was Bernadotte (I, 367).

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Since they are "geniuses"—an epithet borrowed as much from Byzantium as from the Occident—and therefore inimitable, two more earthly exemplary figures are produced from the museum of Russian history for the benefit of the future Gromykos. Both of these are diplomatic "irregulars," both soldiers—Alexei Orlov, the negotiator of the Paris Treaty of 1856 (II, 454 ff.), and old Marshal Kutusov, who was able to gull his Turkish adversary in 1812, induce him to sign a peace and thus release a whole Russian army for the Patriotic war of 1812 (III, 763).

The great ideas that have worked in the diplomatic field—balance of power, *dominium maris,* Monroe doctrine, self-determination, and so forth—fare no better than the great men in this field of history. Some are not even mentioned and all are overshadowed by new ones that originated in Moscow, like "indivisibility of peace." An ancient concept much in use by the Soviet historiographers is that of "the division and redivision of the world" among the imperialists of the various ages. Since their history ends in August 1939, the dilemma of applying it to Soviet Russia is avoided.

The historian of diplomacy, accustomed to, and sometimes perhaps ridiculed for, his insistence on getting names, dates, and places right, is constantly shocked by the carelessness or disregard of the Soviet authors. To cite only a few examples of this attitude: Sir Henry Wotton who fathered the definition of the diplomat as one lying abroad for his country, is called ambassador to France (I, 163), where he never served. Bismarck himself did not sign the so-called Reinsurance treaty (II, 104); the signer was his son Herbert. Jefferson appears as Chief Justice (I, 307) and is confounded with Jay. A number of dates are manifestly wrong (I, 90, 370, 416, 457; II, 60, 156, 189, 319; III, 77, 127, 688). Benjamin Franklin did not arrive in France in 1767 (I, 298), but in 1776. Bentham's *Principles of International Law* is made to appear in 1709 (I, 313). A number of places are either wrong or misspelled (I, 356, Holinden instead of Hohenlinden, II, 200, 234). A siege of Neuss is actually one of Neisse (I, 252. The two towns are hundreds of miles apart). The province of Guelders appears as the Helder (I, 246), Acadia is placed north of the St. Lawrence (I, 246), and the Brown House in Berlin instead of Munich (III, 495). The sev-

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eral inflations since 1914 must have upset the authors' sense of numbers. For a French ambassador at Warsaw at the time of the Polish War of Succession is made to spend three billion livres to win the Poles for the French candidate; and the income of four German principalities from the so-called "soldier trade" of the eighteenth century, "within five years, around the years 1660-70" (!) is given as 33 billion thalers (I, 251); on the same page, incidentally, the Seven Years War and the Thirty Years War are interchanged. Some well-established facts of military history are certainly disregarded (I, 307; II, 200, 234, 393); and there reappears the usual boast, not supported by any non-Russian military history, that the newly established Red Army on and around February 21, 1918, stopped the advance of the German troops near Pskov and Narva (II, 365), when actually the latter had orders not to advance beyond those points. But that particular fiction has now become what Valmy was for the armies of the French Revolution, and the Russians had to have their Valmy, too.

History-writing by adding to the so-called facts is, of course, no new thing; neither is historiography by way of omission. We are accustomed to find this, whether conscious or not, in memoirs and autobiographies. But what is easily understood in the case of a single author, becomes a premeditated sin when several authors—sixteen to be exact—enter into a conspiracy of silence. In this collective work something of a record in omission is achieved.

Things and persons which—in the apparent interest of the Soviet State as constituted today and of Soviet diplomacy as practised today and presumably henceforth—must not even be mentioned include the following: the "purged" older Bolshevists, even if they worked as extensively as Joffe, Karakhan, Borodin, and Madame Kollontai in the diplomatic field, as well as such unofficial but rather active negotiators as Karl Radek who played ball with German "National Bolshevism." The unavoidable necessity of mentioning the letter which played such a role in the British electoral campaign of 1924 and led to the renewed break in Anglo-Soviet relations—the letter which is usually called in polite society the Zinoviev Letter—is got over by calling it the "letter of the

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Comintern" and thus the injunction "they shall not be thought of" is obeyed. Where this is not quite possible, as in the case of Leon Trotsky, the old Bolshevist is labeled as "traitor," a traitor as early as the time of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations (II, 357). The slaying by silence of political adversaries goes as far as the bibliography: such pioneer performances as Louis Fischer's *The Soviets in World Affairs* (1930) or John Wheeler-Bennett's *Forgotten Peace* (1939) are not even mentioned; neither is Uebersberger's *Œsterreich u. Russland seit dem Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts* (Vienna & Leipzig, 1900), a work indispensable for the earlier foreign relations of Moscow. But then the author committed the fault in his later years of becoming a rabid Bolshophobe. The treatment of Hugo Stinnes and his role in postwar Germany is clearly based on a Social Democratic brochure, but no credit for this is given.[8] That Russia intervened in Republican Spain is neither admitted nor denied; it is mentioned that two Soviet steamers were torpedoed by Italian submarines but not whether they carried war materials or personnel to Spain.

The greatest piece of rewriting by silence and omission has to be undertaken in the description of Russo-German relations since Rapallo. Brockdorff-Rantzau's ambassadorship and its six crucial years are mentioned only once—with an interesting statement on how the Germans assured the Russians they would interpret the Locarno pacts, which must have come from the Moscow archives but for which no source is given (III, 328). Brockdorff-Rantzau himself is the must-be-forgotten man, in spite of all the official *pompe funèbre* celebrated on the occasion of his death in 1928; his former role as the one friend of Soviet Russia among ambassadors has subsequently been given to Mr. Joseph E. Davies, with William Bullitt as the *bête noire* (III, 627). The whole complex of relations between Red Army and Reichswehr, preceding even Rapallo, about which we know a good deal more now in detail than when they were first mentioned by Social Democratic speakers in the Reichstag—the details are in the second volume of the Seeckt biography by Rabenau (Leipzig 1940), and still later publications—are simply omitted.

[8] Curt Geyer, *Drei Verderber Deutschlands*, Berlin, Dietz, 1924.

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Other omissions are not quite so complete. There is very little mention and no discussion of Panslavism—which Engels considered the worst enemy of Social Democracy, "an artificial product of the educated classes, the cities and universities, the army and the bureaucrats," a "world imperialistic swindle under the covering cloak of a non-existent Slavic nationality."[9] But Ordine-Nachtchokine who guided Russian foreign affairs in the second half of the seventeenth century—"a diplomat of the first order, 'the cleverest fox' "—is singled out and favorably for his "dream of an alliance with the Polish Republic and 'the glory which would cover the Slavic peoples if they could unite under the domination of Russia and Poland' " (I, 225; see also I, 238).

The influence of the military on diplomacy and foreign relations is seldom alluded to, though the very decisive role of the Russian war minister Milioutine in the worsening of relations between the members of the Three Emperors' Alliance is surprisingly admitted (II, 63). There is no general discussion or specific mention of defense problems in diplomacy. One rather curious omission concerns a theme that has never been treated but ought conceivably to interest a government so closely allied still to an international labor movement—the role of diplomacy as a "class institution" in fighting this very same movement, ever since its rise. But aside from a brief diplomatic history of the Paris Commune of 1871, which does not appear to have been very accurately handled (I, 524), no attempt in this direction is made. Is this a sign that Old Bolshevism and its experiences do not stir the minds of historians and their masters in Soviet Russia any more?

The diplomacy of the Vatican is largely treated by omission, even though it filled the larger part of the diplomatic scene of the Middle Ages. But the "Godless" movement in historiography cannot quite stop at that. If an old treaty invokes divinity and its violation is thought to entail divine punishment, that is laid to "the prejudices of that time," which even in the most believing ages were never too strong (I, 31, 125). At one point a very impressive statement by Bismarck in 1888 on Russia's power, very acceptable to later Russian rulers, is quoted as

[9] Gustav Mayer, *Friedrich Engels*, 2 vols., Berlin, 1920, vol. II, pp. 460-61.

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showing that "the old bird of prey was prudent and clear-sighted" (II, 113), even though lacking in sympathy for Russia. Among other things about the likely result of a war against Russia, the Chancellor wrote that even the most favorable outcome "would never have as a consequence the dissolving of Russia's main strength, which rests upon the millions of genuine Russians of the Greek confession" (*Die Grosse Politik*, VI, 1340). This *ci-devant* element of Russian might, Greek Orthodoxy, is simply omitted in the text, for the obvious reason that the modern Russian diplomat must not be troubled by considering religion, even the old religion, as a potential power factor.

Not quite omitted but definitely underplayed is the role of the diplomat as propagandist and as paymaster of journalists and other propagandists. The older Bolshevist historians who published the *Livre Noir* made not a little of this activity. What, as we know on the strength of documentary evidence, Czarist diplomacy did before 1917, is now imputed to Hitler who had "almost all the 'great' newspapers" of Paris in his pay (III, 747). The first mishap of Soviet diplomacy in this field, the "accidental" discovery of German-language revolutionary propaganda in the diplomatic luggage of Joffe, the Berlin ambassador, is awkwardly explained away (II, 418-19). Since then propaganda activity in the Russian interest has largely or exclusively been taken over by the Comintern. This careful division of labor is, of course, not mentioned as such in this *Lehrbuch* of diplomatic correctitude, which does remind the candidate for a diplomatic post that a law of 1924 enjoins him to abstain from propagandistic activity on his foreign post (III, 815-16). It would be expecting too much to see a parallel drawn between Russian activity in Germany in 1918 and afterwards, and the conspiracy of the Entente diplomats in Red Russia in 1917 and afterwards (II, 413 ff.), or between Comintern and Nazi Party organization. But, as a matter of fact, the Comintern finds no place in this diplomatic history, although the closely corresponding Nazi organizations do, amply. Evidently, no Kantian categorical imperative, under which the duty of historical fairness is after all included, has been annexed with Kant's city of Königsberg.

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In part this duty of fairness is avoided by emphasis, by over- and under-emphasis, by playing up or down events, phases, responsibilities. While the general over-emphasis on Russian diplomacy might accrue to the advantage of the Western reader and his knowledge, he will still be disappointed that such long chapters, as on Brest-Litovsk, turn out to be "broad, not strong" on points of new information or interpretation. The portentous recognition of the USSR by the United States is given less than half a page (III, 506-7), with the engagement not to indulge in propaganda left unmentioned. That Russian precedent for the one-sided termination of the Versailles treaty by Germany, the repudiation in 1870 of the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of 1856, is hardly mentioned at all.

As to scientific standards, claimed in the introduction: the historical knowledge displayed in the work is not everywhere up to date (for examples see I, 503, 513, 516, 518), and neither is the learned apparatus. The standards get lower the more recent the events dealt with, a fault not uncommon in other nationalistic historiography, in fact one of the characteristics of the species. The *Schimpfwörter-Lexicon* comes increasingly into use as time advances. The *audi alteram partem* injunction is never too carefully obeyed: in the case of Bruce Lockhart, there is no mention in text or bibliography that he has a case and that it is available in print. Is that out of fear that the neophyte in Soviet diplomacy will read it on the sly, if he can get access to it?

Even the misuse, not to say falsification of documents, is not altogether shunned, while pieces that had been taken as falsifications by diplomatic historians, like the Bulgarian *faux* of 1887, are left as possibly genuine (II, 106). To mention one example, an essential piece in the determined and openly declared intention of bringing down Bismarck, whom German historians of post-1918 are accused of having placed far too high as diplomat and prince of the peace: the Chancellor is said to have advised his King, who during the Anglo-Russian war crisis of 1885 wanted to lessen the danger by exerting pressure in St. Petersburg, that it was in the interest of German policy rather to sharpen than to assuage that conflict. To prove the accusation, and incidentally disprove the interpretation which

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the editors of *Die Grosse Politik* placed on this episode when they headed a whole chapter of relevant documents "Averting of the Russo-British danger of war by Germany," the central documentary piece (*Die Grosse Politik*, IV, 777) is condensed—one is tempted to say: as it could be condensed only under the pressure of wartime sentiment and considerations—by leaving out, unmarked by the usual signs of omission, sentences that are as disproving as the quoted ones are said to be proving. The whole procedure calls for the usual confrontation in parallel columns, for which space is not available here.

This treatment of facts goes far beyond the neglect of the nuance, an essential characteristic of diplomacy as it ought to be of its history. Nuance seems unsuitable to the purposes of Russian diplomatic history. Indeed, if this history teaches diplomacy to the Russians, what qualities and methods can be expected of them? What will be the effects of the black-and-white treatment, the condemnation rather than the understanding of the other party even in its remoter past? Only the intention of carrying the German "war guilt" of 1941 as far back as 1875 and 1887 can explain the insistence that during the crisis of 1875 Bismarck wanted war and was actually stopped from undertaking it by Gortchakov and the other eager peacemakers (II, 23-26), even though the sharpest critics of his policy at this moment would not go beyond accusing him of intending to produce a war scare among the French. Again he is said to have entertained a "project of attacking France" in the scare of 1887 (II, 100). In both cases such an intention is disproved, for one thing, by the absence of sufficient military preparations which Bismarck always made sure of in the case of wars that he did want.

It lies in the nature of the history of diplomacy, as in that of most political history, that it tends to become less scientific as it approaches modern times, that materials grow weaker and rarer, while political convictions about events become stronger. Scientifically judged, the earlier parts of the present work are the best, the most carefully handled. The chapters on early Russian diplomacy seem excellent to the reviewer, who may have read them with too much of an eye to the present, seeing a parallel between the foreign diplomats being kept under

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close surveillance and restricted as to travel then as much as now. They are fascinating and cannot easily be found elsewhere in any Western literature; they are also puzzling because they deal, more than any other part, with diplomatic ceremonial, which seems very much under reconstruction in and around the Kremlin.

As against the shortcomings of materials covering recent events the Western student of diplomatic history is usually warned to exercise great care in the selection of his sources. This criterion is utterly neglected here. The chapters on the diplomatic history of the 1930's use freely and unhesitatingly newspaper clippings which seem to be assembled rather haphazardly, and draw upon such journalistic writers as Genevieve Tabouis, Curt Riess and an anonymous A. Simone. They draw too heavily upon Dodd's *Diary*, Henderson's *Failure of a Mission* and that other failure, Davies' *Mission to Moscow*. They may be on somewhat safer ground when using the writings of Frederick Schuman, but then they know the slanting of that ground. Hopes that this shortcoming would be at least partly compensated by the use and quotation of materials from the Moscow State archives are doomed to disappointment. There is indeed an occasional reference to such an unprinted source. There is even a reference to an unprintable one, a remark by Alexander III on Bismarck (II, 91); but the use of archival materials remains rare, chancy and unsystematic. It leaves our knowledge on the Russo-French alliance of 1892, as far as the Russian side is concerned, quite as unsatisfactory as before.

Marxism, or what the Russians call Marxism, proves no substitute for this want. Those who expect this outlook to provide a fruitful understanding of, and convincing structure for, a history of recent events will look in vain. If it is not presumptuous for a non-Marxist, one may say that better Marxist thinking and writing are possible than here displayed. In part this insufficiency may be due to the inelasticity of a concept that views all past history as a battle of classes and is then applied to a history of the wars and other conflicts of states, and also to conflicts between groups much smaller and narrower than classes.

The authors have tried to solve this problem by giving each

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of the great periods of international conflict a preface of general materialistic history, and then follow that up with the diplomatic history which the economic developments are said to have strictly determined, through the rise, decline, and utter decay of capitalism. In other words, the usual superstructure stands as a mere front, the rest of the edifice being filled by a resounding and thundering moralistic trumpeting against the capitalistic world, pre- and post-1918. Germany is singled out especially —Germany since Bismarck, whose role as Germany's emancipator from Czarism could not be more vividly recalled today, and whose behavior toward Russia is rather primitively explained by his hatred of that land, which he "hated and feared," and against which he nourished a "solid hatred" (II, 26, 91, 106). Stresemann fares no better in the Moscow court. What is highly praised as Lenin's wisdom in regard to the signing and evading of "enforced" treaties, is just as strongly condemned when Stresemann begins to undermine the Versailles treaty through what he called "Finessieren," although to us it is hard to see a moral or other difference. If German diplomacy against Versailles is thus condemned, who but Russia was the greatest aider and abettor of this endeavor? The final crescendo of such condemnation of an ex-bedfellow of Russian diplomacy is, of course, reached when the Nazis, said to be the direct heirs and successors of Stresemann, are considered. For the peace of the "wide" Russian soul one must trust it will never see Stalin's declaration of November, 1939, that:

> It was not Germany that attacked France and England, but France and England that attacked Germany, thereby assuming responsibility for the present war . . . . The ruling circles of England and France rudely rejected both Germany's peace overtures and the attempts of the Soviet Union to secure the earliest possible termination of the war.[10]

There is far too much mechanical writing in this history. It is the kind of writing that tired journalists, more certain of party doctrines than historical facts, might turn out in weary haste and without verification. That leads to the constant use of pat phrases, such as "internal contradictions," from which

[10] M. Ross, *A History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, Workers Library Publishers, 1940, p. 44.

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the feudal world with its "countless political contradictions" (I, 125) or the Dawes Plan (III, 282) and so many other diplomatic arrangements suffered, and which made the work of the Vienna Congress "a reactionary utopianism" (I, 378). Anglo-American naval rivalry after 1918 "became an essential point of imperialist contradictions" (III, 126); the Washington treaties of 1922 "had not destroyed competition among the states; on the contrary, they created circumstances fraught with international conflicts" (III, 155). High praise, by contrast, is given to Pope Gregory VII—"his policy was without weakness and without contradictions" (I, 129). What would seem to a Western mind the key question of Russian diplomacy —when does a contradiction, within the United Nations or other diplomatic system, become so absolute that it can no longer be bridged over or postponed by diplomatic compromise —is nowhere raised in principle, though it is, of course, amply enough illustrated.

A concept equally used and overused, whether applied to early or recent events, is "imperialism." Indeed, its overuse has really worn it out so much by now, since the Pokrovski school tried to make it a valid and tenable concept, that it signifies merely something anti-Russian. There is, as one might expect, no mention that Russian imperialism wanted East Prussia as early as Elizabeth's time, if not earlier. Russia is reported to have joined the French-Austrian alliance of the Seven Years War on account of "the menace which was presented to Russia by Prussia's excessive growth" (I, 270); but eight pages further on, on the strength of a chance statement by Engels, it is stated that this same Prussia at the same time could do nothing against Austria without the help of either France or Russia.

While one would think that a so-called Marxist interpretation of history would endeavor to get the facts of economic history straight above all others, the mechanical process of writing wrongs them too. There is no need to tell American readers what is false about the statement that at the time of the Open Door doctrine "already the United States considered China as one of the most important outlets for American capital and merchandise" (II, 154). The most villainous form of capitalism is, of course, "finance capitalism." It would serve no useful

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purpose to recapitulate all that is ascribed to this very late or putrid form of capitalism—whose ties with diplomacy, by the way, are very loosely established in this history—a concept that its original author, the late R. Hilferding, came practically to repudiate. But finance capitalism is made to carry the heaviest burden that an institution can bear now, that of war guilt, and it provides the readiest excuse for "war innocence." Since "finance capitalism" played "the preponderant role in the international relations of the twentieth century" and Czarist Russia was or had no financial power, she played only "a secondary role" in bringing on the First World War (II, 10-11). This Marxist *cum* "patriotic" view is Stalin's own historical thesis, one not a little different from the view of earlier Soviet historians like Pokrovski who *was* a historian and ascribed much war-responsibility to Russian, non-capitalistic land-hunger which we observe again today as a hardy perennial, presumably as innocent as Czarist "hunting for the frontier," both actions being "non-capitalistic."

Such "mechanical writing" is guided by what one expects of an adversary and his system rather than of the data of history. The authors maintain (I, 169) that diplomatic posts in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were as a rule held by the high nobility. While that would seem plausible at first sight, paralleling conditions in contemporary armies, actual examination of the diplomatic lists, incomplete as they are, show that bourgeois diplomats were far more numerous. This was in part because they possessed the necessary legal knowledge as well as literary-publicist abilities which noblemen did not generally acquire until the latter half of the eighteenth century; only then did they arrogate to themselves the well-paid and ostentatious diplomatic posts in ever greater numbers, something particularly true of Germany and Austria and a little less of France (I, 289-90) and Russia. This kind of diplomatic "representation" raises once more the question of whether such a corps of diplomats constitutes truly "bourgeois diplomacy which became the instrument of capitalist powers in order to defend their colonial conquests" (I, 294), or whether there is not here a true internal contradiction, one which Moscow's Marxism will not see, a contradiction between bourgeois interests and the ways

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and means by which "feudal" elements represented them diplomatically. On the other hand, one contributor at least insists (II, 11) that already before 1914 "the representative institutions of bourgeois democracy did not dispose of means sufficient to control the action of diplomacy . . . The parliaments had become simple tools in the hands of the executive power which were submissive to the whims of financial oligarchy." This must be squared, not by us, with Lenin's statement of the autumn of 1914 that "the German bourgeoisie, while circulating fables about a defensive war being waged on its part, chose in reality the moment most opportune for war in its own interests," or the declaration that the big German industrialists had themselves provoked the war of 1914 (III, 108). The question is nowhere raised in these three volumes whether the armies and navies of the bourgeois world had not reached the same irresponsible and unrepresentative position as its diplomats. As endangerers of the peace these institutions are let off very lightly on the judgment day of Moscow historiography (I, 105-06), except that those of the Germans are said to have brought under way at least one of the various cycles of rearmament (II, 161). This in turn would seem to reflect a good opinion of the Red Army which is the absolute *mot d'ordre* in Moscow.

Another such mistake induced by plausibility rather than documentary proof may be cited. When in 1899 the Germans received their share of the Samoan Islands, they are said to have wanted a naval station. Actually they were not after such a station because their harbor of Apia did not lend itself to such a purpose; nor did they afterwards turn any of their share of the islands into such a station. The one and only and not too important station there was American Tutuila. Again, without verification, it is stated that William II landed at Tangiers from his yacht (II, 183), as one might have expected; actually he travelled on a Hapag steamer on this particular occasion. To what uncontrolled length such writing can go may be illustrated by the description of the Spa Conference of July, 1920. The nucleus of the story is that Seeckt appeared at Spa in uniform and that Lloyd George did not like this. "The representatives of Germany—the War Minister Heisler [Gessler] and General Seckt [Seeckt], the commander of the Reichswehr

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—presented themselves ostentatiously in full dress uniform" (III, 103). Actually, Gessler was a civilian and wore no uniform and the Reichswehr at that time had no full dress uniform. Why is this done? For the benefit of the version of Russo-German relations since Rapallo as presented here?

The vituperative uses to which Marxism lends itself, are strongly drawn upon for the enemies of Soviet diplomacy: Neville Chamberlain is "a typical representative of that group of those business schemers who, in order to preserve the advantages of their own social class, are disposed to sacrifice the national interest. Closely allied with the metallurgical and chemical concerns of the city of Birmingham, he was one of the magnates of English finance. That is why he showed himself such an obstinate partisan of peace at any price" (III, 623). Among the French politicians of 1939 and later, Bonnet is "allied to the Bank of Lazare Frères" and deep in financial speculations during the Munich crisis of 1938; Flandin represents big capital (III, 639, 647, 661). Léon Blum, chief of the French Socialist Party, "was born of a family of rich Jewish bankers and was himself a big capitalist . . . having acquired a fortune by defending a doubtful clientèle, co-proprietor of one of the most important big stores of Paris . . . It was not for nothing that his paper, *Le Populaire*, received financial support from a well-known liquor firm" (III, 595). Here is not the place to discuss what might be correct and relevant in these accusations, but rather to point out that by a strange coincidence it is the enemies of Soviet Russia that seem to be moved by economic interests while in the case of her friends this motive is not mentioned. Is "economic determinism" then politically determined? If so, what economic position and interest determine what political attitude?

As applied in Moscow, economic determination is often based on statements that are false or dubious: that Stresemann was at one time head of a chocolate trust (III, 268), when he was actually running a trade association; that Papen was a Prussian *hobereau* (III, 460), when he was actually a Westphalian Catholic; that "the Rhenish-Westphalian industrialists were equally favorable to the setting up of a Rhineland Republic" (III, 274), when the movement of separatism was

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really supported by quite different strata; that in the commercial relations between Russia and Germany in the 1870's "the German bourgeoisie" demanded on the one hand higher protective tariffs and still felt itself hurt by Russian protectionism (III, 88). This last statement ignores conflicts within this bourgeoisie, between trading, industrial and agrarian interests. Yet if there is any truth in the proposition that history and diplomacy are manifestations of complex social relationships, one would expect the Marxist interpretation to present a fairly accurate and detailed description of those relationships before proceeding to inference and propaganda.

Is it Marxism? There is even doubt that it is the Leninism of V. I. Lenin. What is called Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism is throughout brought in from the outside and applied to events in the diplomatic sphere, but nowhere deduced out of that sphere. At times this strikes one like the pasting of a paper Santa Claus, or an equally bearded Karl Marx, onto the stale gingerbread of old style diplomatic nationalist history. This is the very thing that Engels warned against when he wrote that "the materialistic method was being turned around into its opposite if it was not used as a guiding thread in historical studies but as a ready-made shibboleth into which the facts are made to fit."[11] The judgment of Marx and Engels on Russian history was certainly less favorable than it appears in this Moscow work. In the final balance, one could say, that what has been taken out of the ideological storehouse of Marxism are the vituperations and grunts of the "classics" rather than their brilliant lights. Thus Karl Marx is quoted as calling Emperor Henry VI "a canaille of the first order" (I, 128) and making Frederick II "spit" on the Papal interest (I, 131). I do not know whether Marx and Engels ever gave a definition of diplomacy—none is attempted here in nearly 2,000 tall pages—but to them diplomatic action was essentially of a commercial nature—"the pursuance of a definite purpose by waiting and experimenting, until the right moment has been reached, the diplomacy of the always open backdoor, of compromising and haggling, the swallowing of insults, if and when interest demands it, that '*ne soyons pas larrons,*' in one word: the mer-

[11] Mayer, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 479.

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chant everywhere. Gottfried Ermen [Engels' partner in business] is in his way as great a statesman as Bismarck, and if one follows the tricks of these great men, one is transferred again and again to the Manchester stock exchange."[12] But since Stalin is declared a "genius" not only in strategy but in diplomacy as well, that view of Engels might not be acceptable in present-day Russia even though it might help to explain the Georgian's tactics and successes at meetings like Yalta and Teheran where Roosevelt succumbed to some of the ancient tricks of Near Eastern bazaars.

By far the largest part of this work deals, as was to be expected, with the relations between the great powers. But it is amazing how completely the small nations can be left out of account, even in an age of what might be called monopoly diplomacy by the Big Three or Four. These relations are, in fact depicted as rather more absolutistic or monolithic than they actually have been.

Only a comparatively small final chapter (III, 727-838) is reserved for "the methods, tactics and organization of modern diplomacy." Neither in this, nor in any other chapter, is an attempt made to go back into the days of pre-State bolshevism. "Diplomat" was, before 1917, a *Schimpfwort* in Bolshevist circles, when, for example, Lenin, exasperated by party quibbles, would cry out that it was impossible to discuss party principles with Trotsky, "for he has no definite conceptions . . . He is to be unmasked as a diplomat of the basest metal."[13] About diplomatic education Lenin once remarked somewhat facetiously (or ferociously): "We have learned diplomacy in the struggle with the Mensheviks."[14] But once in power, the Bolsheviks also had to learn and embrace a good deal of old diplomacy, even though that fact does not earn men like Chicherin as much as an honorable mention. The credit system as evolved in Moscow makes Lenin and after him Stalin the geniuses of Russian diplomacy. It is Lenin whom this history calls the father of the thesis that a peaceful co-existence of the inter-

[12] Engels to Marx, April 27, 1867, in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* 12 vols., Frankfurt a. M., 1927-35, vol. III, Dritte Abteilung, p. 387.

[13] Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics, at Home and Abroad,* New York, A. A. Knopf, 1946, p. 51.

[14] David J. Dallin, *The Big Three,* New Haven, Yale, 1945, p. 84.

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national bourgeoisie with Soviet Russia is possible (III, 294). Since Lenin's statement, twenty-five years have gone by, enough for the men of Moscow to claim for it the strength of a tradition of their own.

Few other rules or traditions of diplomacy, Russian or non-Russian, seem so definitely stated or established here, although it might be possible for the reader to observe certain continuities of practice. The reviewer for example, has been struck by the long, though not unbroken, tradition of Russian diplomacy to insist in peace treaties that "rebels and deserters are not to receive protection from either contractant,"[15] when at the same time the usual peace treaty among Western powers contained forget-and-forgive clauses covering such partisans, a humanitarian tendency so sadly discontinued at Yalta. A beginning of this Eastern habit might be found in a treaty between Byzantium and Attila of 433 A.D. in which the Byzantines bound themselves to extradite the deserters and other fugitives (I, 83), and later steps in this direction could be marked (I, 119).

Another tendency in Russian diplomacy is also observable: the readiness to settle the war guilt question long before the war breaks out and to cry that the warmongers are at work, something that more polite pre-1914 diplomacy did not do and for which we have to thank the Russians, largely.[16] The Comintern is completely left out of the picture here (III, 133 for instance), but one can hardly avoid seeing its workings or those of its forerunners serving Russian interests, in such diverse institutions as the Russian-supported Swedish party of "Patriots" (I, 267) in the eighteenth century, the Polish "dissidents," or even the numerous Czarist princesses at the German courts who represented Czarism as zealously or effectively as any KPD.

Another, more ugly tradition of Russian political life, xeno-

[15] See the Peace Treaty of April 14, 1686, between Ivan and Peter, Czars of Muscovy, and King John of Poland; Jean Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens . . .*, 8 vols., Amsterdam, 1726-31, vol. II, Part 2, p. 125.

[16] To put the odium on the aggressor even more strongly, it is maintained that as a rule in diplomacy a declaration of war must precede hostilities and that the Japanese broke that rule when they attacked the Chinese in 1894 (II, 124), or the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904. Actually, only some ten wars of the 120 that took place between 1700 and 1872 were preceded by formal declarations. Sir J. F. Maurice, *Hostilities without Declaration of War,* London, 1883.

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phobia, that seems now returning to fuller force, finds some mention, early rather than recent, in the *History of Diplomacy*. While the Russians might find justification for their anti-cosmopolitanism, others could draw sociological conclusions from the materials given here. As modern Russia restricts movements of the diplomats in Moscow so severely in 1948, so tenth century Byzantium and Venice in their later stages limited the contacts of residing diplomats among their own people. Again, French absolutism topped its victory over feudal enemies at home by ending the latter's direct correspondence with foreign potentates. Seen along such lines of tradition, "Soviet democracy" reveals itself as absolutism, xenophobic absolutism which strives for the backing of "mass sentiment"; even though the latter had to be disregarded in the negotiations of the 1940's when, in spite of the "people's unwillingness" to let the supreme leader go abroad for negotiations, Stalin went to Teheran and Potsdam. (Such warnings by experienced servitors of heads of state notwithstanding, that "interviews between powerful sovereigns bring blessings only if they speak of nothing but the weather," some American democrats, calling themselves more radical than others, go on demanding that direct negotiations between Truman and Stalin be resumed.)

The fact of great sociological significance and historical consequence, that so many of the most important Russian diplomats of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries were of foreign origin or descent—from Czartorisky, Pozzo di Borgo and Capo d'Istria to Lieven, Brunnow, Nesselrode, Meyendorff, Mohrenheim, Giers, Jomini, and Lamsdorff, with Gortchakov of half-German descent—is not mentioned, much less explained, although the same condition is freely discussed as the state of Russian diplomacy under Ivan III (I, 221). On one occasion Giers, who seems to have been of Swedish or Jewish descent, is called German. "He endeavored constantly not to hurt the interests of Germany and to be agreeable to Bismarck. It is on such occasions that this mediocre man showed sometimes proof of initiative and sometimes acted absolutely as if he had been a German agent" (II, 63). It would demand too much from present-day Moscow to see in this a conservative cosmopolitanism or an absolutism that still knew

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whom to choose as an ally for its own preservation and welfare but whose decay set in when it opened its doors to Panslavism and militarism. The historians and their masters can no longer admit of Marxist cosmopolitanism and most of the Jews in Soviet diplomacy, who are most easily accused of it or of outright treason, are by now gone from the foreign service and from its history.[17]

This three-volume work on diplomacy would satisfy Old Russians like Pobiedonostsev and Katkov more easily than a Western historian. Katkov wrote to the Chief Procurator in 1887 on the occasion of a book on international relations by Tatistchev that "this was the first Russian work, written from the purely Russian standpoint, on present international relations . . . What a contrast when compared with the works on international law by Professor Martens, which are based on doctrines of foreign provenience and on a dissolvent cosmopolitanism."[18] It should be noted that Martens, and the whole Martens tribe in international law and diplomacy, in their days represented a community of international law and diplomacy, a "one world," helping, at Göttingen or Petersburg, to educate the diplomat of their days. Indeed, to judge by the qualifications that the *History of Diplomacy* demands of the modern diplomat, the latter is supposed to retain many of the features and accomplishments of that older school, for he must be

> a specialist in the most varied fields of science. He must know to perfection at least the two most important European languages, must know in detail the diplomatic history of modern times, must be an expert in the problems of international law, all this without prejudice to his general culture and his scientific, artistic and literary knowledge. All these qualities convey to him the esteem due to his rank and his dignity on the part of the government, the society and the diplomatic corps of the country where he is accredited and assure him the prestige indispensable in the exercise of his functions. And that is not all . . . (III, 810)

But the logical product—there may be a different outcome in some individual cases, at any rate—of the pedagogy of the

[17] For such a case, that of Soviet ambassador Helfand in Rome, 1940, see Hugh Gibson, ed., *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1946, pp. 275-6.

[18] Constantine Pobiédonostsev, *Mémoires, politiques, correspondance officielle*, . . . , Paris, 1927, p. 489.

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Moscow *History of Diplomacy* can only be a nationalist, inflexible, touchy[19] and retiring personnel, bound to the central office, diplomats even more completely under the spell and domination of the home office than modern diplomatic service generally produces. There will be less and less resistance to what the German diplomats, in exasperation, used to call their *Zentral-Rindvieh,* the bovine at the center, the immovable bureaucracy of the home office. The control over the Russian diplomat is made still more rigid by the party doctrine, and this *History of Diplomacy* is part of the indoctrination, since, providing a guide for conviction more than knowledge, it pictures Russian diplomacy pre- and post-Lenin, as foresighted, infallible, clever, "liberating," with nothing to admit, no faults or errors on one's own part, no help from any outside agency. One cannot fail to wonder whether this leaves any flexibility in diplomatic practice except possibly that involved in the *reculer pour mieux sauter.*

[19] Mme. Kollontai, Soviet Minister to Sweden, a writer in her own right, in October, 1939, had to protest to the Swedish foreign office against an article in *Social-Demokraten,* which cited as a commentary on the fourth division of Poland Voltaire's letter to Catherine II of 1772: "Have you, like other thieves, immediately begun to divide the spoils?" UP dispatch from Stockholm, Oct. 7, 1939.

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WHO GETS POWER AND WHY

By ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL

Harold D. Lasswell, *Power and Personality,* New York, W. W. Norton, 1948, pp. 262. $3.00.

Dinko Tomasic, *Personality and Culture in Eastern European Politics,* New York, George W. Stewart, Publ., 1948, pp. 294. $3.75.

Bertram Schaffner, *Father Land,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, pp. xv, 203. $3.25.

Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver, eds., *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture,* New York, Harper, 1947, pp. xx, 703. $6.50.

A FEATURE of Western ideology, particularly its American variant, is consciousness of tension between ideals and reality. One source of this tension is a propensity to seek social goals by way of adventitious motives. Education seeks marks not knowledge; business seeks profits not products; politics seeks power not the good life. To protest this lack of what Max Weber called substantive rationality, and to demand that first things be put first is labelled "idealism," while acceptance of the immediate incentive and disregard for the final end is labelled "realism."

Thus in political science the name "realistic" has been largely applied to that tradition which concentrates on power relations and assumes that its subjects behave as "political men," that is, that they strive to maximize power. The "realist" assumes that all men in politics share the same drive. So deeply ingrained is this identification of politics and power that it appears even in the unconscious where the state is a father symbol. It appears also in everyday idioms where to be in the government is "to be in power" and to go into politics means not to pave streets but to enter a game of hierarchical advancement. It appears also in scholarly thought. Unlike Aristotle, who defined the *polis* as that association formed for the highest good and which comprehends the rest, most modern scholars find in a monopoly of coercion the distinctive attribute of the state.

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The term "realistic approach to politics" may also be used in another sense to refer not to goals, but to the scientific objectivity of the observer. In this sense it need imply nothing about the value preferences of either the observer or the observed. For reasons that are partly semantic and partly social, however, there has been a tendency in the past for these two types of "realistic" analysis to merge. The willingness to look at and recognize naked power relations has been one of the earmarks of the scientifically objective scholar. He has found in power, as the economist has in value, an element in terms of which to develop a coherent and predictively useful theory. The analysis of politics which proceeds on the assumption of the power seeking *homo politicus* has been a very fruitful fiction. Like all such fictions, however, it provides only one of several possible partial analyses, and should be recognized as such.

It is one of the merits of the books reviewed here that they all recognize that attitudes towards power are culturally determined, and they ask the question which realistic political scientists have usually begged: who are the power seekers and how do they get that way? In other words, while these books are realistic in the sense of objectivity they do not indulge in the spurious realism of assuming that everyone is out for all he can get. Rather they set themselves the task of explaining why cultures and individuals differ in power hunger and in the extent to which they interpret interpersonal relations in power terms.

Of these four studies one is a general exposition of the characteristics of the power-seeking individual, two are case studies of national character, and one is a collection of essays oriented around the question of how to curb the quest for power while retaining the concomitant advantages of Western civilization. The general theory of the power seeker is best developed by Lasswell, who up to now has certainly made the most important contributions to this field. In *Psychopathology and Politics*[1] he showed by psychoanalytic case studies how motivations formed in the primary sphere during childhood are displaced into political ideologies and actions. Today it is axiomatic that such deep probing of unconscious motivations is needed to

[1] Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1930.

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understand the differences in political aspirations of persons and groups. Both the Schaffner study of how the Germans got that way and the Tomasic study of Yugoslavia are in large measure Freudian as are indeed all the writings of that genre. Perhaps no insight of twentieth-century political science will in the end prove so revolutionary and fruitful in the development of political science as the recognition of the fact that political acts may be explained in terms of unconscious personal meanings.

In so far as *Power and Personality* recapitulates this insight which had already been developed in *Psychopathology and Politics* it is not a similarly epoch-making book. This more mature statement is, however, in some ways better and more carefully formulated. A large part of the book is devoted to the clarification of terms and concepts. The book is thus more than just a monograph on the relation of power and personality. It is an elucidation of a systematic theory of power.

In Lasswell's terminology the *homo politicus* is the type wholly absorbed in advancing the value position of the "sacred me." Government comprises the institutions of power. But Lasswell avoids the pitfall of identifying this language of his own with common usage and existential reality. He goes right on to say that the pure *humo politicus* does not exist and that government in this sense is not the same as the institution commonly called *the* government. There is, he points out, government in private life as well as public.

Using this conceptual apparatus Lasswell then proceeds to classify types and sources of power. He avoids the common tendency to identify power with violence. "Political phenomena," he says, "are only obscured by the pseudo-simplification attained with any unitary conception of power as being always and everywhere the same (violence or economic power . . .)." Rather, in an able appendix written jointly with the logician Abraham Kaplan, he attempts to distinguish the various types of power and influence.

Power is defined as "participation in the making of decisions." These decisions may affect any one of several values such as respect, affection, wealth, or enlightenment. At the same time, these values may in turn be the sources of power.

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Thus one may have power because of having respect, affection, wealth, or enlightenment. In other words, each value is both a source of power and something which power can influence. Thus we get a series of possible combinations. There is, for example, power based on wealth and exercised over enlightenment, which is "advertising." There is also power based on enlightenment and exercised over wealth. This is "economic foresight."

Rigor of analysis in this book is, however, not limited to conceptual clarification. There is an excellent chapter on the variety of political roles and political types which contains a very useful classification of kinds of leadership. This analysis, of course, requires a vocabulary specialized in the interests of precision, but it is not a jargon chosen for pretentiousness. It is a vocabulary sufficiently precise to avoid the situation that crops up in the collection of essays on *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture* where each writer uses the term *power* in a different sense. Yet with the exception of the appendix, Lasswell's book could well be understood by any college graduate who is willing to concentrate, for Lasswell has chosen his words with an eye to popular appeal and has drawn his examples from a vast fund of interesting information about all times and places.

The most telling illustrative material, and indeed the most fruitful portion of the book, is the set of case studies of judges in terms of which Lasswell develops his hypotheses about the relationship of power and personality. Through these studies he shows in detail the projection of attitudes from the primary to the secondary sphere. The harsh conscientiousness of Judge X is related to his compulsive character resulting from overstrict and protective child training. Similarly the dramatic, erratic, judicial conduct of Judge Z and his fascist tendencies fit the traits of what Lasswell calls the dramatizing type (more ordinarily referred to as narcissism).

While each of these special types of leaders has individual idiosyncracies that are psychologically explicable, all of them also have in common one trait: a more than average striving for power. This demand for power also has its psychological roots. It arises, says Lasswell, from a need for assurance.

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> The accentuation of power . . . is compensation against estimates of the self as weak, contemptible, immoral, unloved. Personalities fit to participate in the democratization of society must love themselves enough to love all. Progressive democratization depends upon finding the ways of dealing with children which do, in fact, aid in the formation of democratic character.

This analysis of the motive of the power seeker, and the more general hypothesis that political acts have unconscious personal motivations have been in the last few years extensively confirmed in a series of monographs on national character. The results which Lasswell arrived at by the study of the individual leader can also be arrived at by the study of groups characterized by different patterns of authoritative relationships. An early and important study of these patterns is Horkheimer's *Autorität und Familie*.[2] At present most such research is an outgrowth of the current interest in establishing basic personality patterns of different national groups. Much of this work has been a result of wartime and postwar concern with international political strategy. As America's role in world affairs has grown we have become increasingly aware of the differences between people of different cultural backgrounds. We have become aware that the things that make Japanese or Germans surrender are different from the things that make Americans surrender; that the things that make Russions compromise are different from the things that make Americans compromise; and that the things that a German will feel about the exercise of power are different from the things an American will feel about the exercise of power. Differences of such obvious importance to international relations cried out for precise scientific investigation. The concepts of psychoanalysis and the techniques of anthropology together provided one fruitful channel for research into the relationship of personality and culture. A group of psychiatrists, psychologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists, largely centered around Columbia Univerity and the Museum of Natural History in New York, has in the past few years produced a number of remarkably fruitful monographs along these lines. There are the studies by Geoffrey Gorer and Ruth Bene-

[2] Max Horkheimer, ed., *Studien über Autorität und Familie*, Paris, 1936.

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dict on Japan, Geoffrey Gorer and Margaret Mead on the United States, Kecskemeti and Leites and Rodnick on Germany, Kardiner on a number of primitive cultures, and various others. To this list belong also two of the volumes here being reviewed: Schaffner's and Tomasic's. These two are particularly relevant to the problem of attitudes toward power. They both concern themselves with cultures out of which have come leaders marked by power mania.

Schaffner's book attempts to identify the traits of personality which inclined the Germans to accept Nazism. The study is based on a series of sentence completion tests given to Germans who were being screened for responsible positions. The sentence completion test consists of a series of phrases each of which is the start of a sentence and which the subject completes as he wishes. For example, the test might say "When a man expresses his political opinion, his wife should . . ." The replies of the Germans to this and other questions were indeed strikingly different from those one would expect from Americans, and within the German sample there was some variation between those of democratic and of Nazi inclinations. Sentences oriented around prestige and submission, subservience to authority and respect for discipline were, however, widespread throughout the group even among those who for one reason or another had not been Nazis. This emphasis on one's power position, says Schaffner, is related to a fundamental sense of insecurity in German culture which will make democratization difficult no matter who may be in power.

In similar fashion, the principal result of Tomasic's study is to identify by a careful study of Yugoslav politics and history some of the insecurity-producing factors which have given rise to a group of insatiable power-seekers who have kept that part of the world in turmoil for years. The two main rural strata in the Balkans, according to Tomasic, are the settled plowmen of the valleys and plains and the Ural-Altaic sheepraisers and horsebreeders who invaded Europe over the centuries. In what is now Yugoslavia the former are represented by the Zadruga culture and the latter by the Dinaric culture in the mountains. Dinaric culture accentuates power seeking, while Zadruga is marked by power indifference. The result has been that political

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life in this part of the world has been dominated by persons of Dinaric backgrounds and values. They have been ambitious, uncompromising, violent, and sectarian.

The Dinaric house or *kuća* is dominated by the arbitrary and absolute rule of the oldest male. Discipline is ruthless but inconsistent. The result is conflict between fathers and sons. Patricides and infanticides are frequent. Conceit and ambition are boundless. Group organization is therefore authoritarian but treachery and renegadism are frequent. Society is organized into a series of kućas, clans, tribes, and bands whose relations are marked by theft, warfare, torture, and treachery. These groups themselves tend to break up as a result of conflicts of leaders. These patterns of behavior are transferred into Balkan politics particularly by the urbanized Dinarics who, after moving to the cities, rationalize their struggles by means of Western ideologies.

These political patterns can be easily enough seen in the headlines that come out of the Balkans. Tomasic's book was apparently written before Tito broke with the Cominform since this event is never alluded to. But so closely does this branch follow the patterns of political behavior outlined by Tomasic that one constantly has the illusion that the book was written to explain recent Yugoslav events. One does not often find social science writing of such high predictive value.

The Dinaric robber bands of *haiduks* or *chetniks* evolve into politicalized guerrillas. These bands, since they lived by fighting and gloried in martyrdom, often succeeded in rising against hopeless odds from tragedy to victory. The bands of warriors might have a common enemy, the Turks, but nevertheless collaboration with the enemy and factional fights were common. Here we see in anticipation the whole pattern of the Mikhailovich-Tito conflict.

So too, Tito's behavior since the end of the war follows standard patterns. Tito was a disciplined Bolshevik, that is, a follower of an absolute leader, Stalin. But here the pattern of filial rebellion set in. Just as mediæval Dinaric kings were killed by their ambitious sons, just as Mikhailovich was betrayed by his son who fought with the Partisans and by his daughter who publicly accused her father of treason, so Stalin

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was betrayed by Tito. The Dinaric leader typically secedes to establish his own small sect of followers whom he then rules as ruthlessly as did the ruler against whom he rebelled.

The Dinaric leader is also characterized by utter self-confidence and by exhibitionistic pride. The amazing rebellion of Yugoslavia against the Russian Goliath was possible only under a political leader of the most sanguine temperament. Tito's self-magnification also comes out clearly in pictures recently published in *Life* and elsewhere of his magnificent costumes and residences. The Dinaric hero, according to Tomasic, dresses ostentatiously and flaunts decorations. Tito is now typical in this respect although he once dramatized the simple proletarian character of his movement and leadership. It took Stalin twenty years to shed his great coat. Tito has done it in three.

Tito's rebellion is only one of a series of current events that the reader will better understand through Tomasic's analysis of Balkan political patterns and personality. The Greek civil war and the phenomenal purges in the Albanian Communist Party fit neatly. The East European attacks on the Roman Catholic Church can also be better understood when one sees that they continue a policy of Dinaric rulers who, since the Middle Ages, found in the Church the one universalizing influence that tended to check self-aggrandizement and conflict. The successes and difficulties of collectivization in the satellite states are also clarified by the description of the communal organization of Zadruga society.

Zadruga society with its tightly-knit self-sustaining community offered a level of security which created no incentive for power seeking. The Zadruga peasants developed, according to Tomasic, a harmonious and well integrated way of life. They and the urban artisans of Zadruga origins therefore left it to the Dinarics to assume the leading political roles. When the Zadruga community began to disintegrate under the influence of the growth of a market economy the peasants finally became politically active. But their agrarian parties retained, according to Tomasic, the moderate and peaceful orientation of the people they represented. It is by the dominance of these ele-

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ments, therefore, that Tomasic feels that the turbulence of Balkan politics can be overcome.

Taking Schaffner's and Tomasic's books at face value, it is clear that they both present insights that might explain many puzzling phenomena in international politics. But we can hardly take either book quite at face value. Each presents a consistent and suggestive theory that may be regarded as an excellent example of the potentialities of the psychocultural approach. Each also illustrates the most important trap in this field, namely the ease of selecting facts to prove any proposition, and the difficulty of providing objective criteria of validity.

The bias of Tomasic's book is patently pro-Zadrugan and anti-Dinaric, pro-Croatian and anti-Serbian, pro-Roman Catholic and anti-Orthodox. Although some of Tomasic's facts have been challenged, it is not necessary to disprove any of them in order to assert that they have been so selected and presented as to exaggerate the polarity between Zadrugan and Dinaric culture. The contrast is not quite so black and white between the turbulence, violence, and power hunger of the Dinaric kuća and the security, peace, and power indifference of the Zadruga commune. One may well question whether the peasant parties of Eastern Europe were always models of democratic and liberal moderation. They were, of course, bulwarks (now destroyed) against terroristic tyrannies. But they too had their animosities, particularly against the representatives of urban culture. They were, therefore, in Poland, Roumania, and elsewhere, frequently anti-Semitic. The pogrom was not exclusively a Dinaric practice. Then too one might point out that peasant parties in Eastern Europe (like the farm bloc in the United States) did not always represent the ordinary peasant. Interests, sometimes not even rural, have frequently donned galluses or their Balkan counterparts.

Tomasic's book, while probably presenting a somewhat one-sided picture of personalities in different cultures by means of selection for emphasis of certain traits among the myriad present, presents large amounts of evidence. The same can not be said of *Father Land*. The report of the series of sentence completion tests is peculiarly fragmentary. Although results were statistically analyzed there is nowhere to be found a tabu-

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lation of the results. We are only given sample completions to a few selected questions. These results are filled out by a number of chapters on the German family and German personality patterns which are based on no special research and simply sum up the impressions of an intelligent observer. This kind of impressionistic writing on national character has a long history and its dangers are well illustrated by the amazing contrast between Schaffner's book and another book on the German character which appeared at almost the same time, David Rodnick's *Postwar Germans*.[3] Schaffner says that the father is the dominant authority in the German family; Rodnick says the mother. Schaffner says that childhood is a period of insecurity in the German family; Rodnick says one of security. Schaffner says the German child gets little by way of overt demonstrations of affection; Rodnick says much. Rodnick's is certainly a far more careful, thorough, and detailed study, but that does not necessarily make Rodnick's conclusions correct. The lines between the two theses are drawn distinctly and tautly. What is needed is not further assertion, but rather canons of proof.

There are such canons. Some of the relevant studies have been cautious and well documented. Lasswell's case studies based on well-tried psychiatric procedures carry conviction. "Some Psychological Hypotheses on Nazi Germany," by Paul Kecskemeti and Nathan Leites[4] is a model example of exhaustive documentation. Psychological tests such as TAT, Rorschach, etc., provide extensive opportunities for rigorous comparative studies. Even statements about the prevalence of certain ideas in a culture (which are usually among the vaguest and least documented of scholarly statements) can be tested by the new techniques of content analysis. Since every culture contains contradictory behavior of all kinds and since the differences between cultures are only in the statistical distribution of the different kinds of behavior, this field of personality and culture is one in which examples may be misleading and where careful assessment of the evidence is particularly necessary.

[3] New Haven, Yale, 1948.
[4] In *Journal of Social Psychology*, vols. 26, 27, 28 (Nov. 1947, Feb. 1948, Aug. 1948).

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The kind of evidence that is needed but often lacking may be illustrated by a gap in Tomasic's argument. The parallelism between the power orientation of Dinaric culture and of Balkan politics is clearly shown. It is certainly probable that this parallelism is a product of common child-training patterns. This supposition is capable of proof. Unfortunately, however, it is only assumed that the characteristics of child training and primary relationships among Dinaric herdsmen also prevail among Balkan urban strata which produce politicians. A valuable supplement to this volume would be a statistical study of the composition of the Yugoslav elite either now or before the war to demonstrate precisely the extent of their Dinaric ancestry. This might be further supplemented by studies of the family pattern of these urbanized Dinarics to determine to what extent arbitrary and inconstant paternal authority remained characteristic, to what extent pride, violence, etc. also remained characteristic; in short to what extent the rural patterns actually do continue. In areas such as Yugoslavia it is, of course, often forbidden to use the best techniques for gaining information. Rather than criticize the absence of certain information, one might wonder whether valid results can be obtained at all for areas where secretiveness is a deliberate policy. We find, however, that the information for making such studies is largely available even for those parts of the world behind iron curtains. Tomasic's book is a good example of what can be done by combining the knowledge had by immigrant groups with the information available from books and the insights of the social scientists. While Tomasic had the good fortune to combine the roles of social scientist and informant in his person, researches of this kind must often rely on second-hand data. This often distresses researchers used to more satisfying techniques of direct field observation. Naturally such observations are desirable when possible, but we should not be stopped by a fetish from attempting to get the answers to those questions for which answers are needed. Tomasic's book is partly based on field work, partly on written sources. It demonstrates that much can be found out by the intelligent scholar reworking existing materials with new techniques and concepts.

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Despite any criticisms one might wish to make of details of evidence, there seems little doubt on the basis of the total evidence accumulated in the books so far considered that we can now identify those personality factors which threaten to produce an overweening striving for power. If the drive to acquire autocratic power is indeed a compensation against estimates of the self as weak, then we may begin to find an answer to the question posed in the call for the seventh meeting of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion in their Relation to the Democratic Way of Life. "Western culture," the call says, "bears as one of its most characteristic features an emphasis upon the power element." It then asks, "How can we retain the essential advantages of our civilization, including its scientific and material assets, and yet bring the quest for power and the tendency toward aggression under control?"

To answer this or similar questions, whether they arise in reference to domestic or international aggression, the material now being accumulated by the psychocultural approach is of inestimable value. The policy maker can use both the key insights as to the nature of power drives, and the detailed cultural studies of particular areas. Indeed one might suggest that America's leading position in world affairs demands that we now systematically compile comparative information of a psychocultural kind for the entire world. Just as the best intelligence agencies of the past compiled detailed information on subjects ranging from the depths of rivers to folk customs, so we now need information on personality. Such information has in fact also been collected in the past, but only now for the first time do we know what questions to ask so as to go beyond mere common sense. Such information would be of particular value to American policy formers since, for various cultural reasons, they are particularly inclined to the form of provincialism which assumes that every street is like Main Street and every local leader like Babbitt. Americans more than most Europeans are apt to need the corrective of reliable cultural studies to realize the variety of ways in which men think and act. The beginning of a series of monographs of the kind needed is being made in such programs as Research in Contemporary Cultures under the late Ruth Benedict, and

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Margaret Mead. With such materials and with the appropriate desires on our part, perhaps our policy makers can devise measures that will exert influence but will not be taken as imperialist intervention. If political scientists choose to define their specialty to exclude the examination of this kind of sociological material they will be cutting themselves off from information that political policy makers need, and should want. The psychocultural approach neither invalidates nor replaces the traditional techniques of political science research. It adds one more tool to the stock of the political scientist.

It would, of course, be foolish to expect too much by way of practical results at this stage of the development of the analysis of personality and politics. We are only beginning to understand what makes individuals or nations voracious of power and what makes other individuals or nations accept domination. But even if we had full understanding, there would still be the inevitable gap between theoretical knowledge of scientific principles and the invention of practically desirable policies. It is no accident that the weakest portions of these books tend to be the practical ones. Any attempt to apply a general analysis to practical problems is likely to be less impressive than the original analysis. The complexities of concrete reality can never be adequately encompassed in any one theory.

The second part of *Power and Personality* which deals with the policies conducive to democratic leadership suffers somewhat as a result of these handicaps. It is nevertheless useful to the extent that it draws attention to the policy implications of certain facts which are usually disregarded by practical leaders. Perhaps fifty years hence policy makers will concern themselves with the role of unconscious motivations, now they seldom do.

In Tomasic's book to an even greater extent one might question whether the practical conclusions follow from the analysis. Since stability in Eastern Europe depends, according to him, on bringing peasant elements to the fore, and since conflict situations will bring the militant Dinarics to the fore, Tomasic concludes that American policy in this part of the world should be one of conciliation and not of containment of Russia and should be pro-Zadrugan. He fears that in a conflict situation

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"local trigger-happy puppets are inclined to assume a crusading zeal that may surpass the intentions of their masters, get out of control, and endanger and indeed upset the peace." This conclusion, however, is obviously based on many assumptions and by no means follows from the analysis. Tomasic's book might equally be used to support the thesis that American policy should now be to stimulate Dinaric type rebelliousness and separatism. Tomasic's book and the Tito experience show how such a policy is possible, and it is by no means clear that stability is what we should most desire for regions under Russian domination.

The fourth book here reviewed is a particularly good example of a somewhat naive approach to the solution of practical problems. The problem posed in the symposium on *Conflicts of Power in Modern Culture* is, as we have already noted, a crucial one which in effect summarizes the problem of all of these books. To determine how to retain a dynamic society without the evils of power seeking is a subject worthy of intensive research. That a conference can help answer the questions involved is, however, doubtful. Belief in associations and parliamentary procedure is so strong in our culture that it is sometimes assumed that they are appropriate not only as techniques of action but also as techniques of scholarship.

The assumption seems to be that if enough brilliant people are brought together in one room something will be discovered. The roster of participants was indeed brilliant; hence, many of the papers are excellent. The good ones, however, are usually summaries of what the author has said more fully elsewhere. Thus the papers of Hans Morgenthau, Charles Morris, Laura Thompson and Alice Joseph, and F. S. C. Northrop are all interesting because they represent the central thought and research of high-grade scholars who happened to have worked in seclusion on topics relevant to the conference.

A number of the papers in this collection deal directly with the problem of what makes men seek power and how they can be restrained. Among these we might single out Talcott Parsons' summary of the present state of relevant sociological knowledge. Other papers worthy of note are those by Howard Mumford Jones and Ralph Linton.

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The most valuable outcome of the Conference is probably to popularize in lay language a portion of what has now become a rather well worked out body of knowledge about the conditions of striving for power. In short there is coming to be a relatively reliable set of answers to the question posed by the Conference as to how to control the quest for power. Such works as Lasswell's and Tomasic's begin to identify those frustrations which must be reduced if absolute power is not to be demanded by some as the only acceptable reassurance against insecurity.

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RESEARCH NOTES

THE WAR CRIMES TRIALS

By FRANZ NEUMANN

AFTER four years of effort, the war crimes tribunals in Germany and Japan have completed their appointed tasks. Yet, in the extraordinary accumulation of documents and in the series of unprecedented judgments which remain as their legacy, they have posed as many problems as they have solved. Not only the decisions of the courts, but also the procedures employed and the evidence produced, have still to be studied and evaluated. The preparation of materials and the evolution of pertinent research projects is, in itself, a major undertaking. Indeed, it is one which calls for immediate and cooperative effort.

General Telford Taylor, Chief of Counsel for War Crimes at Nuremberg, and Dr. James Shotwell, Acting President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, have already engaged in preliminary studies of the manner in which the apparatus and results of the trials may be most usefully analyzed.[1] This research note attempts to explore further the possibility of reducing to order the mass of available data, and to outline the kinds of research projects that can evolve, once order is attained.

I

Collection and Cataloguing of the Records

The foremost task involves the collection and dissemination of materials.

1. The documents and transcripts of the International Military Tribunal have been published both here and in Great Britain.

2. Only miscellaneous publications exist as yet for the other trials. In Great Britain, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, Deputy

[1] See General Taylor's article on "The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials" in *International Conciliation* (April, 1949), no. 450.

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Chief Prosecutor, is supervising a War Crimes Trials Series, several volumes of which have been published.[2] In the United States a number of works are in preparation. None of these publications will, of course, be adequate for intense scholarly study. They contain merely selections of the countless documents and transcripts.

3. If the materials are to be properly utilized they must be systematically collected. Such a collection ought to include:

a) The documents and transcripts of the International Military Tribunal and of the Tokyo trial.
b) The documents and transcripts of the other 12 Nuremberg trials.
c) The trials carried out by British, French, and Soviet authorities before and after the enactment of Allied Control Council Law No. 10.
d) Representative trials held by military courts in the four zones of occupation.
e) Representative German trials (a very interesting one is that of the German tobacco king, Reemtsma, at Hamburg).
f) Representative trials against collaborationists in liberated countries (France, Austria [Guido Schmidt], Holland, etc.).

4. There is no reason why there should not be duplicate collections. Relatively little effort and money will be required to set up a complete collection of the trials if immediate action is taken. Any university interested in the problem should do so. Some institution should, however, prepare a complete list indicating what the sources are, where they are located, and how they can be ordered. To do this, the institution in question would employ a junior research assistant (preferably one formerly attached to the Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes) to prepare this document, and would have to circulate it among the interested universities and research centers.

[2] Among them, *The 'Peleus' Trial*, edited by John Cameron, London, William Hodge, 1948, and the *Trial of Josef Kramer and Forty-Four Others*, edited by Raymond Phillips, London, William Hodge, 1949.

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5. The next step would be the indexing of the material by the libraries concerned. The difficulties should not be under-estimated. They are quite considerable. I understand, however, that the Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes has indexed its materials. An investigation would determine whether this index can be utilized.

II

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

1. The first of the problems concerns the legal basis of the trials, particularly of the international trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo and the trials held on the basis of Allied Control Law No. 10.

The nature of the problem is known. I, therefore, need not discuss it here. But the significance of the problem is by no means appreciated. It is closely intertwined with that of Germany's international legal position.

Three theories are advanced:

a) The law under which Germany is being governed is that of the Hague Convention law of belligerent occupation.

b) Germany was and is in a state of *debellatio*. The occupants are thus the sovereigns in Germany. According to this theory, the International Military Tribunal was a German court (François de Menthon and Hans Kelsen).

c) The law under which Germany is being governed is a new international constitutional law of intervention which authorizes a government to interfere in the domestic affairs of any other country in order to maintain or restore liberty and democracy. This theory grants either a universal right of intervention (Western German jurists), or a limited right of intervention for the execution of the Potsdam agreement (Eastern German jurists).

No single rule emerges from the judgments of the various tribunals. But a number of views have been expressed, particularly in dissenting opinions.

The significance of the problem raised by the tribunals is threefold:

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a) It poses a question of positive international law. What is the legal basis of the tribunals, wherefrom derives the validity of the London Agreement of August 8, 1945 and of Allied Control Council Law No. 10?

b) What is and what should be the law of belligerent occupation? Clearly the Hague Convention cannot apply to the occupation of a country which the occupants desire to remodel from top to bottom. The problem then becomes one *de lege ferenda* and the views expressed during the trials as well as the judgments will provide excellent material for a solution of this most difficult problem (especially if contrasted with German practice and the practice of the Allied Powers after 1944).

c) The political significance of the various theories becomes increasingly clear. There are those who say that the trials have no legal basis at all. Some argue that they have a solid legal basis but that the principles upon which the trials rest, can and must be turned against the victors. Others insist that the trials have purged the Germans, who are now ready and willing to serve as allies of the West (or East) in order to implement the decisions against the East (or West).

A study of the reception of the trials in Germany thus has not only legal but immediate political signifiance.[3] More about this later.

2. The criminality of "aggressive war" stands in the foreground of many of the trials, yet no clear picture emerges as to what this term means. The concept of "aggressive war" is, of course, an old one. But one new element has been added to the old formulations, namely the threat to a nation's internal security structure ("indirect aggression").

The problem, whether a state can commit aggression by subversion of the internal structure of another nation, was fully discussed during the Anglo-Russian negotiations in the summer of 1939. The Soviets then demanded of the United Kingdom and France that the projected military alliance come into

[3] A Japanese professor has just published a volume in English denouncing the Tokyo trials.

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action in the case of "indirect aggression."[4] Since then the problem has been discussed in a rather haphazard manner. Mr. John Foster Dulles, in a speech delivered on May 6, 1948, before the Bond Club in New York, extended the concept of aggression still further. Not only is indirect aggression here comprised in the concept of aggression, but an international movement (international communism, as distinct from the Soviet State) is defined as an aggressor and various consequences derived from this novel point of view.

Clearly the problems raised by the extension of the concept of aggressive war are formidable in character. It is to be noted that the Brussels Pact contains a formulation which may be interpreted to mean a commitment by the participating nations to ward off indirect as well as direct aggression.

The trials dealt with the problem of indirect aggression in considerable detail. The techniques of indirect aggression, its significance in preparing direct aggression, its legal meaning, etc., are discussed in many places. The contribution of the trials must be evaluated.

3. The problem of aggression—in both its meanings—leads to that of the concept of conspiracy. Continental liberal legal thinking rejects the very conception of conspiracy as incompatible with the individualistic basis of criminal law. The decisive break on the European continent occurred in the Soviet purge trials where Mr. Vyshinsky first developed the modern and quite dangerous concept of criminal conspiracy. It is restated in Trainin's book.[5] The Nazis also began to amend the criminal code by introducing the concept of *Banden* (gang) crime. The conspiracy concept developed in the war crimes trials does not appear to fit any category: it is neither the Anglo-American conception of conspiracy nor Mr. Vyshinsky's which is equivalent to guilt by association.

The contribution of the war crimes trials must be evaluated and an attempt made to formulate the conspiracy concept in such a manner that it avoids the obvious dangers inherent in it.

[4] For a full discussion see L. B. Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude, 1938-1939*, London, 1948, p. 196.

[5] *Hitlerite Responsibility under Criminal Law*, by A. N. Trainin, edited by A. Y. Vyshinsky, translated by Andrew Rothstein, London, 1945.

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4. This leads directly to a discussion of individual responsibility for criminal acts committed by states. The underlying problem—who are the subjects of a modern law of nations—was recently restated by Philip C. Jessup.[6] I need not add to this discussion. But the answer to the question—what is positive international law—is by no means clear. The complexity of this problem can only be fully realized if we understand the universal trend toward a bureaucratization of society. Criminal responsibility can ordinarily be assumed only where the individual has a choice whether or not to commit an act on orders of superiors. But ever larger activities in modern society —regardless of its political structure—do indeed become bureaucratic and the choices tend to disappear. The contribution of the war crimes trials needs intensive study.

5. There are, of course, many more problems of international law dealt with in the trials which deserve fuller attention.

a) What, for example, are the rules of warfare according to the war crimes trials? In the case of submarine warfare (Doenitz judgment) the International Military Tribunal did not assess Doenitz "on the ground of his breaches of the international law of submarine warfare" because the British and American navies acted similarly. The view of the court may thus be interpreted to mean that three wrongs make one right, although the judges merely wanted to avoid the reproach of hypocrisy. The problem needs further study.

b) What is the value of the legal procedure adopted by the tribunals? It neither corresponds to Anglo-American rules of evidence, nor to the continental rules. A unique procedure was indeed developed. It would be worth while to analyze what the deviations from the two legal systems are, whether they are valuable, and in what direction they can be perfected for a permanent international criminal tribunal (see below).

[6] *A Modern Law of Nations*, New York, Macmillan, 1948, pp. 15-42.

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III

Problems of International Politics

1. The trials were conducted with several aims in mind: to punish German (Japanese) criminals; to deter other nations from breaking the peace or from committing crimes against humanity; to promote the cause of democracy in Germany and in Japan; and to help reincorporate the two countries into the world community.

It is the second problem that is, of course, of paramount significance. As the situation stands, the trials, if they remain isolated incidents in the history of international politics, have but little value. They were conducted by the victors and are thus exposed to the obvious reproach that they merely clothe naked power with the garb of right. In the absence of a permanent international criminal tribunal, the sincerity of the victors cannot be tested. Governments which resort to aggressive war obviously expect to be victorious and thus escape punishment. If, however, they lose the war and their responsible leaders are punished as a result of trials conducted by the victors, the victors can hardly escape having a charge of hypocrisy leveled against them.

Logically, only a permanent international criminal court could solve the problem and could possibly act as a deterrent. But that such a tribunal would in reality act as a deterrent is open to serious doubt. A court without an enforcing agency would be ineffective no matter how composed. It is still more difficult, in a period of bi-polarization in international politics, to get a powerful court standing above the contending power centers. We cannot, therefore, expect that any international criminal court could possibly act as a deterrent to future aggressive wars.

But it could perhaps do less and yet do something important. The jurisdiction of such an international criminal tribunal could be confined to the punishment of violations of the rules of warfare. We know from the proceedings of the war crimes tribunals that a number of Germans refused to carry out orders (or sabotaged them), if they were convinced that these orders were incompatible with the rules of warfare (assassina-

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tion of hostages, extermination, deportation). To a limited extent, therefore, humanitarian traditions and the deterrent effect of international law (received by means of the various armed forces manuals) retained some force even under conditions of a brutal totalitarian system.

It might thus be wise to define the rules of warfare and the rights and duties of the occupant, and to consider means and ways of establishing an international criminal tribunal with just such limited jurisdiction.

The war crimes trials will provide abundant material on the rules of warfare and the rights of the occupants, the type of court best suited to apply them, and the procedures to be followed.

2. The problem of punishing violations of internal legal rules transcends, however, the rules of warfare. With the adoption of the United Nations Charter on Human Rights and the outlawing of genocide quite serious problems, far more political than legal, will make themselves felt. It is fairly easy to enact a Human Rights Declaration, it is very difficult to live up to it and to enforce it.

The international legal problem is reflected in the domestic jurisdiction clause of the Charter of the United Nations.[7] It is essentially the principle underlying this clause which has prevented the International Military Tribunal from convicting defendants because of atrocities committed against Germans prior to the outbreak of the war.[8]

There seems to be no difficulty where the very violations of human rights constitute a threat to peace. Let us, in fact, assume that Article 2, paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter is no legal obstacle to the enforcement of human rights provisions. That still leaves the problem of enforcing international human rights provisions whose violation constitutes no threat to the peace.

No answer to this problem can be provided here.[9] However,

[7] See the discussion by Leland M. Goodrich, "The United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction," in *International Organization*, vol. III, no. 1 (February, 1949), pp. 14-28.

[8] Cf., Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-44.

[9] Perhaps the best statement of the difficulties involved in enforcing civil rights is that by David Riesman, "Civil Liberties in a Period of Transition," in *Public Policy*, vol. III, 1942, pp. 35-96.

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any discussion of the feasibility of an international criminal court ought to consider the advisability of extending the tribunal's jurisdiction to those violations of human rights which do not constitute a threat to the peace.

3. The records of the trials contain a wealth of material on the Versailles Treaty. That violations occurred was, of course, known, and much has been written about them. The extent to which the demilitarization provisions were circumvented is, however, quite amazing. We have now imposed a series of restrictions upon Germany, Japan, and the other vanquished countries. The problem of enforcing peace treaty provisions thus has very great actual significance. A systematic analysis of the trials will undoubtedly contribute a great deal toward preventing in the future circumventions and violations similar to those which occurred after Versailles.

IV

The War Crimes Trials, Dictatorship, and the German Problem

1. General Taylor's insistence that no future social scientist can possibly write or teach about Germany without having acquainted himself with the trials is, of course, fully true.[10] But the significance of the trials goes far beyond the interests of the specialist in the German area. The study of the war crimes trials is of the utmost importance to every social scientist who is interested in dictatorship.

a) The study of modern dictatorship must center in an analysis of those conditions of democracy which permit or facilitate the rise of caesaristic leaders. A student of these problems will find in the documentation of the trials rich materials on the following problems:

conditions under which group conflicts are transformed into class conflicts;

the impact of authoritarian economic organizations (trusts, cartels) upon the political process of democracy;

the sabotage of democratic processes if they tend to endanger vested interests;

[10] Cf., Taylor, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

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the change in status and psychology of the middle classes under the impact of technological change;
the decline in the militancy of the democratic labor movement;
the emergence of a moral lag—growing technological efficiency and declining morality;
the role of depressions and inflations;
the strategy and tactics of seizing power through democratic institutions.

These are six problems whose analysis I consider vital to an understanding of the processes which may lead a country from democracy to the acceptance of caesaristic leaders. Obviously, the social scientist will find no theory formulated in the trials. But he will find an abundance of illustrative materials.

b) The second group of problems will center in the alleged superiority of dictatorship over democracy. The trials are likely to reveal that the partisan conflicts in a democracy are replaced by clique conflicts in a dictatorship, conflicts far more disruptive than the clash of political parties. A study of such relationships as those between army and party, civil service and party, and business and party may show that the highly praised efficiency of a dictatorship is a myth. Such an analysis can be broadened and deepened so as to include other dictatorial governments. The research conducted by French and German scholars into the administrative efficiency of the *Ancien Régime* tends to strengthen my view that the democratic régime is superior even in regard to mere technical efficiency.

2. The effect of the trials upon present-day Germany is of crucial concern to the United States; for the United States, more than any other country, was the prime mover in the creation of the International Military Tribunal, and carried out its responsibilities under Allied Control Council Law No. 10 to a greater degree than any other power. Our political and moral investment in the trials is heavy. What will our burden be?

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a) There are, of course, groups in Germany—and quite considerable ones—which believe in the justice of the trials and the fairness of the proceedings. But they are not the influential groups nor do they dare defend the trials openly.

The powerful groups in Germany tend to use the trials as political instruments either to attack the West or to offer themselves as Allies against the East, or to attack all victorious powers. It is conceivable (and even likely) that the trials will play a role similar to the famous "War Guilt Lie" after 1918.

This possibility requires that a periodic analysis of German attitudes toward the trials be undertaken in order to have an index of the strength of German democracy and the revival of an aggressive nationalism.

b) The significance of the trials for analysis of the weak spots of German democracy is too obvious to need discussion. The problems discussed under IV, 1 are, of course, valid for Germany (and also for Italy and Japan).

V

The Utilization of the Materials

1. Some research is already in progress. The following studies are being carried out at Columbia University under my supervision. They are based on the materials contained in the documents and transcripts of some of the trials:

German Business and Nazism 1919-1933; an M.A. thesis;
German Business and Nazism 1933-1945; an M.A. thesis;
The German Police and the Nature of a Police State; a Ph.D. dissertation;
Purification in the Netherlands; a Ph.D. dissertation;
The German Civil Service and Anti-Semitism; an M.A. thesis;
Genocide and the Master Race; a project of Mrs. Olga Lang, formerly on General Taylor's staff. The project is being sponsored by the European Institute at Columbia University.

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At the University of Chicago, the Bettelheim-Janowitz team is carrying out a series of psychiatric studies relating to behavior in concentration camps.

2. It seems impossible and inadvisable to establish a Central Research Organization for the utilization of the materials. The trials cover diverse topics; the unity of the three major topics listed above is not an organic one, but was created by the trials. Besides, a single research center would be inadvisable in view of the tremendous variety of existing research organizations. It therefore appears preferable to use present facilities.

Finally, many topics (such as the problem of dictatorship, the problem of German democracy, etc.) are not susceptible to organized research.

3. To a limited extent, however, a coordination of research activities seems advisable.

a) An established institution might undertake a survey and prepare a list of the trials, indicate where and how the records can be obtained, and circulate the list among the libraries and interested research institutions.

b) A central index should be prepared on the basis of the document index prepared by the Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes.

c) International legal problems and problems of international politics are partly susceptible to organized research. The problem of an International Criminal Court may have to be handled in two different ways:

research will have to be carried out in order to analyze the contribution made by the Tribunals to the establishment of such a Court, its structure, jurisdiction, and procedure;

a committee will have to be formed composed of international lawyers and statesmen, to study the feasibility of such a proposal in the light of the present international situation.

The revision of the rules of warfare could be handled in a similar manner.

The reformulation of the law of belligerent occupation should be handled separately from the rules of warfare

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because of the radically changed nature of military occupation. Such a task will require the following:

research into the war crimes trials in order to discover what the various courts held to be the rights and duties of the occupants;
a systematic analysis of occupation practices after World War II;
the establishment of a committee of international lawyers for the purpose of laying out the program and of formulating the law.

d) Projects concerned with the following issues should receive financial support if they go beyond the stage of the M.A. or Ph.D. thesis:

the legal basis of the trials;
the concept of aggressive war;
the concept of conspiracy;
the problem of criminal responsibility;
the procedures followed by the tribunals;
Peace Treaty enforcement;
the impact of the trials upon Germany;
contribution of the trials to an understanding of the problem of dictatorship;
contribution of the trials to an understanding of the German problem.

The projects should be supervised by appropriate institutions.

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COOPERATIVE AREA RESEARCH*

By FRANZ MICHAEL and STANLEY SPECTOR

THE so-called "area" approach to academic work, developed during the last decade, has raised problems both in teaching and research. These problems have been essentially different in the field of teaching on one hand, and in the field of research on the other. The term "area study," as used here, is meant to imply a full understanding of a society, or of socially related facts in a geographical setting, however defined. The tools for this understanding are the various academic disciplines, each of which emphasizes one aspect of the social complex under study. The object of area work is the integration of these various approaches. In area teaching, the student is given the opportunity to integrate the various aspects to which he is exposed. In addition he ought to achieve mastery over the methods of at least one discipline. In area research, the integration must take place within the work itself. Thus, area research requires the development of specific methods of integrating the work of men in various disciplines.

An attempt at such integration has been made in the Modern Chinese History Project. We have selected modern China as our subject, by which we mean the Chinese society in transformation under the impact of the West. We have realized the necessity of giving historical depth to the social factors under investigation. And so we have divided our social complex into periods, working from the middle of the last century up to modern times. The periods to be used as major focal points are selected according to the major social events. Specifically, we have concentrated our first efforts on the so-called T'aip'ing period, in the middle of the nineteenth century, at which time major social transformations are observable. These phenomena must be studied and described through the methods and point of view of various disciplines.

* This paper is based upon the experiences of the Modern Chinese History Project, Far Eastern and Russian Institute, University of Washington. The Director of the Institute is Dr. George E. Taylor.

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For each area program the question arises as to which disciplines may be best employed. In principle an area program may be based upon integrating the work of from two to all disciplines which concern themselves with factors of social significance. In our experiment we have thus far included representatives of the fields of political science, history, economics, sociology, philosophy and literature (linguistics, anthropology and geography will be brought in).

Area work lends itself ideally to a coordination of work by scholars from the area in question with other specialists. This international aspect is of notable importance since it broadens the outlook of the entire group. Although knowledge of the language (or languages) of the area is a *sine qua non* for practically all participants, it is recognized that men with intensive disciplinary specialization will rarely acquire the intimate grasp and proficiency that can be gained by a scholar whose mother tongue is the language of the area. Our own project is based upon a balanced division of Chinese and Western scholars, and in our opinion, this type of international cooperation in research has great possibilities for the future.

Given the subject and the concept of a cooperative approach, the problem facing the Project was the development of specific methods of integration. It was obviously not enough to have each member of the group search out a subject of his own field or interest to be collected later into a symposium. Nor could the barriers of isolated effort be overcome merely by placing the participants at adjoining desks or cubicles and having a process of integration take place by osmosis over cigarettes and luncheons. From the beginning, each move had to be planned and worked out by the group as a whole.

The first major step taken was the development of a system of categories for the classification of the potential material. These were working-categories of an objective nature, into which the materials could be divided on a logical basis so that they could be easily found again. They were not writing-categories into which the materials would later be divided in the analytical stage. In the very process of discussing and establishing these categories, the group members, even at this early stage, went beyond the formal framework of their respective

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disciplines. Categories presented themselves which under examination disclosed new disciplinary interrelations, and in pursuing these interdisciplinary relationships new categories were derived, (e.g., military ideology; bureaucratic industry; social and racial background of examination candidates and officials; natural calamities; local rebellions). We do not claim that these categories could not have been developed under several of the existing disciplines, but in their juxtaposition they reflected the conjunction of disciplinary concepts.

These categories for data secured the material and made it easily available for multiple uses not always foreseeable at the moment.

The next step to be undertaken was the division of the larger problem into various aspects lending themselves to specific disciplinary approaches. The nature of specific phenomena, such as gentry, or the T'aip'ing movement, is determined by raising such questions as: what was the political organization of the T'aip'ings; what was their military organization; what was their financial system; what was their ideology, etc.; and requiring the representative of the discipline in question to answer them. Such questions were then organized into larger disciplinary studies (e.g., "The Impact of the T'aip'ing Rebellion upon the Manchu Financial System").

This division could once more create the danger of a "cubby-hole approach" wherein each member would concern himself only with his own topic. However, the relationships of the various topics were adjusted continually through a system of coordination. This involved a constant exchange of materials, findings and thought, which influenced all the individual studies and directed them toward a common objective.

The final stage is a synthesis in which the various analytical studies blend into a description of the whole social complex.

Although these theoretical considerations seem rather obvious at this time, the actual problem of putting them into practice required several years of painstaking, and often painful, experiment. The exchange of thought and information had to be formalized. For this purpose a seminar, meeting at frequent, regular intervals, was instituted. This faculty research seminar has become the main working organ of the research

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group. It is fulfilling the various functions of integration already described. In this seminar we determined, first of all, the working categories. They were initially suggested by various members, and adopted after general study and discussion. When actually put to use, the original categories showed weaknesses and inadequacies which had to be brought to the attention of the seminar and corrected from time to time. Thus the seminar was responsible for establishing the categories, and is now carrying on the constant task of refinement, addition and correction. The second responsibility of the seminar was the consideration and distribution of research lines. In the process the larger disciplinary studies were blocked out through discussion and distributed to the group members through common consent. In the course of research, constant adjustments and changes had to be made, with new divisions and delegation of specific problems to the various members. The division having been made, the seminar still remained the directing point for the research. In the course of the disciplinary research of the individual member, each step was reported to the seminar, which provided criticism and advice. The initial data and concepts, the developing outline of the monograph study, the bibliography, the material chapter by chapter, were presented by each member in rotation. These presentations were ruthlessly criticized by the group, and many supplementary sessions became necessary at times to reconstruct the study. These discussions brought forth the principal advantages of cooperative effort, with the result that each member consciously realized how much his own work had been shaped by the effort of all. It took time to overcome the customary deference to scholarly sensibilities, both American and Chinese. But we now feel that the absence of such restraints is essential to success.

As the studies and monographs progressed, new plans were continuously evolved to fill gaps in the overall treatment as they emerged. With the advance in the treatment of the materials, and the elucidation of many issues, work could begin on synthesis, taking the form of a volume which would integrate the findings and concepts gained by the group.

These exchanges of thought in seminar produced many ideas

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which could not immediately be utilized in the specific studies. It was therefore of the utmost importance to keep a written record of the discussions for later reference.

As a result of the seminar, each member was fully informed about the thinking and status of work of each participant. Thus it was possible for each member to determine, in going through materials for his own study, which items were of interest to other members of the group. Consequently he was in a position to collect materials not only for himself, but for his colleagues. This led to the second most important form of work integration: the establishment of a pool of information to which all contribute and from which all take. A system was developed for the standardized recording of information on specially prepared forms. The traditional treasure of the scholar is his private collection of research data, inaccessible to, and undecipherable by, others. In group work it was found necessary to limit this type of academic private property. The data, consisting of bibliographical information, every type of research finding, translations, analytical comments and interpretations relating to his own or any other member's interest, were placed on form cards by each member. These cards were then classified according to the categories agreed upon by the group. Since the majority of the data referred to more than one category item, a careful system of cross-references was established. All new cards were exhibited to the entire group, and if not immediately needed by the writer, were kept in readiness for general use in a file based upon the categories. Contributions to this file are also made by others than the members of the research group. A collection of information has been thus built up, which aside from its immediate use to the research group and project, will be of value in any future work.

Cooperation in such an enterprise is only possible when the individual members of the group are completely willing to consider and share in group decisions. The spirit of cooperation, which may have to be nursed at the beginning, will grow in a successful team. There are always differences of opinion, which are not only desirable but particularly necessary and fruitful in group work. However, many of these differences often disappear in a constant give-and-take. The willingness to cooperate will

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depend first of all on the mutual respect of members for each other. It has been found that cooperation in itself provides great academic satisfaction and personal enjoyment. An *esprit de corps* has been created through which the individual identifies his own interest with that of the group and makes group achievement his own. To attain this, assurance has to be given each member that his professional contribution will be realized and given full and proper credit. This raises the question of authorship. Group work in itself can only have group authorship, and our main volumes containing the work synthesis will appear under the authorship of the Modern Chinese History Project, and all contributing members will be listed and given recognition for their part in it. Monographs for which individual members take the main responsibility will appear under the authorship of such members; however, the debt owed to the cooperating group will be clearly expressed. In addition, all particular contributions will be given special mention.

Our remarks up to this point have been concerned with the group work of the research faculty. However, the achievement of favorable results has led us to look upon the program as an excellent training ground for graduate students. There is, of course, no reason why thesis work cannot be included within the scope of the plan. The highly qualified student who is willing to undertake his thesis work within this program, and who is found acceptable, must make his own independent contribution. But, like faculty members, he has the advantage of constant criticism from the point of view of all disciplines. Moreover, he has the privilege of witnessing and participating in the group work with access to all Project materials. In turn, he is obligated to follow the group rules of cooperation.

An area program on the Far East has the responsibility of introducing to the Western world a description of social situations, the sources for which are in languages little known (nor long remembered). Much more than in the case of Western areas will it be necessary to make available documentary material in the English language. In addition to appendices of such translated documentary material to monographs and group works, it has been regarded by our project as a major

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responsibility to make available a special series of documentary publications and research tools. This responsibility for producing translations and research aids would have weighed heavily upon the research faculty; therefore we developed a translation division attached to the research project. This division was designed with the additional purpose of giving American and Chinese fellows and assistants special training in the language and in the use of the materials. Both alone and in teams, they were entrusted with the translation of documents, the preparation of charts, glossaries and other tools; and the working out of smaller, mechanical research problems. A language class in documentary translation attached to the project was added for the American graduate students, while the Chinese students are given training in the interpretation of the material and the expression of such interpretations in English. For these purposes the Institute provides a considerable number of fellowships and assistantships.

Of the main studies in progress, the monographs of James Wu on "The Impact of the T'aip'ing Rebellion upon the Manchu Financial System," of Vincent Shih on "The Ideology of T'aip'ing Tien Kuo," of Dr. Hellmut Wilhelm on "Political Ideology in Nineteenth Century China," and of Franz Michael on "Military Organization and Power Structure of China during the T'aip-ing Rebellion," have been fully or partially completed in the first draft and are being made ready for publication. Other monographs are still in preparation. Six shorter studies were completed last year and presented at professional meetings. Three of them have been placed for publication.

In the translation program the first project has been the translation of all available T'aip'ing documents and the collection of all former translations. These are now ready for publication in two volumes. The second project has consisted of compiling and indexing the contents of all memorials of the twenty-two leading Chinese statesmen of the period. Of these, the six most important compilations have been completed. The third project is an itemized abstract of the *Ch'ing Shih Lu* (*Veritable Records of the Ch'ing Dynasty*). The two latter projects are not only of immense value to our research teams, but will constitute important publications. Lastly, a

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number of specific smaller research problems and translations have been undertaken. Among them is a translation of Chinese Communist documents, *Cheng Feng Wen Hsien,* from the year 1941.

At this stage of our experiment we have come to the following conclusions with regard to the validity and value of the cooperative research undertaken. Working in the group, each individual member exceeded in scope and quantity of work what he could have accomplished on his own. A common stock of concepts verified by the various members' disciplines have been developed. Yet divergencies in interpretation remain. We believe that the methods developed can be applied to any area problem, and suggest that they may lead to a new concept of social research, a new synthesis of the social sciences.

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